# traefik-llmgateway
A [Traefik](https://traefik.io) middleware plugin that turns a Traefik
instance into a multi-provider LLM gateway: one endpoint, several upstream
providers, per-user API keys organised into groups, request/token/cost
limits, and a registry plus authenticated proxy for in-cluster MCP servers
and A2A agents.
The plugin is self-contained. It has no sidecar and no companion service.
It runs as a [Yaegi](https://github.com/traefik/yaegi)-interpreted Go
module, the same way [`traefikoidc`](https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc)
does, configured per-middleware in Traefik's dynamic configuration.
**Status:** stable at **v1.0**. Configuration keys, endpoints, and
behaviour now follow semver — breaking changes wait for a major release
instead of landing between patches, as they could before 1.0.
Feature-complete, all gates green (unit tests, `-race`, `yaegi-check`,
integration), and published to the Traefik Plugin Catalog. One behaviour
worth knowing before you deploy: [streaming is delivered buffered rather
than token-by-token](#known-limitations) under the current Traefik + Yaegi
combination.
## What it is
- A unified, OpenAI-compatible surface (`/v1/chat/completions`,
`/v1/embeddings`, `/v1/models`) that translates requests and responses to
and from Anthropic's and Google Gemini's own wire formats, so any
OpenAI-SDK-compatible client can talk to all three providers through one
API shape.
- An Anthropic-compatible surface (`POST /v1/messages`) for Anthropic SDK
clients — including Claude Code — to talk to any configured provider in
Anthropic's own Messages API shape; see [Anthropic Messages API
(`/v1/messages`)](#anthropic-messages-api-v1messages).
- Native passthrough per provider (`/{provider}/...`) for callers that want
a provider's own wire format untouched, with the gateway injecting that
provider's own API key and still enforcing auth and limits.
- Per-user API keys, organised into groups that control which providers,
models, MCP servers, and agents a user can reach, plus request/token/cost
limits enforced per user and per group.
- A registry and authenticated reverse proxy for MCP servers and A2A
agents, so those can sit behind the same gateway, the same auth, and the
same group-based visibility rules as the LLM traffic.
Request flow diagram (mermaid — renders on GitHub)
```mermaid
flowchart LR
Req["incoming request"] --> Route{"route
ServeHTTP: path+method dispatch"}
Route -->|"a recognized route:
/v1/models, /v1/chat/completions,
/v1/embeddings, /v1/mcp/servers,
/v1/agents, /mcp (federated),
/mcp/name/...,
/a2a/name/..., or /providerName/...
for a known provider"| Auth["auth (per branch)
identify(): key digest lookup"]
Route -->|"no route matches"| Fallback["passthroughUnknown ? next : 404
never calls identify()"]
Auth -->|"no match"| E401["401 authentication_error"]
Auth -->|"user, group"| Branch{"branch"}
Branch --> Models["GET /v1/models"]
Branch --> Unified["POST /v1/chat/completions
POST /v1/embeddings"]
Branch --> Registry["GET /v1/mcp/servers, /v1/agents"]
Branch --> MCP["MCP/A2A proxy"]
Branch --> Federated["POST /mcp (federated JSON-RPC)"]
Branch --> Passthrough["native passthrough"]
Unified --> Resolve["resolve model
registry.resolve"]
Resolve -->|"unknown/denied"| E404["404 / 403"]
Resolve --> Limit1["limiter.checkAndCount"]
MCP --> Limit2["limiter.checkAndCount"]
Federated --> Limit4["limiter.checkAndCount"]
Passthrough --> Limit3["limiter.checkAndCount"]
Limit1 -->|"over budget"| E429["429 / 503"]
Limit2 -->|"over budget"| E429
Limit3 -->|"over budget"| E429
Limit4 -->|"over budget"| E429
Limit1 --> Exec["execute: translate + call adapter"]
Limit2 --> ExecProxy["execute: reverse proxy"]
Limit3 --> ExecProxy
Limit4 --> ExecFed["execute: answer locally, or
JSON-RPC call(s) to backend server(s)"]
Exec --> Account["account: usage, cost"]
Account --> Resp["respond to client"]
ExecProxy --> Resp
ExecFed --> Resp
Models --> Resp
Registry --> Resp
```
Every route the plugin recognises is handled entirely inside the
middleware — `next` (the router's configured backing service) is only
reached when a request matches none of the plugin's routes and
`passthroughUnknown` is `true`.
## Quickstart
### Static configuration
The plugin is in the Traefik Plugin Catalog, so the catalog form of static
configuration works:
```yaml
experimental:
plugins:
llmgateway:
moduleName: github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefik-llmgateway
version: v1.0.3
```
You can also load it as a
[`localPlugin`](https://doc.traefik.io/traefik/plugins/#defining-a-local-plugin),
mounting this repository's source into the Traefik container at
`/src/github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefik-llmgateway`.
That form tracks a branch instead of a pinned release, which suits
development and any deployment that wants to follow `main` — see
[`examples/docker-compose.yml`](examples/docker-compose.yml) for a
working, tested setup that does exactly this:
```yaml
# traefik static config (traefik.yml / --experimental.localPlugins.*)
experimental:
localPlugins:
llmgateway:
moduleName: github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefik-llmgateway
```
The catalog form above pins a released tag instead, which is the better
default for production: a pod restart cannot pick up a change you have not
deployed on purpose.
### Dynamic configuration
A minimal single-provider middleware, one group, one user:
```yaml
http:
middlewares:
llmgateway:
plugin:
llmgateway:
providers:
openai:
type: openai
apiKey: "env:OPENAI_API_KEY"
models: ["gpt-5-mini", "gpt-4o"]
groups:
default:
providers: [] # empty = every configured provider is allowed
users:
inline:
- name: alice
group: default
apiKey: "env:LLMGW_KEY_ALICE"
```
> Write an "allow everything" group as `providers: []` (an explicit empty
> list), not a bare `{}`. See the note at the top of
> [`examples/kubernetes.yaml`](examples/kubernetes.yaml) — confirmed
> against Traefik's **file provider**, twice, with this exact plugin build:
> a bare `default: {}` fails plugin construction with
> `expected a map, got 'string'`; `default: {providers: []}` loads cleanly.
> Not tested against the Docker/ECS label providers or the Kubernetes CRD
> provider — no claim either way for those. An explicit empty list means
> the same thing as an empty object (all values allowed), so writing it
> this way costs nothing even where the bug does not apply.
Attach the middleware to a router the same way as any other Traefik
middleware. The router's backing service is never actually reached unless
`passthroughUnknown: true` and the request matches none of the plugin's
routes — a small dummy service (`traefik/whoami`, or any always-up
internal service) is enough.
Call it:
```sh
curl http://llm.example.com/v1/chat/completions \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $LLMGW_KEY_ALICE" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"model":"gpt-5-mini","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}'
```
## Full configuration reference
Every limit or visibility list follows one convention throughout: **empty
or omitted means unlimited / all**. Field names below are the exact JSON
keys the plugin's Go structs expect (`llmgateway.go`); Traefik's dynamic
config accepts them as YAML, which decodes to the same JSON shape.
### `Config` (top level)
| Field | Type | Default | Semantics |
|---|---|---|---|
| `providers` | `map[string]ProviderConfig` | — | Required, at least one entry, or the plugin refuses to construct. |
| `groups` | `map[string]GroupConfig` | `{}` | Optional. A user references one group by name; an unknown reference is a construction error. |
| `pricing` | `map[string]ModelPricing` | `{}` | Per-model USD/1M-token overrides, keyed by model id (bare or `provider/model`). Merged over, not replacing, the built-in table (`pricing.go`). |
| `mcpServers` | `map[string]TargetConfig` | `{}` | MCP server registry; see [MCP/A2A](#mcp-and-a2a). |
| `agents` | `map[string]AgentConfig` | `{}` | A2A agent registry; see [MCP/A2A](#mcp-and-a2a). |
| `users` | `UsersConfig` | — | Inline and/or file-backed API-key holders. With none configured, every request is unauthenticated and gets 401. |
| `redis` | `RedisConfig` | — | Distributed limit-counter backend. Omitted means in-process counters only (per-replica, approximate across multiple Traefik instances). |
| `retry` | `RetryConfig` | `{}` (disabled) | Same-provider retry for transient upstream failures — see [Retry](#retry). Omitted or `enabled: false` means no retry: every request makes exactly one upstream attempt, byte-identical to a gateway built before this field existed. |
| `failover` | `FailoverConfig` | `{}` (disabled) | Cross-provider failover for a bare model id more than one configured provider serves — see [Failover](#failover). Omitted or `enabled: false` means no failover, byte-identical to a gateway built before this field existed. `enabled: true` opts in; a deployment with no overlapping providers behaves exactly as before regardless of this setting either way. |
| `requestTimeout` | `string` (Go duration) | `5m` | Progress-based upstream request timeout, applied to every provider adapter call, native passthrough, and the MCP/A2A target proxy — see [Request timeout](#request-timeout). **Behavior change for every deployment**: before this field existed, no timeout was set at all, so a provider that accepted a connection and then went silent hung the request forever. A provider's own `requestTimeout` (`ProviderConfig`) overrides this. Empty means the default; a value that fails to parse, or parses to zero or a negative duration, is a construction error. |
| `cache` | `CacheConfig` | `{}` (disabled) | Opt-in Redis-backed response cache for unified non-streaming chat/embeddings — see [Caching](#caching). Omitted or `enabled: false` means no caching, byte-identical to a gateway built before this field existed. |
| `breaker` | `BreakerConfig` | `{}` (every default) | Per-provider discovery circuit breaker — see [Provider health (discovery circuit breaker)](#provider-health-discovery-circuit-breaker). Every field is individually zero-means-default; a provider whose discovery never fails is unaffected regardless of what this block contains. |
| `targetHealth` | `TargetHealthConfig` | `{}` (probes off) | Health tracking for MCP servers and A2A agents — see [MCP and A2A](#mcp-and-a2a)'s "Target health" section. Passive recording and exposure stay on regardless of this block; `enabled` gates only the active probe sweep. |
| `admin` | `*AdminConfig` | `nil` (disabled) | Read-only admin dashboard — see [Admin](#admin). `nil` or `enabled: false` means the `/admin*` routes are not registered at all. |
| `metrics` | `*MetricsConfig` | `nil` (disabled) | Prometheus text-exposition endpoint — see [Metrics](#metrics). `nil` or `enabled: false` means the metrics route is not registered at all. |
| `modelAliases` | `map[string]string` | `{}` | Operator-defined alias id → target model id — see [Model aliases](#model-aliases). Omitted or empty means no aliases, byte-identical to a gateway built before this field existed. |
| `modelMeta` | `map[string]*ModelMetaConfig` | `{}` | Per-model context-window and cost overrides, keyed by exact `provider/model` or a bare model id — see [Model metadata](#model-metadata). Omitted or empty means no overrides; every model's metadata still resolves through discovery and the built-in table. |
| `passthroughUnknown` | `bool` | `false` | `false`: a request matching none of the plugin's routes gets a 404 JSON envelope. `true`: it falls through to the router's own backing service. **Does not cover the three media routes** — see the upgrade note below. |
| `maxInFlightBodyRequests` | `int` | `0` (self-tuned) | Caps how many unified/media requests may concurrently be inside their own request-body read+decode step — see [Body-admission limit](#body-admission-limit). `0` self-tunes from the host's own `GOMAXPROCS`; a positive value pins an exact cap instead, clamped to a maximum of 10,000. |
> **Upgrading from v0.1**: `POST /v1/images/generations`, `POST
> /v1/audio/speech`, and `POST /v1/audio/transcriptions` are now handled by
> the gateway itself, unconditionally — see [Image and audio
> endpoints](#image-and-audio-endpoints). They no longer fall through to
> `next` even when `passthroughUnknown: true`. A v0.1 deployment that
> served its own backend on any of these three exact paths, relying on
> passthrough to reach it, must move that backend to a different path
> before upgrading to v0.2 — the gateway now intercepts these paths first,
> every time.
