mirror of
https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefik-llmgateway.git
synced 2026-10-12 04:54:45 +00:00
I2 (controller ruling): docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-19-traefik-llmgateway-design.md
described limits as "user overrides group" / "user limit if set, else
group limit, else unlimited" — stale relative to the actual, already-correct
implementation (buildLimitScopes/checkAndCount evaluate every configured
scope and return the first violation). Amended §2 and §7 to state both
scopes are enforced together and the tighter bound wins.
I4 (manifest hedge): .traefik.yml's groups.default was a bare "{}",
the shape empirically reproduced as a decode failure outside this
repo's own (necessarily simplified) yaegi-check harness. Changed to
"providers: []" — same zero semantics, no longer a bare empty object.
manifest_test.go's JSON mirror and drift-check token updated to match;
make yaegi-check still passes (its YAML-subset parser already handles
an inline "[]" under a nested map key).
M9 (pricing provenance): pricing.go's built-in table comment replaced
"verify before release" with a real source note (each provider's own
published list prices, recorded 2026-08, approximate). README's limits
section gained the matching caveat and points to the "pricing" config
override for billing-grade accuracy.
Doc nits: README's Kubernetes section now says the example manifest
applies cleanly once Traefik's CRDs (Middleware, IngressRoute) are
installed, rather than claiming kubectl apply -f works unconditionally.
README's Security notes section no longer claims "no auth-event logging
at all" (see the paired fix: commit) — it now describes what is logged
and that key material never appears.
This commit and its sibling fix: commit are the final wave closing out
the whole-branch review findings for docs/superpowers/sdd/2026-08-20-
traefik-llmgateway.
Gates: go test ./... -count=1 (-race) green, gofmt -l . empty, go vet
clean, make yaegi-check OK, golangci-lint 0 issues.
234 lines
8.6 KiB
Go
234 lines
8.6 KiB
Go
package traefikllmgateway
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"sort"
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)
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// Target kinds handleTargetProxy and resolveTarget dispatch on, selecting
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// which of Config.MCPServers/Config.Agents to consult and which of
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// group.allowsMCP/group.allowsAgent authorizes the request.
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const (
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targetKindMCP = "mcp"
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targetKindAgent = "a2a"
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)
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// defaultAgentCardPath is the well-known A2A agent-card path used for a
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// listed agent whose AgentConfig.Card is empty.
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const defaultAgentCardPath = "/.well-known/agent-card.json"
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// mcpServerListing is one entry of GET /v1/mcp/servers: the configured
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// name and the gateway-relative URL a client proxies requests to it
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// through.
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type mcpServerListing struct {
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Name string `json:"name"`
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URL string `json:"url"`
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}
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// agentListing is one entry of GET /v1/agents: the configured name, the
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// gateway-relative proxy URL, and the gateway-relative agent-card URL.
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type agentListing struct {
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Name string `json:"name"`
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URL string `json:"url"`
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Card string `json:"card"`
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}
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// handleMCPServers implements GET /v1/mcp/servers: grp's visible MCP
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// servers, filtered by group.allowsMCP and sorted by name for a
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// deterministic response.
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func (g *Gateway) handleMCPServers(w http.ResponseWriter, grp *group) {
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names := make([]string, 0, len(g.cfg.MCPServers))
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for name := range g.cfg.MCPServers {
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if grp.allowsMCP(name) {
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names = append(names, name)
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}
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}
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sort.Strings(names)
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servers := make([]mcpServerListing, len(names))
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for i, name := range names {
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servers[i] = mcpServerListing{Name: name, URL: "/mcp/" + name}
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{"servers": servers}) // headers already committed; nothing useful to do on encode failure
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}
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// handleAgents implements GET /v1/agents: grp's visible A2A agents,
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// filtered by group.allowsAgent and sorted by name for a deterministic
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// response. Each entry's card URL is the agent's own gateway-relative
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// proxy URL plus its configured card path, defaulting to
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// defaultAgentCardPath when AgentConfig.Card is empty.
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func (g *Gateway) handleAgents(w http.ResponseWriter, grp *group) {
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names := make([]string, 0, len(g.cfg.Agents))
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for name := range g.cfg.Agents {
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if grp.allowsAgent(name) {
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names = append(names, name)
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}
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}
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sort.Strings(names)
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agents := make([]agentListing, len(names))
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for i, name := range names {
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cardPath := g.cfg.Agents[name].Card
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if cardPath == "" {
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cardPath = defaultAgentCardPath
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}
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agents[i] = agentListing{Name: name, URL: "/a2a/" + name, Card: "/a2a/" + name + cardPath}
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{"agents": agents}) // headers already committed; nothing useful to do on encode failure
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}
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// targetRoute splits path into a target name and its rest path for the
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// "/{prefix}/{name}/{rest...}" MCP/A2A convention (prefix is
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// targetKindMCP or targetKindAgent), reusing passthroughRoute's own
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// EscapedPath-based, traversal-safe splitting twice: once to peel prefix
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// off path, once more on what is left to peel name off rest. ok is false
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// when path's first segment is not exactly prefix, or when no name
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// segment follows it — a bare "/mcp" or "/mcp/" carries no target name to
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// route to.
