lukaszraczylo f405340d32 test(integration): exercise passthrough model/path restriction under Yaegi ...

SHOULD-7, round 3, 2026-08-22 review -- a report-correction gap, not a
code defect (the reviewer verified peekPassthroughModel/
scanTopLevelModel and allowsPassthroughPath directly via the repo's own
Yaegi harness). Every group/user this integration suite drove native
passthrough through ("eng", "limited", "hotreload") left models and
passthroughPaths unset, so hasModelRestriction() was always false and
allowsPassthroughPath's non-empty-list branch was never reached -- the
suite itself never exercised security findings 2/3's enforcement code
under a real Traefik+Yaegi process, contrary to an earlier claim.

Added a dedicated "restricted" group (models: ["gpt-mock"],
passthroughPaths: ["v1/chat/completions"]) and its own user (dave),
isolated from every other group/test in this file, plus
TestPassthroughModelAndPathRestriction: an allowed model on the allowed
path (200, proxied for real), a denied model on that same allowed path
(403 -- proves the model peek runs), and an ALLOWED model on a path
outside the allowlist (403 -- proves the path check alone, not the
model check, is what fires there). Verified passing via `make
integration` against the real docker-compose stack.

2026-08-22 14:50:06 +01:00

..

dynamic.yml.tmpl

test(integration): exercise passthrough model/path restriction under Yaegi

2026-08-22 14:50:06 +01:00

traefik.yml

test(integration): config hot-reload proof via directory provider

2026-08-20 23:37:53 +01:00