Provider, `mcpServers`, and `agents` map **keys** (names) must match
`^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$` and must not be `v1`, `mcp`, or `a2a` — those names are
reserved because they would shadow the gateway's own fixed routes
(`/v1/...`, `/mcp/{name}/...`, `/a2a/{name}/...`); a name that collides is
a construction error, not a silently-unreachable provider. A `nil` map
*value* under any of `providers`, `groups`, `mcpServers`, or `agents` is
also a construction error, never a panic (`providers.go`, `mcp_a2a.go`,
`auth.go`).
### `ProviderConfig`
| Field | Type | Default | Semantics |
|---|---|---|---|
| `type` | `string` | — | Required: `openai`, `anthropic`, or `gemini`. `openai` also serves any OpenAI-wire-compatible provider (Grok, DeepSeek, a local vLLM/Ollama gateway, ...) via `baseUrl`. |
| `baseUrl` | `string` | Per type: `https://api.openai.com`, `https://api.anthropic.com`, `https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com` | Trailing slash trimmed. |
| `apiKey` | `string` | — | Secret form: literal, `env:VAR`, or `file:/path` — see [Secret forms](#secret-forms). An `openai`-type provider resolving to an empty key is a valid **keyless** upstream (no `Authorization` header sent) — useful for a local model server with no auth. `anthropic` and `gemini` reject an empty resolved key at construction. |
| `discoveryInterval` | `string` (Go duration) | `1h` | Minimum time between discovery refreshes for this provider. Only meaningful when `discovery: true`. Refresh is checked on incoming requests, not by a background timer, so this is a floor rather than a schedule — see [Model routing](#model-routing). Invalid duration string is a construction error. |
| `models` | `[]string` | `[]` | Explicit model ids this provider serves. Combined with any discovered ids. |
| `discovery` | `bool` | `false` | Pull the provider's own model-listing endpoint at startup, then no more often than `discoveryInterval` when requests arrive. A discovery failure is logged and non-fatal; construction still succeeds on `models` alone. |
| `metadataPath` | `string` | `""` (no metadata capture) | Only read by `openai`-type providers. A second endpoint, fetched alongside `discovery`, that reports per-model context length — for example `/api/v0/models` on an LM Studio server. Must start with `/` when set (checked at construction). See [Model metadata](#model-metadata). |
| `passthrough` | `*bool` | `nil` (enabled) | `nil` or `true`: this provider's native passthrough route (`/{name}/...`) stays reachable, unchanged from before this field existed. `false`: the route is disabled — `ServeHTTP` treats it exactly like an unconfigured provider name, falling through to the ordinary unknown-route 404 without even reaching authentication. Does not affect the MCP/A2A target proxy, which has its own routing prefix. |
| `requestTimeout` | `string` (Go duration) | Inherits the top-level `requestTimeout` (`5m` if that is also unset) | Overrides the global request timeout for this provider alone, including its native passthrough route — see [Request timeout](#request-timeout). An explicit override always wins over the global default. Empty inherits; a value that fails to parse, or parses to zero or a negative duration, is a construction error. |
### `GroupConfig`
| Field | Type | Default | Semantics |
|---|---|---|---|
| `limits` | `*LimitsConfig` | `nil` (unlimited) | |
| `providers` | `[]string` | `[]` (all) | Glob-matched (`path.Match`) against a provider's configured name. |
| `models` | `[]string` | `[]` (all) | Glob-matched, exactly as given — no automatic `provider/` prefix stripping. Both the bare and provider-prefixed forms of a model id are checked, so a pattern like `gpt-*` matches a client request for either `gpt-5-mini` or `openai/gpt-5-mini`. |
| `cache` | `*bool` | `nil` (inherit) | Overrides the top-level `cache.enabled` setting for this group's requests — see [Caching](#caching). `nil` inherits the global setting; `false` opts the group out even when caching is globally on; `true` opts the group in, but only when the top-level `cache` block is actually configured (a construction error otherwise — there is nothing to inherit `ttl`/`maxBodyBytes` from). |
| `cacheTTL` | `string` | `""` (inherit) | Sets the TTL written when this group's own request populates a cache entry — see [Caching](#caching). It does not scope entries to a group: cache entries are shared across every group that can reach the model (see the Caching section's "User identity is not part of the key" note, which applies to group identity too), so this controls a write's TTL only, not which group can read the entry. Empty inherits the global TTL. A set value must be a valid, positive Go duration (`"30s"`, `"5m"`), and requires the top-level `cache` block to be configured — a construction error otherwise, the same "nothing to inherit from" reasoning as `cache: true` above. |
| `mcpServers` | `[]string` | `[]` (all) | Glob-matched against a configured MCP server name. |
| `agents` | `[]string` | `[]` (all) | Glob-matched against a configured agent name. |
| `passthroughPaths` | `[]string` | `[]` (all) | Restricts which REST path this group's **native passthrough** requests may address — glob-matched (`path.Match`) against the path segment after the provider name (e.g. `v1/files` for a request to `/openai/v1/files`). Empty is allow-all, matching every other field on this table — **not** `["*"]`: `path.Match`'s `*` does not cross `/`, so a literal `["*"]` pattern denies every multi-segment `rest` (almost all real passthrough traffic). Leave this unset to actually allow everything. See [Unified vs. passthrough](#unified-vs-passthrough) for the related model-authorization rule. |
### `LimitsConfig`
All six fields default to `0` (unlimited). A negative count, or a cost
that is negative, `NaN`, or `±Inf`, is a construction error.
| Field | Type | Window |
|---|---|---|
| `requestsPerMinute` | `int64` | Fixed 1-minute window, UTC. |
| `requestsPerDay` | `int64` | Fixed calendar-day window, UTC midnight to midnight. |
| `tokensPerDay` | `int64` | Fixed calendar-day window, UTC. |
| `tokensPerMonth` | `int64` | Fixed calendar-month window, UTC. |
| `costPerDayUSD` | `float64` | Fixed calendar-day window, UTC. |
| `costPerMonthUSD` | `float64` | Fixed calendar-month window, UTC. |
Every window enforces correctly on the in-process fallback too, not only Redis —
see [Limits and accounting](#limits-and-accounting)'s "Fallback" bullet for the
retention floor that keeps `tokensPerMonth`/`costPerMonthUSD` a true calendar-month
budget rather than a rolling one when Redis is absent or down.
A user's own `limits`, when set, are checked **in addition to** their
group's limits, not instead of them — a request is refused the moment it
breaches whichever of the two is tighter. A user with no `limits` of their
own is governed purely by their group's — see
[UserConfig](#userconfig).