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func targetRoute(path, prefix string) (name, rest string, ok bool) {
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first, remainder, matched := passthroughRoute(path)
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if !matched || first != prefix {
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return "", "", false
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}
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return passthroughRoute("/" + remainder)
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}
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// resolveTarget looks up name in the Gateway's MCP-server or agent
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// registry, selected by kind (targetKindMCP or targetKindAgent). known is
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// false when no such name is configured at all; allowed reports whether
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// grp's glob patterns permit it, meaningful only when known is true.
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func (g *Gateway) resolveTarget(kind, name string, grp *group) (targetURL string, allowed, known bool) {
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switch kind {
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case targetKindMCP:
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tc, ok := g.cfg.MCPServers[name]
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if !ok {
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return "", false, false
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}
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return tc.URL, grp.allowsMCP(name), true
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case targetKindAgent:
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ac, ok := g.cfg.Agents[name]
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if !ok {
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return "", false, false
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}
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return ac.URL, grp.allowsAgent(name), true
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default:
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return "", false, false
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}
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}
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// handleTargetProxy implements the MCP/A2A target proxy routes:
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// "/mcp/{name}/{rest...}" and "/a2a/{name}/{rest...}" reverse-proxy rest,
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// verbatim, to name's configured target URL (Config.MCPServers[name].URL
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// or Config.Agents[name].URL, per kind). It shares its proxy mechanics
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// with handlePassthrough via proxyUpstream — hop-by-hop header stripping,
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// the client's own gateway credential stripped, SSE-safe incremental
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// flushing, a dead upstream mapped to 502, a canceled client context
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// logged rather than surfaced. Unlike handlePassthrough, no upstream
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// credential is injected (proxyUpstream's injectAuth argument is nil):
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// MCP servers and A2A agents are in-cluster targets that trust the
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// gateway's network position, not a per-provider API key the gateway
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// holds on the caller's behalf. Accounting is likewise passthrough-only —
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// a target request is counted by checkAndCount below, but its response
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// is never teed off for token/cost usage extraction.
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//
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// Checks run: unknown name (404) before group authorization (403) before
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// capability/path checks (Upgrade→501, traversal→400) before rate limits
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// (429/503) — matching handlePassthrough's own order (403 → 501 → 400 →
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// limit), with the unknown-name check slotted in first since a target
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// proxy request can fail that in a way native passthrough never can. A
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// request rejected on any check before checkAndCount must never burn the
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// caller's or their group's rate-limit quota for a call that was never
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// going to reach the upstream.
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func (g *Gateway) handleTargetProxy(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, u *user, grp *group, kind, name, rest string) {
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targetURL, allowed, known := g.resolveTarget(kind, name, grp)
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if !known {
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writeOAIError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "invalid_request_error", "unknown "+kind+" target")
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return
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}
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if !allowed {
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writeOAIError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "invalid_request_error", kind+" access denied")
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return
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}
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if r.Header.Get("Upgrade") != "" {
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writeOAIError(w, http.StatusNotImplemented, "invalid_request_error", "websocket/upgrade passthrough not supported")
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return
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}
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if hasTraversalSegment(rest) {
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writeOAIError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_request_error", "invalid path")
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return
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}
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scopes := buildLimitScopes(u, grp)
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if violation := g.limiter.checkAndCount(scopes); violation != nil {
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writeLimitViolation(w, violation)
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return
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}
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upstreamURL := targetURL
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if rest != "" {
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upstreamURL += "/" + rest
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}
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if r.URL.RawQuery != "" {
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upstreamURL += "?" + r.URL.RawQuery
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}
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g.proxyUpstream(w, r, upstreamURL, g.targetClient, nil, false, kind+" target (name "+name+")")
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}
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// validateTargetURLs checks every configured MCP-server and agent entry at
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// construction: the map value must be non-nil, the name must pass
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// validateConfigName (the same character-set, dot-only, and reserved-name
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// rules as a provider name — an MCP server or agent is routed at
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// "/mcp/{name}/*" or "/a2a/{name}/*", so the same shadowing risk and the
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// same "." / ".." directory-traversal-segment risk both apply), and the
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// target URL must parse (url.Parse) and use an http or https scheme. A nil
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// value, invalid name, or malformed/non-HTTP target is rejected once, here,
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// at construction — a constructor error, not a nil-pointer panic or a 502
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// the first time some caller happens to address it.
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func validateTargetURLs(cfg *Config) error {
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for name, tc := range cfg.MCPServers {
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if tc == nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: mcpServers %q: config must not be nil", name)
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}
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if err := validateConfigName("mcpServers", name); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := validateTargetURL(tc.URL); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: mcpServers %q: %w", name, err)
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}
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}
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for name, ac := range cfg.Agents {
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if ac == nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: agents %q: config must not be nil", name)
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}
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if err := validateConfigName("agents", name); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := validateTargetURL(ac.URL); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: agents %q: %w", name, err)
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// validateTargetURL reports an error unless raw parses as a URL with an
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// http or https scheme.
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func validateTargetURL(raw string) error {
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u, err := url.Parse(raw)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid url %q: %w", raw, err)
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}
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if u.Scheme != "http" && u.Scheme != "https" {
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return fmt.Errorf("url %q must use http or https scheme, got %q", raw, u.Scheme)
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}
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return nil
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}
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