### `UsersConfig`
| Field | Type | Default | Semantics |
|---|---|---|---|
| `file` | `string` | — | Path to a JSON users file, merged over `inline` and hot-reloaded — see [Users file](#users-file-format). |
| `inline` | `[]UserConfig` | `[]` | Resolved once at plugin construction. |
### `UserConfig`
| Field | Type | Default | Semantics |
|---|---|---|---|
| `name` | `string` | — | Required. |
| `group` | `string` | — | Required; must reference a configured group, or construction fails. |
| `apiKey` | `string` | — | Secret form (see [Secret forms](#secret-forms)); must resolve non-empty and unique across every inline **and** file-sourced user. |
| `limits` | `*LimitsConfig` | `nil` (governed by group's limits alone) | When set, enforced alongside — not instead of — the group's own limits; both scopes are checked, and the request is refused by whichever is breached first. |
| `admin` | `bool` | `false` | Grants access to the read-only admin dashboard — see [Admin](#admin). Works the same for an inline or a file-sourced user. An admin user is otherwise ordinary: their own keys, group, and limits still apply, including to the admin routes themselves. |
### `RedisConfig`
| Field | Type | Default | Semantics |
|---|---|---|---|
| `address` | `string` | — | Required when the `redis` block is present at all. `host:port`, RESP protocol — works against Redis, [Valkey](https://valkey.io), or [Dragonfly](https://www.dragonflydb.io). |
| `password` | `string` | `""` (no `AUTH`) | Secret form. |
| `db` | `int` | `0` | Must be `≥ 0`. Sent via `SELECT` on every new connection. |
| `failOpen` | `*bool` | `true` | `true`: a Redis error switches that operation to the in-process fallback store and logs (rate-limited to once per 30s). `false`: a Redis error returns 503 instead of enforcing against a non-shared fallback. |
### `RetryConfig`
| Field | Type | Default | Semantics |
|---|---|---|---|
| `enabled` | `bool` | `false` | `false`: no retry, one upstream attempt per request. `true`: retry per [Retry](#retry) below. |
| `attempts` | `int` | `1` | Retries performed **after** the first try, not the total try count. `1` (default) allows one retry — two tries total. The maximum, `3`, allows three retries — four tries total. A value outside `1`-`3` is a construction error. |
| `backoff` | `string` (Go duration) | `250ms` | Base wait before the first retry; doubles on each further retry, capped at 2s per wait. Invalid duration string is a construction error. |
### `CacheConfig`
| Field | Type | Default | Semantics |
|---|---|---|---|
| `enabled` | `bool` | `false` | `false`: no caching, `/v1/chat/completions` and `/v1/embeddings` behave byte-identically to a gateway built before this field existed. `true`: caching per [Caching](#caching) below — requires `redis` to be configured too, or it silently stays off (one warning logged). |
| `ttl` | `string` (Go duration) | `5m` | How long a cached response stays valid. Invalid duration string is a construction error. |
| `maxBodyBytes` | `int` | `1048576` (1MiB) | Largest response body still eligible for caching; a larger one is skipped (never stored, never an error). Maximum accepted value is `8388608` (8MiB) — above that is a construction error. |
### `BreakerConfig`
| Field | Type | Default | Semantics |
|---|---|---|---|
| `failureThreshold` | `int` | `3` | Consecutive failed discovery refreshes that open the breaker — see [Provider health](#provider-health-discovery-circuit-breaker). `0` uses the default. Must be between `1` and `100`, or construction fails. |
| `openDuration` | `string` (Go duration) | `1m` | Base backoff a newly opened breaker waits before its first half-open probe; doubles on every further failed probe, capped at `maxOpenDuration`. Invalid or non-positive duration string is a construction error. |
| `maxOpenDuration` | `string` (Go duration) | `6h` | Ceiling on the backoff `openDuration` doubles into. Must be `>= openDuration` and no more than `24h`, or construction fails. Deliberately longer than the default `discoveryInterval` (1h) — see [Provider health](#provider-health-discovery-circuit-breaker) for why a value at or below `discoveryInterval` suppresses nothing. |
### `TargetHealthConfig`
Configures the opt-in active probe sweep for MCP servers and A2A agents
— see [MCP and A2A](#mcp-and-a2a)'s "Target health" section for the full
contract. **Passive recording from real proxied traffic, and exposure
through `GET /admin/api/targets` and the `llmgateway_target_healthy`
gauge, stay on unconditionally, regardless of this block.** `enabled`
gates only the background probe sweep.
| Field | Type | Default | Semantics |
|---|---|---|---|
| `enabled` | `bool` | `false` | `false`: no MCP server or A2A agent is ever proactively contacted for health purposes. `true`: the active probe sweep runs, at most once per `probeInterval`, triggered by `/metrics`, `GET /admin/api/targets`, `GET /v1/mcp/servers`, or `GET /v1/agents` — never a timer. |
| `probeInterval` | `string` (Go duration) | `60s` | Minimum time between sweeps. Must be between `10s` and `1h`, or construction fails. |
| `failureThreshold` | `int` | `3` | Consecutive failed observations (probe or passive traffic) that mark a target unhealthy. `0` uses the default. Must be between `1` and `100`, or construction fails. |
### `AdminConfig`
| Field | Type | Default | Semantics |
|---|---|---|---|
| `enabled` | `bool` | `false` | `false`: the `/admin*` routes are not registered at all — a request to any of them falls through to the plugin's existing 404/`passthroughUnknown` handling like any other unrecognized path. `true`: the read-only dashboard per [Admin](#admin) below. |
### `MetricsConfig`
| Field | Type | Default | Semantics |
|---|---|---|---|
| `enabled` | `bool` | `false` | `false`: the metrics route is not registered at all. `true`: the Prometheus text-exposition endpoint per [Metrics](#metrics) below. |
| `path` | `string` | `/metrics` | Overrides the served path. |
| `allowedCIDRs` | `[]string` | `[]` (no bypass) | CIDR blocks whose source address may scrape without an admin key — e.g. `10.42.0.0/16` for a cluster's pod network. **Never use a whole RFC1918 range like `10.0.0.0/8`** — see [Metrics](#metrics)'s own warning for why that specific mistake is live-reproducible, not theoretical. |
| `modelLabel` | `bool` | `false` | Adds a `model` label to the provider attempt/failure counters, breaking them out per `(provider, model)` pair. Off by default: a deployment with hundreds of discovered model ids is a series-count explosion waiting to happen. |
### `ModelPricing`
| Field | Type | Semantics |
|---|---|---|
| `inputPerM` | `float64` | USD per 1,000,000 input/prompt tokens. |
| `outputPerM` | `float64` | USD per 1,000,000 output/completion tokens. |
### `ModelMetaConfig` (a `modelMeta` entry)
Overrides one model's **context window and per-token cost for display**
— see [Model metadata](#model-metadata). Distinct from `ModelPricing`
above, which drives request-cost **accounting**: `modelMeta` never
changes what a request is billed.
| Field | Type | Default | Semantics |
|---|---|---|---|
| `contextTokens` | `int` | `0` (not overridden) | A value of `0` falls through to the next layer (discovery, then the built-in table) instead of overriding with an unknown value. Must not be negative. |
| `inputCostPerMTokMicroUsd` | `int64` | `0` (not overridden) | Input cost per 1,000,000 tokens, in micro-USD (1 USD = 1,000,000). `0` falls through to the next layer unless `free` is set. Must not be negative. |
| `outputCostPerMTokMicroUsd` | `int64` | `0` (not overridden) | Output cost per 1,000,000 tokens, in micro-USD. Same fallthrough rule as `inputCostPerMTokMicroUsd`. |
| `free` | `bool` | `false` | `true` sets both cost fields to an explicit, known zero — distinct from leaving them at `0`, which means "not overridden here, keep looking." Rejected at construction when combined with a non-zero cost field (contradictory). |
### `TargetConfig` (an `mcpServers` entry)
| Field | Type | Semantics |
|---|---|---|
| `url` | `string` | Required; must parse with an `http` or `https` scheme, checked at construction. |
### `AgentConfig` (an `agents` entry)
| Field | Type | Default | Semantics |
|---|---|---|---|
| `url` | `string` | — | Required; same URL validation as `TargetConfig`. |
| `card` | `string` | `/.well-known/agent-card.json` | Path appended to the agent's gateway-relative proxy URL for its A2A agent-card listing. |
### Secret forms
Every `apiKey`/`password` field accepts one of three forms
(`secrets.go`):
- **Literal** — the value itself, used as-is. Fine for local/dev; avoid for
anything real.
- **`env:VAR`** — read from environment variable `VAR` on the Traefik
process. Errors if unset or empty.
- **`file:/path`** — read from a file, trimmed of surrounding whitespace.
Errors if unreadable or the trimmed content is empty.
Provider keys, Redis's password, and inline users' keys are resolved
**once**, at plugin construction. A file-sourced user's `apiKey` is
re-resolved on every hot reload (see below), so it can use `env:`/`file:`
forms too and pick up a rotated value without a Traefik restart.
### Users file format
One JSON object, one `users` array, mounted from a single Kubernetes
Secret (`users_file.go`):
```json
{
"users": [
{"name": "alice", "group": "engineering", "apiKey": "sk-llmgw-..."},
{"name": "bob", "group": "general", "apiKey": "env:LLMGW_KEY_BOB", "limits": {"requestsPerDay": 100}}
]
}
```
A file user with the same `name` as an inline user overrides it (the
inline entry is dropped from the merged set). Hot reload polls the file's
mtime, throttled to once per 5 seconds on the request path, and is
best-effort: a reload already in progress is skipped rather than
serialising every concurrent request behind it, so a change lands within a
few request-driven checks, not necessarily on the very next one. A
reload's own error (unreadable file, malformed JSON, a user referencing an
unknown group, a duplicate key) is logged and the last good user set is
kept — a bad edit to the file never breaks already-authenticated traffic.
## Model routing
- A model id in **`provider/model`** form resolves directly against that
provider, but only when the part before the slash names an actually
configured provider. Any other id — including one that merely contains a
slash, such as an upstream's own `uni/deepseek-v4-flash-0731` naming — is
treated as a single **bare** id.
- A bare id resolves against the first configured provider, in sorted
provider-name order, whose known model set (explicit `models` plus any
discovered ids) contains it. When more than one provider knows the same
bare id, the sorted-first provider wins it and the gateway logs a
collision warning once per id; every provider's copy stays reachable
through the explicit `provider/model` form regardless of who won the
bare id, and `GET /v1/models` lists both the bare (winner's) form and
every `provider/model` form.
- **On the unified routes** (`modelRegistry.resolve`, used by
`/v1/chat/completions`, `/v1/embeddings`, and the three media
endpoints), authorization requires both `group.allowsModel` and
`group.allowsProvider` for the resolved provider — a model that exists
but the caller's group cannot reach returns 403, distinct from a model no
configured provider knows at all (404). Native passthrough
(`/{provider}/...`) always checks `group.allowsProvider`, and additionally
checks `group.allowsModel` — against a `model` field peeked from the
request body — whenever the group's `models` list is non-empty; see
[Native passthrough model authorization](#native-passthrough-model-authorization)
and the authorization row in [Unified vs.
passthrough](#unified-vs-passthrough).
- **Discovery**: `GET {baseUrl}/v1/models` for an `openai`-type provider,
`GET {baseUrl}/v1/models` for `anthropic`, `GET {baseUrl}/v1beta/models`
for `gemini`. Runs once at plugin construction (bounded to 5s per
provider), then again no more often than `discoveryInterval`. A failed
refresh is logged and keeps the provider's last-known discovered set —
**stale-while-error**, never an empty list just because one refresh
attempt failed.
**Refresh is request-driven, not a background timer.** The plugin runs
inside Traefik's own process, so it deliberately starts no periodic
ticker of its own: the interval is checked on each incoming request
(`ServeHTTP`), and a refresh is spawned only when it has elapsed. Three
consequences worth knowing:
- **An idle gateway never refreshes.** With no traffic at all, the
discovered set stays as it was, indefinitely.
- **A new model upstream takes up to `discoveryInterval` to appear** —
an hour by default. Lower `discoveryInterval` on the providers whose
catalogues actually change if you want it sooner; it costs one extra
model-listing call per provider per interval.
- **There is no manual refresh trigger.** The admin API is read-only
(`overview`, `targets`, `usage`, `usage/history`); restarting the
plugin is the only way to force discovery immediately.
This is why `GET /v1/models` can lag a provider that just published a
model, and it is behaviour, not a fault. Discovery health itself is
visible per provider in the admin dashboard and as
`llmgateway_provider_healthy` on `/metrics`.
## Model aliases
Operator-defined indirection: a client-facing alias id that resolves to a
real target model id. `modelAliases` is empty by default, and an empty map
changes nothing about model resolution — this is purely additive.
```yaml
http:
middlewares:
llmgateway:
plugin:
llmgateway:
# ... providers, groups, users unchanged ...
modelAliases:
# Client-facing name -> real target. The target can itself be
# bare ("gpt-5-mini") or provider-prefixed
# ("anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-5"); either resolves through the
# normal rules in [Model routing](#model-routing) above.
aliased/coding: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-5"
aliased/fast: "gpt-5-mini"
```
- **Swapping the underlying model**: point an alias at a different target
and let Traefik's dynamic-config reload apply it — no gateway restart,
no client-side change. A client that has always addressed
`aliased/coding` keeps working unmodified after the operator moves that
alias to a newer model.
- **Precedence**: an EXACT alias match wins resolution before any other
rule, including `provider/model` prefix splitting — checked first in
`modelRegistry.resolve`. The target then resolves through the same
rules as any other id (bare, `provider/model`, or a discovered id).
Because of this, an alias whose id contains a `/` is rejected at
construction if the part before the `/` names an actually configured
provider (it would be shadowed by prefix resolution) — see the
validation rules below.
- **Authorization**: a group may use an alias when its `models` glob
matches the **alias name itself**, OR when it already grants access to
the **resolved target** — either is enough. `providers` still gates the
target's own provider as usual.
- **Validation at construction** (a bad alias config fails the same way a
bad provider config does — no gateway starts with a broken alias
table):
- the alias must be non-empty and contain no control characters;
- when the alias contains `/`, its prefix must not name a configured
provider (would be shadowed by prefix resolution);
- the alias must not equal an explicit `models` entry of any provider
(ambiguous — which one wins?);
- the target must not itself be another alias (no alias chains);
- the target must not be empty.
A target naming a model that is not yet known (awaiting a provider's
first discovery fetch, or simply never configured) is accepted at
construction — it resolves lazily. An unresolvable target at request
time returns 404 with a message naming both the alias and the missing
target. A target that is later discovered and collides with an
already-configured alias id is not a construction error either — the
alias always wins that resolution, and the gateway logs one warning
per such id.
- **`GET /v1/models` listing**: every alias the caller's group may use is
listed as a model object alongside real models — `id` is the alias,
`owned_by` is the target's resolved provider name. An alias whose
target does not resolve yet is omitted from the listing until it does.
- **Echo behavior**: exactly like the existing provider-prefix alias echo
(`__alias`, [Unified vs. passthrough](#unified-vs-passthrough)) —
`anthropic`- and `gemini`-type targets build their own response
envelope and echo the client's exact alias string back in its `model`
field. An `openai`-type target's response is a **verbatim passthrough**
of the upstream body, so its `model` field carries whatever the
upstream itself returned (typically the bare upstream model id) —
**not** the alias — the same documented v0.1 passthrough asymmetry,
unchanged by this feature.
- **Applies everywhere a model routes**: unified chat and embeddings,
`/v1/images/generations`, `/v1/audio/speech`, and
`/v1/audio/transcriptions` (including its multipart rewrite — the
upstream `model` field receives the resolved target's own upstream id,
never the alias, exactly like a provider-prefixed id already does).
- **Admin overview**: `GET /admin/api/overview` includes an `aliases`
array (`{alias, target}`, sorted by alias) — see [Admin](#admin). No
secrets involved.
## Model metadata
Per-model context window and per-token cost, resolved for display —
`GET /v1/models` and the admin dashboard show what an operator or client
actually knows about a model, without inventing a number nobody
configured or reported. `modelMeta` (config overrides) is a **separate**
config surface from `pricing` (request-cost accounting, see
[`ModelPricing`](#modelpricing)) — the two never affect each other.
Context and cost each resolve through their own layer stack
(`modelmeta.go`'s `resolveModelMeta`), most specific first:
1. **Context**: a `modelMeta` config override → a provider's own
discovery-captured context (`metadataPath`, below) → the built-in
table → unknown.
2. **Cost**: a `modelMeta` config override (or its `free: true`) → a
`":free"`-suffixed model id (see the free-tier note below) → the
built-in table → unknown.
A field genuinely unknown at every layer stays unknown — never invented
— and is omitted from `GET /v1/models`, not sent as a misleading zero.
```yaml
http:
middlewares:
llmgateway:
plugin:
llmgateway:
# ... providers, groups, users unchanged ...
modelMeta:
# Exact "provider/model" key.
"uni/deepseek-v4-flash-0731":
contextTokens: 524288
free: true
# Bare model id — applies wherever that bare id resolves.
"ornith-397b/qwen3.6-27b/btl-4":
contextTokens: 262144
free: true
```
- **Alias inheritance**: a [model alias](#model-aliases) inherits its
target's fully resolved metadata, unless the alias id itself has its
own `modelMeta` entry — that entry's fields win, independently per
field (setting only `contextTokens` on the alias still inherits the
target's cost).
- **Free-tier naming convention**: a model id ending in `:free` (a real
provider naming convention some upstreams use for their own free-tier
models) resolves to a known, zero cost even with no `modelMeta` entry
and no built-in table row for that exact id — ranked above the
built-in table, below an explicit `modelMeta` override. Context is
unaffected by this rule; it still resolves through the normal layers
above.
### Discovery-captured context (`metadataPath`)
Set `metadataPath` on an `openai`-type provider to fetch a second
endpoint alongside `discovery`, one that reports per-model context
length — LM Studio's own, non-OpenAI-compatible endpoint is the
supported shape:
```yaml
providers:
macstudio:
type: openai
baseUrl: "http://macstudio.local:1234"
discovery: true
metadataPath: "/api/v0/models"
```
The response's `loaded_context_length` field is preferred over
`max_context_length` when both are present — it reflects the context
actually usable right now, which an operator can configure smaller than
the model's own maximum under VRAM-constrained runtime settings. This
means the reported context window can **change** across a discovery
refresh (a model reloaded with a different context setting reports a
different value) — it is not a fixed, one-time fact the way the built-in
table's numbers are. A failed or absent metadata fetch is always
non-fatal: no metadata is captured for that refresh, and `discovery`
itself is unaffected.
### Built-in table
`pricing_data_gen.go` is a generated, checked-in table synced from
[LiteLLM's own pricing
data](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/blob/main/model_prices_and_context_window.json),
pruned to the provider types this gateway can meaningfully match
(`openai`, `anthropic`, `deepseek`, `xai`, `minimax`, `cerebras`,
`dashscope`, `moonshot`) and to chat/embedding models only — the full
upstream table is over 3,000 entries, most of them for providers this
gateway has no adapter for.
Run `make pricing-sync` to regenerate it against the current upstream
data. This fetches over the network and writes `pricing_data_gen.go` at
build time only — the running plugin never fetches anything itself. The
generated file's header records a content digest of the fetched bytes,
not a date, so a re-run against unchanged upstream data reproduces an
identical file with nothing to review.
### `GET /v1/models` extension fields
Two OpenAI-compat-safe extra fields on each model object, present only
when known:
```json
{
"id": "openai/gpt-5",
"object": "model",
"owned_by": "openai",
"context_window": 400000,
"pricing": {"input_per_mtok_usd": 1.25, "output_per_mtok_usd": 10}
}
```
- `context_window` — an integer token count, omitted when unknown.
- `pricing` — `{input_per_mtok_usd, output_per_mtok_usd}`, both floats
in USD per 1,000,000 tokens. Omitted when unknown; present with `0`
values for an explicitly free model — a known zero, not an absent
field.
The admin dashboard's `GET /admin/api/overview` exposes the identical
resolved values per provider (`providers[].modelMeta`, keyed by upstream
model id) and per alias (`aliases[].modelMeta`) — see
[Admin](#admin).
## Limits and accounting
- Counters use **fixed windows**, keyed by UTC calendar boundaries (the
minute, the day, the month) — not a sliding window. Requests-per-minute
and requests-per-day counters increment **before** evaluation, so every
request counts toward its scopes' rate tracking even if it is ultimately
refused by a different scope's limit.
- Token and cost budgets are checked against the value **already
accumulated** from prior requests, before this request's own usage is
known (usage only arrives after the upstream call completes). A request
that would start already over budget is refused; a request that starts
under budget but pushes the scope over it is still allowed to complete —
an accepted at-most-one-request overshoot, not an exactly-enforced cap.
- **Accounting** parses usage from the provider's own response: OpenAI-type
`usage`, Anthropic `usage` (from `message_start`/`message_delta`), Gemini
`usageMetadata`. When a **non-streaming** unified-route response reports
no usage at all, the gateway falls back to a rough estimate —
`ceil(request-body-bytes / 4)` counted as prompt tokens, no completion
estimate — and marks it `estimated`. Estimated usage therefore lands
entirely in the `tokin` counter below; `tokout` never moves for an
estimated request. A **streaming** unified-route response with no usage
is logged and the request itself is still counted, but no token
estimate is applied.
- **Tokens are tracked in two directions**: every prompt token increments
a `tokin` counter, every completion token a separate `tokout` counter —
the same split the admin usage API and usage-history API both expose
(see [Admin](#admin)). `tokensPerDay`/`tokensPerMonth` limits are
unchanged by this: they still enforce one TOTAL budget, read as
`tokin + tokout` in a single batched store read at evaluation time. A
violation message still says "tokens", regardless of which direction
pushed the scope over.
- **A synthetic total scope** (`kind: "total"`, `id: "all"`) is counted
alongside every request's own user/group scopes on every metered route
(unified chat/embeddings, the media endpoints, native passthrough, the
per-server MCP/A2A proxy, and the federated `/mcp` endpoint) — the sum
of all LLM traffic combined. It carries no
limit and is never evaluated: no configuration can throttle it. The
admin usage API's `total` row and every `scope=total` usage-history
query read this scope.
- **An hour window** (`req`/`tokin`/`tokout`/`cost`, UTC calendar hour)
is counted alongside minute/day/month on every metered route, purely
for charting — no `LimitsConfig` field ever names it, so it is never
evaluated against a limit. It is the finest granularity the usage-
history API (below) can query.
- Cost is `tokens × price`, computed in integer **micro-USD**
(1,000,000ths of a dollar) throughout to avoid float drift, from the
built-in per-model table (`pricing.go`) or a configured `pricing`
override. An unpriced model costs 0 and logs a once-per-model warning
(capped at 128 distinct unpriced model names per process lifetime, then
one summary warning). The built-in table is **approximate** — list
prices as each provider published them, recorded 2026-08, and not kept
in sync automatically. Set `pricing` overrides for billing-grade
accuracy.
- **Storage**: `redis` configured wires a hand-rolled, stdlib-only RESP2
client (`resp.go`) — no `go-redis`, which is not Yaegi-interpretable —
against Redis, Valkey, or Dragonfly. Every counter write (`checkAndCount`,
`account`) goes through ONE pipelined round trip for the whole request,
regardless of how many user/group/total counters it touches (perf
review, 2026-08-21) — a 3-scope request previously paid up to 9 (request
counting) or 27 (usage accounting) separate round trips. Semantics are
deliberately **at-least-once, never under-counting**: a lost reply after
the server already applied the pipeline can cause a resend that
over-counts every counter in it by its own delta. This is a
fail-*safe* trade-off (more restrictive than reality), never a
fail-*open* one.
- **Fallback** (no `redis` configured, or a Redis error with
`failOpen: true`): counters live in an in-process map — correct for one
Traefik replica, only approximate across several, since each replica
counts independently. Exact limits across multiple Traefik replicas
require the shared Redis. **Enforcement stays correct on the fallback at
every window**, including `tokensPerMonth`/`costPerMonthUSD`: a
window's counter always outlives its own natural length
(`enforceTTLFor`, limits.go), so a month budget is still a true
calendar-month budget, never a rolling one, whether Redis is configured
or not.
- **Usage-history charting is more limited on the fallback**, and the
limit differs by window (`memoryStoreMaxTTL`'s 48h ceiling only binds
where a window's own `enforceTTLFor` floor sits under it — limits.go):
`hour` charts its full default span (48 buckets fit inside the 48h
ceiling); `day` only shows its most recent ~2-3 buckets out of the 35
a request can ask for (a day bucket's own key also sits under the
ceiling, so it expires long before a 35-day span would need it); `month`
charts its CURRENT bucket in full (a month's own floor, ~32 days, wins
over the ceiling — the in-progress month's key outlives the whole
month), but not any earlier one, since each past month's key already
expired ~32 days after its own creation. Redis applies the real
hour/day/month retention TTLs directly (no ceiling), so a Redis-backed
deployment charts the full span every window supports.
- **Retention** (Redis counter key TTL, distinct from a window's own
length): a minute key lives 2 minutes, an hour key 48 hours, a day key
35 days, a month key 400 days — long enough for the usage-history API's
largest span (48 hourly / 35 daily / 13 monthly buckets) to always find
a live key, not just long enough to survive that bucket's own single
rollover. **Migration**: none — a deployed process's old, unsplit `tok`
counter keys simply expire on their existing TTL and are never read
again; nothing needs backfilling.
- **Provider/model success rates** (`limits.go`): a separate counter
family from request/token/cost accounting above, tracking upstream
HEALTH rather than usage — `llmgw:prov:{provider}:attempt:{window}:
{bucket}` and `llmgw:prov:{provider}:fail:{window}:{bucket}` per
provider, `llmgw:provmodel:{provider}/{model}:attempt:{window}:{bucket}`
and the `fail` counterpart per `(provider, model)` pair. `window` is
`min` (2-minute TTL) or `day` (35-day TTL) only — no `hour` or `month`:
provider health is a now-and-today question, not a billing one. Every
upstream HTTP attempt increments `attempt`; only a provider-fault
outcome increments `fail` — the SAME transient classification [Retry](
#retry)'s own retry decision uses (connection error, HTTP 429, HTTP
5xx), **plus one addition this counter family alone applies**: a
request that hit the gateway's own configured deadline
(`context.DeadlineExceeded`) also counts as a failure here, even though
retry itself never retries a deadline it already knows has passed. A
request the CLIENT canceled (`context.Canceled`) still counts as an
attempt only, from both — not the provider's fault either way. A
non-429 4xx (the provider answered, just didn't like the request) is
never a failure. Retried attempts are all counted individually: a
request retried twice before succeeding writes three attempts here (two
failures, one success), not one. The admin overview API (see
[Admin](#admin)) is the only reader; the write itself runs off the
request's own goroutine (fire-and-forget — this is telemetry, and
nothing in the request path waits on or gates against it), so it never
adds latency to a response, streaming included. That goroutine is
bounded (64 in flight per process) and lossy under sustained pressure:
a write that cannot start immediately is dropped, not queued — a
deliberate trade-off against an unbounded goroutine pile-up if the
configured store ever goes slow without going fully down. Enforcement
(request/token/cost limits) never goes through this path at all.
- **Native passthrough accounts provider-level only, never per-model.**
`POST /{provider}/...` has no resolved model at request time — the
upstream model, if any, only appears in the response body, read after
the attempt has already resolved — so it never writes a `provmodel`
counter, only the provider-level ones above.
### Body-admission limit
The unified `chat/completions`/`embeddings` routes and the three media
routes (`images/generations`, `audio/speech`, `audio/transcriptions`)
each decode their request body into memory before doing anything else
with it — a step that can use several times the body's own byte size,
worst case, for an adversarially-shaped payload. To bound how many
requests can be doing that at once, each of those routes claims a slot
from a small in-process semaphore for exactly the duration of its own
read-and-decode step, and releases it immediately afterward — **not**
for the rest of the request. Resolving the model, checking the response
cache, and the upstream call itself (which can run for seconds to
minutes on a real completion) all happen with the slot already
released, so this never becomes a ceiling on total concurrent requests.
- On exhaustion (every slot in use at that instant), the request gets an
immediate **503** with a `Retry-After` header — never queued, never
blocked.
- The slot count self-tunes from the host's own `GOMAXPROCS` by default;
`maxInFlightBodyRequests` (see the `Config` table above) pins an exact
value instead when set.
- The unified chat/embeddings routes decode against a **4MiB** cap —
narrower than the 10MiB the media routes and `audio/transcriptions`'
multipart body still use (see [Body limits](#image-and-audio-endpoints)
above) — sized to comfortably fit a single inline base64-encoded image
in a chat message while bounding worst-case decode memory.
- **Native passthrough is not gated by this at all**: it streams the
request/response body straight through rather than decoding it into
memory, so there is nothing here for this limit to bound (the one
exception, a bounded 64KiB peek for model-restricted groups, is
already capped independently — see [Native passthrough model
authorization](#native-passthrough-model-authorization)).
## Retry
Same-provider retry for a transient upstream failure. Off by default
(`retry.enabled: false`); every config that predates this field keeps
making exactly one upstream attempt per request. See [Failover](#failover)
below for the separate, cross-provider mechanism.
- **Scope**: every adapter upstream call — chat, embeddings, model
listing, and the three media endpoints (`images/generations`,
`audio/speech`, `audio/transcriptions`) — across all three provider
types. Native passthrough (`/{provider}/...`) and the MCP/A2A proxy are
raw reverse proxies and are never retried; the client owns retry
semantics there.
- **Attempts is retries, not tries**: `attempts` counts retries
performed **after** the first try. The default, `1`, allows one retry
— two tries total, not one. The maximum, `3`, allows three retries —
four tries total.
- **Transient classification**: a connection error (dial/EOF/reset), HTTP
429, or HTTP 5xx. Never a non-429 4xx, a translation error, a request
that failed to build in the first place (a malformed method or URL
fails identically on every attempt), or a context
cancellation/deadline.
- **Zero-bytes rule**: retry only runs before any response byte reaches
the client. A non-streaming call may retry its whole exchange. A
streaming call retries only the initial request, up to the point the
upstream's headers and status arrive — once the first chunk is
forwarded, a stream that then dies mid-flight is not retried, since the
client already holds partial data.
- **Waiting**: a 429 response carrying a `Retry-After` header that parses
as a non-negative whole-second count no greater than 2s waits exactly
that long. Every other case — no header, an unparseable value (for
example the HTTP-date form), a negative value, a value over 2s, or a
`Retry-After` on a non-429 5xx — falls back to exponential backoff
(`backoff × 2^(attempt-1)`), capped at 2s per wait either way. A
context canceled or timed out during a wait aborts the remaining
retries immediately, rather than blocking out the wait in full.
- **Accounting**: only the final attempt's usage is recorded — a failed
attempt's body is drained and discarded, never parsed for usage, so it
is never double-counted. Request counters still increment once per
client request, unchanged.
## Failover
Cross-provider failover for a bare model id more than one configured
provider serves — for example `whisper-1` configured on both `openai` and
`openai-audio`. **Off by default** (`failover.enabled: false` unless set
otherwise): a version upgrade with no config change preserves prior
behavior exactly, since failover changes which provider serves a request
and can shift cost attribution or mask a broken provider key behind an
apparent success. Set `failover.enabled: true` to opt in. A deployment
with no overlapping providers, or with a single provider, behaves
exactly as before regardless of this setting either way, since there is
never a second candidate to try.
- **Scope**: `POST /v1/chat/completions`, `POST /v1/embeddings`, and
`POST /v1/messages` only. The image/audio endpoints
(`images/generations`, `audio/speech`, `audio/transcriptions`) are not
wired into failover yet — each has its own request-shape handling
(multipart rebuild, binary/streaming responses) that needs its own
scoped follow-up.
- **Eligible candidates**: a bare model id resolved via the collision
winner (the same mechanism `GET /v1/models` documents for overlapping
catalogs) offers every OTHER configured provider that also serves that
id and that the caller's group is authorized to use. A `provider/model`
request, or an alias whose target is `provider/model`, is an explicit,
exact choice and is never eligible for substitution.
- **What falls through**: everything except HTTP 400 — connection
failures, timeouts, HTTP 429/401/403/404, and any 5xx. A 400 never
falls through: the request is malformed and every provider would reject
it identically. A failover past a 404 is logged loudly, always, naming
both providers and the model — a 404 usually means a real configuration
mistake, not a transient outage. The routine "failing over from X to Y"
line is rate-limited to once per 30s during a sustained outage (with a
suppressed-count note on the next line), so it cannot itself become a
blocking synchronous write on every request; the 404 line is exempt
from that limit.
- **Cost guard (not optional)**: failover never routes to a candidate
priced higher than the provider it is failing over FROM (the first
candidate actually attempted, never the cheapest in the list), checked
on BOTH input and output cost per token — a candidate cheaper on input
but dearer on output is still rejected. Pricing is resolved exactly the
way real billing resolves it: the canonical `provider/model` id in
`pricing` first, falling back to the bare model id, so a per-provider
`pricing` override correctly makes the identical model id cost
different amounts on different providers. Unknown pricing is never
treated as free: if the primary's price is known and a candidate's is
not, the candidate is skipped (an unknown price cannot be proven
cheaper); if the primary's price is unknown and a candidate's is known
and non-zero, the candidate is skipped too (moving from unbilled to
billed is itself a spend increase); both unknown, or both an explicit
known-zero price, are treated as equal and allowed. There is no config
flag for this — it applies unconditionally whenever failover is
enabled.
- **The cost guard cannot see `modelMeta`'s `free: true`.** It resolves
pricing only through `pricing` and the built-in table — the same
source `unifiedCostMicros` actually bills against — deliberately never
through `modelMeta` (see [Model metadata](#model-metadata) /
`ModelMetaConfig`), since `modelMeta` drives GET `/v1/models` display
only and never affects billing. A model declared free the `modelMeta`
way is therefore treated as unknown-priced by the cost guard and loses
redundancy: it is skipped as a failover candidate whenever the primary
has a known price (fail-safe, and logged like any other cost skip).
Declare the price through `pricing` (e.g. `{"inputPerM": 0,
"outputPerM": 0}`) if you want a genuinely free model to remain
eligible as a cheaper failover candidate.
- **Never mid-stream**: failover only happens while nothing has reached
the client yet. Once the first byte of a response is written, status
and body are committed and the request is never retried elsewhere.
- **Health signals, kept separate**: the discovery-endpoint health
surfaced on the admin dashboard is an ordering hint only — a provider
whose `/v1/models` is unhealthy is tried later, never skipped outright,
since plenty of providers serve chat completions fine while their model
listing is broken. A separate, in-memory, per-pod request-path health
signal (not yet exposed on the admin dashboard) is the actual routing
gate: a provider is skipped without being called once it has failed
three consecutive LOGICAL requests (same-provider retries all count as
one outcome, not one each) — everything except HTTP 400 counts as a
failure for this gate, including 401/403/404, so a provider with a dead
API key is eventually routed around instead of retried forever.
- **Accounting**: a failover chain still counts as exactly one client
request against `requestsPerMinute`/`requestsPerDay` — never once per
attempt. Per-provider attempt/failure counters (the admin dashboard's
success-rate badge) attribute every attempt to the provider that
actually made it.
- **Caching**: a cacheable response produced by a failover provider is
stored under that provider's own cache key, never the first candidate's.
Each candidate's own cache entry is checked immediately before that
candidate's own attempt, in try order — never for every candidate up
front. Checking every candidate's cache before any of them was
attempted was tried and reverted: it silently served a DIFFERENT
candidate's cached response even while the actual primary was
perfectly healthy, which is failover with no failure. The
request-path health signal above is what actually keeps a genuinely
dead primary from being dialed again — once it is marked unhealthy it
is excluded from the candidate list entirely, so a later request
reaches the next candidate's cache without the dead one ever being
attempted.
- **Configurable**: `failover.maxAttempts` caps how many different
providers one request will try in total, primary included (default 3,
maximum 10) — distinct from `retry.attempts`, which retries the SAME
provider. `failover.enabled: false` (the default) turns the whole
mechanism off.
- **Known limitation — no per-attempt timeout**: `newAdapterHTTPClient`
sets no client timeout and no response-header timeout; the only bound
on an upstream call is the incoming request's own context, shared
identically across every candidate. A provider that accepts the TCP
connection and then simply never responds will hang the request
indefinitely and never trigger failover — only a failure fast enough to
leave time on that shared context (a dial failure, a fast non-2xx
response, or the context's own deadline finally expiring) does. This is
a pre-existing property of the plugin's HTTP client, not specific to
failover, and applies to every route, not only this one; it is not
addressed in this change.
## Request timeout
Every provider adapter call and every native passthrough
(`/{provider}/...`) request is bounded by a progress-based timeout:
aborted once this gateway observes no upstream read progress for the
configured duration, never simply because elapsed time crossed a fixed
deadline. The MCP/A2A target proxy (`/mcp/{name}/...`, `/a2a/{name}/...`)
shares the identical mechanism. The federated `/mcp` endpoint
(`mcp_federation.go`) does **not** — see the "Federated MCP" note below.
**Behavior change for every deployment, not an invisible bug fix.** Before
this feature, an adapter's `*http.Client` set no timeout of any kind: a
provider that accepted the connection and then went silent — sent no
headers, or sent headers and then stalled mid-body — hung the gateway
request forever. Default, when neither `requestTimeout` field is set:
**five minutes**.
- **Two mechanisms, one config value**: time to the first response header
(`Transport.ResponseHeaderTimeout`), and idle time WITHIN the response
body once headers arrive. The second is what catches a provider that
answers promptly and then stalls mid-stream or mid-JSON-body —
`ResponseHeaderTimeout` alone only bounds the wait for headers.
- **Progress-based, not total-duration.** A streaming response resets the
idle timer on every chunk it forwards, so a long generation that keeps
producing tokens completes even if the whole exchange runs for 20
minutes — a total-duration cap was deliberately rejected for exactly
this reason. Non-streaming responses share the identical mechanism: a
large or slow-but-progressing body is unaffected; only a body that goes
quiet for the full timeout is aborted.
- **What "progress" means, precisely.** The idle timer resets on bytes
read from the *decoded* body — after `net/http`'s own transparent gzip
decompression, when the upstream used it. A gzip'd response whose
compressed bytes keep arriving on the wire but whose deflate stream
yields no decompressed output for the whole timeout window is still
aborted: this gateway has no visibility into wire-level progress
without a transport or connection wrapper, which is disproportionate at
the five-minute default. In the same vein, a streaming forwarder reads
one chunk from the upstream, writes it to the client, then reads again
— the write is not itself watched, so time spent blocked writing to a
slow or stalled client counts against the SAME idle window as a silent
upstream. Aborting in that case is still the right call (holding an
upstream connection open indefinitely for a stalled client is its own
problem), but the failure is not always the provider's fault even
though the request is attributed to one for accounting purposes.
- **Never retried.** A `ResponseHeaderTimeout` failure surfaces as a
`context.DeadlineExceeded`-shaped error, which [Retry](#retry)'s own
transient classification explicitly excludes. A mid-body watchdog
timeout happens after the retry mechanism has already returned its
response to the caller, so it is never in a position to be retried
either way. Not retrying a hang is the intended behavior — retrying a
provider that just proved it cannot make progress would only waste the
same amount of time again.
- **Scope and override**: `requestTimeout` (top level) sets the global
default. A provider's own `requestTimeout` overrides it — an explicit
override always wins. Native passthrough for a provider uses that same
provider's resolved value, so a client hitting `/{provider}/...` gets
the identical bound as a request through `/v1/chat/completions`. The
MCP/A2A target proxy has no per-target override; it always uses the
global default.
- **Config form and validation**: a Go duration string (`"5m"`, `"90s"`),
matching `retry.backoff`/`cache.ttl`'s own convention. Empty means the
default. A value that fails to parse, or parses to zero or a negative
duration, is a construction error — unlike `cache.ttl`, zero/negative is
never accepted here as "no timeout": that would silently reintroduce the
exact hang this feature fixes.
- **Classification**: a timeout firing is always logged and reported to
the client as an upstream failure (`502`, `server_error`), naming
whichever provider or target the request was addressed to, and is never
classified as a client disconnect (`context.Canceled`) — the two stay
distinguishable in every log line. The log wording says "upstream
progress stalled", not "provider timed out": for the reason described
above (a slow client can trip the same watchdog a slow provider does),
the message reports what was observed without asserting which side
caused it.
**Federated MCP (`POST /mcp`) is bounded differently, not left unbounded.**
`mcp_federation.go`'s two direct upstream calls
(`doBackendJSONRPC`/`mcpBackendCloseSession`) are not wrapped by the
idle-progress watchdog described above — a federated backend that sends
headers and then stalls mid-body is not caught by it. They are not
unbounded either: both still run through `g.targetClient`, so
`Transport.ResponseHeaderTimeout` (the global `requestTimeout`) still
bounds the wait for headers, and each call additionally runs under its
own fixed `context.WithTimeout` — 20s for `tools/list`, 120s for
`tools/call`, 5s for the best-effort session-close DELETE. A worst-case
stall there is bounded at whichever of those applies, not indefinite.
## Caching
An opt-in, Redis-backed response cache for the unified, non-streaming
`POST /v1/chat/completions` and `POST /v1/embeddings` routes. Off by
default (`cache.enabled: false`); every config that predates this field
keeps calling the upstream on every request. Caching also requires
`redis` to be configured — without it, `cache.enabled: true` is silently
disabled with one warning logged at construction, never a per-replica
in-process fallback: divergent replicas would otherwise serve different
cached bodies for the same request.
- **What's cacheable**: a non-streaming request to either route, whose
upstream response was HTTP 200 and no larger than `cache.maxBodyBytes`.
Never cached: a streaming request, native passthrough, MCP/A2A, the
image/audio endpoints (see [Image and audio endpoints](#image-and-audio-endpoints)),
or any non-200 upstream response.
- **Key**: `llmgw:cache:` plus a hex SHA-256 digest of the provider name,
the resolved upstream model id, the client's own exactly-as-sent
`model` string (`requestedModel`), the endpoint (`chat` or
`embeddings`), and the canonical JSON of the request body with
`stream_options` and `user` removed. `requestedModel` and the endpoint
are both part of the key so that two different alias forms of the same
upstream model (`claude-x` versus `anthropic/claude-x`) never collide
into one cache entry: a translating adapter (`anthropic`, `gemini`)
bakes the client's own alias into the cached response body's `model`
field, so a second client using the other alias form would otherwise
receive an id it never sent.
- **User identity is not part of the key.** Identical requests share one
cache entry across every user and group that can reach the model — by
design, since a provider's response to an identical request is
provider-deterministic and carries no per-user data.
- **Hit/miss header**: every cacheable request's response carries
`X-Llmgw-Cache: hit` or `X-Llmgw-Cache: miss`, set before the body is
written either way.
- **Accounting**: a cache hit increments request counters exactly like
any other request — `limiter.checkAndCount` runs before the cache
lookup — but never touches token or cost counters, and never runs the
streaming-response-with-no-usage estimate. Only a genuine upstream call
(a miss) accounts real tokens and cost. This means a cache hit is
request-quota-counted but token/cost-free.
- **Group override**: `GroupConfig.cache` (a `*bool`) overrides the
top-level `cache.enabled` setting per group — `nil` inherits it, `false`
opts the group out even when caching is globally on, `true` opts the
group in. Setting `true` on a group when the top-level `cache` is not
enabled — the block omitted entirely, or present with `enabled: false`,
both read the same way — is a construction error: there is nothing
configured to inherit `ttl`/`maxBodyBytes` from.
- **Group TTL override**: `GroupConfig.cacheTTL` sets the TTL written when
this group's own request populates a cache entry — it is not a per-group
scope. Cache entries are shared across groups, exactly like the "User
identity is not part of the key" bullet above: whichever group's request
happens to populate (or later refresh) an entry decides that entry's
TTL, and a later request from a different group that hits the same
entry reads it with the TTL already stored there, unaffected by its own
`cacheTTL`. An empty value inherits the global TTL for that group's own
writes; a set value must parse as a positive Go duration and requires
the top-level `cache` block to be configured, or construction fails.
- **Storage**: values are stored via the same hand-rolled RESP2 client
(`resp.go`) the limiter's distributed counters use — the identical
Redis/Valkey/Dragonfly connection, not a second one. A Redis error
during a cache read or write is treated as a miss (logged,
rate-limited) and never fails the request; the upstream call still
happens and the client still gets a correct answer.
## Provider health (discovery circuit breaker)
A per-provider, in-memory, three-state circuit breaker (`closed` →
`open` → `half-open`) driven entirely by `discovery` refresh outcomes —
never by `/v1/chat/completions` or any other request-path traffic. It
exists so a provider whose discovery endpoint fails on every cycle (an
expired API key, a typo'd `baseUrl`, an upstream outage) is re-probed
LESS often the longer it stays broken, instead of at the same fixed
`discoveryInterval` forever, and so the admin dashboard can show that
provider as visibly broken instead of indistinguishable from a healthy
one.
- **States**: `closed` is normal — refreshes run on the provider's own
`discoveryInterval`, exactly as if this feature did not exist.
`breaker.failureThreshold` (default `3`) CONSECUTIVE failed refreshes
open it; any success in between resets the count to zero. `open` skips
refresh attempts until a backoff window elapses, starting at
`breaker.openDuration` (default `1m`) and doubling on every further
failed probe, capped at `breaker.maxOpenDuration` (default `6h`).
`half-open` is exactly one probe refresh, deciding whether to close the
breaker again (success) or reopen it with a doubled backoff (failure).
- **The backoff window is an ADDITIONAL gate on top of
`discoveryInterval`, never a replacement for it** — whichever of the
two is currently longer wins, and the shorter one is masked entirely
rather than merely adding a little extra delay. This means
`breaker.maxOpenDuration` only ever reduces re-probe frequency once it
EXCEEDS `discoveryInterval`; set no higher, it changes nothing
observable and the provider is refreshed at the same cadence a
deployment without this feature would already see. The shipped
defaults are chosen with this in mind: `maxOpenDuration` (6h) is
deliberately longer than the default `discoveryInterval` (1h), so a
permanently broken provider under stock config backs off 1h, 2h, 4h,
6h, 6h, ... — roughly 5 re-probes a day instead of 24. A custom
`discoveryInterval` shorter than `maxOpenDuration` keeps this relationship;
one set LONGER than `maxOpenDuration` reverts to plain interval-only
throttling with no suppression from this feature at all.
- **Classification**: any refresh outcome with a non-nil error counts as
a failure, including a malformed-`baseUrl` request-build failure — this
is deliberately NOT the same classification `retry` above uses for
deciding whether to retry a request, since a permanently broken
provider must still be able to trip the breaker. A client-canceled
context (plugin shutdown, an outer context canceled upstream) is
NEUTRAL: it counts as neither a failure nor a success, and never resets
or closes an open breaker.
- **A provider that never fails is completely unaffected** — every
default is chosen so `closed` never diverges from plain
`discoveryInterval` gating.
- **Scope**: this reflects the DISCOVERY endpoint only. A provider whose
model listing 401s while its actual completion endpoint works fine
(common behind a proxy that exposes chat but not model listing) is
reported unhealthy here despite being entirely usable for real traffic
— this signal must never be the sole reason to refuse routing to a
provider.
- **Per-pod, not distributed.** Each replica learns a provider's
discovery health independently — a latency optimization, not a
correctness guarantee. Three replicas disagreeing briefly after a
provider starts failing is expected, not a bug.
- **Dashboard**: the Providers tab shows a provider's current state and,
while open, when it will next be probed — see [Admin](#admin).
## Unified vs. passthrough
| | Unified (`/v1/...`) | Native passthrough (`/{provider}/...`) |
|---|---|---|
| Wire format | Always OpenAI-shaped in, OpenAI-shaped out. | The provider's own native format, untouched. |
| Authorization | `group.allowsModel` AND `group.allowsProvider`, both checked against the resolved provider (`modelRegistry.resolve` — see [Model routing](#model-routing)). | `group.allowsProvider`, always. `group.allowsModel` too, but ONLY when the group's `models` list is non-empty — see the model-enforcement note below the table. `passthroughPaths`, when set, also gates the REST path. |
| Translation | `openai`-type: body forwarded verbatim (model id rewritten). `anthropic`/`gemini`: full bidirectional translation, including streaming, chunk by chunk. | None — a raw reverse proxy. |
| Model alias in the response | Translated providers (`anthropic`, `gemini`) echo back the client's exact requested model string in the response's `model` field, even though the upstream call used the resolved provider model id. An `openai`-type response is a verbatim passthrough of the upstream body, so it carries whatever model id the upstream itself returned — this asymmetry is intentional, not a bug. | The upstream's own `model` field, verbatim — there is no alias to echo. |
| Embeddings | `openai`-type: passthrough. `gemini`: mapped to `:embedContent`/`:batchEmbedContents`. `anthropic`: **501** — Anthropic's API has no embeddings endpoint. | Whatever the provider itself supports at that path, subject to the same `models`/`passthroughPaths` authorization as every other native passthrough request. |
| Unsupported parameters | A semantically meaningful field the target provider cannot express (e.g. `n > 1`, `logit_bias`, `logprobs` on Anthropic) is a **400**, never silently dropped. | Not applicable — the request reaches the provider exactly as sent. |
| Non-2xx upstream response | Wrapped in the gateway's own error envelope, with the provider's own body embedded under `error.upstream`. | Forwarded to the client exactly as the upstream sent it — status, headers, and body. |
### Native passthrough model authorization
A group's `models` glob authorizes native passthrough traffic too, but
only once it has something to authorize:
- **`models` empty (the default)** — nothing for `allowsModel` to reject,
so the request body is never even read for this purpose. Every request
reaches the provider exactly as it did before this feature existed.
- **`models` non-empty** — the gateway reads up to 64KiB of a JSON request
body looking for a top-level `model` field (a genuinely binary body —
multipart, `audio/*`, `image/*`, `video/*`, `application/octet-stream`
— is never read at all, since it cannot carry one). The field, when
found, is checked against `models` in both its bare and
`provider/model` forms. **A `model` field not found within that 64KiB
window is DENIED (403)** — fail closed, not fail open. This includes a
**Gemini** passthrough request: Gemini's model id lives in the URL
path, never the JSON body, so a group with a restricted `models` list
will see every Gemini passthrough request denied. Route Gemini traffic
for a model-restricted group through the unified `/v1/*` API instead.
## Anthropic Messages API (`/v1/messages`)
`POST /v1/messages` serves Anthropic SDK clients — including Claude
Code — directly, in Anthropic's own Messages API request/response shape:
the inbound counterpart to the outbound-only Anthropic support the
unified routes already had. From model resolution through response
caching, usage accounting, and adapter-error handling, this route shares
one implementation with `/v1/chat/completions`
(`runMeteredCall`, `routes_unified.go`) — the same group authorization
(see [`GroupConfig`](#groupconfig)), [limits and
accounting](#limits-and-accounting), and [caching](#caching) semantics
apply. Only the wire shape and the client-facing error envelope are
specific to this route.
### Authentication
Anthropic SDKs authenticate with the `x-api-key` header, not
`Authorization: Bearer`. This route accepts **both** — the identical
credential lookup (`authStore.identify`, `auth.go`) every other route
uses already reads either header, `Authorization: Bearer` taking
priority if a request somehow carries both — so no separate credential
path exists for this route. A failed auth answers in Anthropic's own
error shape (`{"type":"error","error":{"type":"authentication_error",
"message":"..."}}`), never the OpenAI-shaped
`{"error":{"type":...,"code":...}}` every other route uses.
### Translation vs. passthrough
Behavior depends entirely on the resolved provider's configured `type`:
| Resolved provider `type` | Behavior |
|---|---|
| `anthropic` | **Passthrough.** The request reaches that provider's own `/v1/messages` endpoint untranslated — no message-body translation of any kind. The response reaches the client BYTE-FOR-BYTE identical, with one exception: `"model"` is rewritten to the client's own requested alias, the same routing rewrite every route applies before any adapter call — not a translation of the response body. This is a real byte-level guarantee, not an approximation: every other field's value is copied from the upstream's raw bytes without ever passing through a Go value, so a JSON integer beyond `float64`'s exact range (inside, say, a `tool_use` block's arbitrary `input`) survives intact instead of being silently rounded. |
| `openai` or `gemini` | **Full bidirectional translation**, through the same `providerAdapter.chatCompletion` a `/v1/chat/completions` request against that provider already uses — its contract is OpenAI-shape in, OpenAI-shape out regardless of provider type. The Anthropic-shaped request is translated to OpenAI's shape before the call; that provider's OpenAI-shaped response is translated back to Anthropic's shape before it reaches the client. |
A few translation specifics worth knowing:
- **`anthropic-beta` is forwarded** to an `anthropic`-type upstream (an
explicit allowlist — `Authorization`, `x-api-key`, `Cookie`, and every
hop-by-hop header are never forwarded, and the gateway's own credential
injection always overrides whatever the allowlist copied), so Claude
Code and the SDKs can still opt into 1M context, token-efficient
tools, computer use, and other beta features through this route.
- **Prompt-cache tokens are billed.** Anthropic's
`cache_creation_input_tokens` and `cache_read_input_tokens` fold into
the same combined prompt-token count every other route's budgets
track, alongside `input_tokens` — not dropped, and not priced at a
separate cache-tier rate.
- **`tool_result.is_error`** has no native OpenAI tool-message field.
`content` — a string, Anthropic's content-block array form (Claude
Code sends this), or absent — is normalized to a plain string first
(OpenAI's own tool message requires one; a `null` content is
rejected), then gets an `"Error: "` prefix, so an OpenAI-backed
agentic loop still sees the failure signal regardless of which shape
the client sent.
- **Reasoning models** (OpenAI's `o1`/`o3`/`o4`/`gpt-5` families) get
`max_completion_tokens` instead of `max_tokens` — the field those
models reject with a 400.
- **`thinking`** (Anthropic's extended-thinking config) has no OpenAI
equivalent and is dropped when translating to an `openai`/`gemini`
target; the gateway logs a warning naming the dropped field rather
than discarding it silently.
### Streaming is not yet supported
`"stream"` set to anything other than the JSON literal `false`, `null`,
or an absent key gets a clean **400** `invalid_request_error` — never
silently ignored, never answered non-streamed. `null` is treated the
same as unset, so an SDK that serializes an unset optional field as
explicit `null` never gets a false-positive rejection on an ordinary
non-streaming call. This is deliberately a 400, not a 501: Anthropic's
own SDKs retry any status ≥ 500, so a 501 here would turn every
streaming call — the default for Claude Code — into a multi-request
retry storm against the caller's own request-rate limit. The rejection
happens *before* the rate limiter runs, so a streaming-rejected request
never consumes budget either. A follow-up release adds the Anthropic SSE
event translator (`message_start`/`content_block_delta`/`message_stop`)
— a genuinely different event model from OpenAI's own stream shape this
plugin already forwards on `/v1/chat/completions`.
### Route takeover
On a deployment running `passthroughUnknown: true`, `POST /v1/messages`
used to fall through to `next` (the router's own backing service) before
this route existed — nothing in this plugin recognized the path. Now the
gateway intercepts it unconditionally: `next` is never reached for this
path again, regardless of `passthroughUnknown`. This is intended — the
whole point of this route is for the gateway itself to answer
`/v1/messages` — but it is a real behavior change for any deployment
currently proxying `/v1/messages` downstream through
`passthroughUnknown`. Route that traffic elsewhere, or expect the
gateway to answer it directly, before upgrading.
## Image and audio endpoints
`POST /v1/images/generations`, `POST /v1/audio/speech`, and
`POST /v1/audio/transcriptions` follow the same pipeline as
`/v1/chat/completions` — auth, model routing, group authorization, limits,
adapter call — minus response caching and token/cost accounting (below).
> **Upgrading from v0.1**: these three routes are now handled by the
> gateway unconditionally. They are matched and served before
> `passthroughUnknown` is ever consulted, so a request to any of them
> **never** falls through to `next` — not even with `passthroughUnknown:
> true`. If a v0.1 deployment pointed its router's backing service at one
> of these exact paths and relied on passthrough to reach it, that backend
> must move to a different path before upgrading.
| | `openai`-type | `gemini` | `anthropic` |
|---|---|---|---|
| `images/generations` | Native forward. | Translated to Imagen's `:predict` (below). | **501**. |
| `audio/speech` | Native forward; the binary response is streamed to the client as it arrives. | **501** — no OpenAI-compatible text-to-speech endpoint. | **501**. |
| `audio/transcriptions` | Native forward; see below for how the multipart body is forwarded. | **501** — no OpenAI-compatible speech-to-text endpoint. | **501**. |
- **Model routing**: `images/generations` and `audio/speech` read `model`
from the JSON request body. `audio/transcriptions` reads it from the
multipart request's `model` form field instead — the field can appear
in any position among the request's parts, and a body with more than
one `model` field is a **400**.
- **Multipart forwarding**: when the client's `model` field already
equals the resolved upstream model id (a bare id, the common case), the
original multipart body is replayed byte-for-byte, unchanged. When it
does not — a provider-prefixed id (`openai/whisper-1`) or another alias
resolves to a different upstream model string — the body is rebuilt
with every other part copied verbatim and only the `model` part's value
rewritten, so the alias never reaches the real provider. The rebuilt
body uses a new multipart boundary; the client's exact boundary is not
preserved, only an equivalent body.
- **Gemini image translation**: `{model, prompt, n, size,
response_format}` maps to Imagen's `{instances:[{prompt}], parameters:
{sampleCount, aspectRatio}}`. `size` maps to `aspectRatio`:
`1024x1024`/`512x512` → `1:1`, `1792x1024` → `16:9`, `1024x1792` →
`9:16`; an absent `size` defaults to `1:1`; any other value is a
**400**. `response_format: "url"` is a **400** — the gateway stores
nothing to host a URL from. A truthy `quality` or `style` is a **400**,
the same convention chat's translators use for an unsupported field.
Imagen's `predictions[].bytesBase64Encoded` maps back to OpenAI's
`data[].b64_json`.
- **Never cached**: image and audio responses are excluded from the
response cache (`cache.enabled`) regardless of its configuration.
- **Accounting**: request counters (`requestsPerMinute`/`requestsPerDay`)
increment the same as any other route. Token counters never move, and
cost is always recorded as 0 — images and audio are not
cost-accounted.
- **Body limits**: `images/generations` and `audio/speech` share a 10MiB
JSON cap — no longer the unified `chat/completions`/`embeddings`
routes' own cap, which is narrower (4MiB, see below); the media routes
kept the original 10MiB. `audio/transcriptions` enforces the same
10MiB cap explicitly, returning **413** over it — unlike an oversized
JSON body, which is silently truncated into a parse failure, a
truncated multipart body can still parse a valid prefix and would
forward cut-off audio upstream if it were not rejected outright.
- **Retry** (above) applies to all three the same as chat/embeddings; a
streaming `audio/speech` response is retried only before the first
response byte reaches the client, the same zero-bytes rule as chat's
streaming path.
## Admin
A read-only dashboard and JSON API for operational visibility — providers,
groups, model aliases, and per-user/per-group/total usage against
configured limits, plus usage charts. No mutation of any kind; config
stays owned by GitOps/Traefik as usual. Off by default (`admin.enabled:
false`, or the `admin` block omitted entirely): none of the routes below
are registered at all, and a request to any of them falls through to the
plugin's existing 404/`passthroughUnknown` handling.
The dashboard itself is a small Vue 3 + Pinia + Chart.js single-page app
([`webui/`](webui/)), built once with `vite build` and baked into the
plugin as generated Go source (`admin_assets_gen.go` — see
[Development](#development)); nothing under `webui/` is needed at runtime
or in CI.
- **Enabling it**: set `admin.enabled: true`, then flag at least one user
`admin: true` (`UserConfig.admin`) so someone can actually reach
`/admin/api/*`. An admin user is otherwise ordinary — their own keys,
group, and limits still apply everywhere except the admin routes
themselves (see "Admin traffic is never counted" below).
- **`GET /admin`** serves the built app's `index.html` shell, and
**`GET /admin/assets/{hashedname}`** serves its content-hashed JS/CSS.
Both are deliberately served **with no authentication at all** once
`admin.enabled` is true (disabled still falls through to the same
404/`passthroughUnknown` handling described above): a browser navigating
straight to the URL has no way to attach a custom `Authorization` or
`x-api-key` header, so gating the page itself would make it unreachable
from a browser in the first place. This is safe because the shell and
its assets carry **zero data of their own** — every value is fetched
client-side from the JSON routes below, which stay fully gated — and the
built JS/CSS is exactly what `vite build` emits from `webui/`, publicly
inspectable by any admin dashboard user already. Each asset response
carries a long-lived `Cache-Control: public, max-age=31536000,
immutable` (the hash in the filename changes whenever the content does,
so a cached response never goes stale); an unrecognized asset name is a
`404` in the same error envelope every other unknown route returns.
- **Browser key-entry flow**: the page reads an admin API key from the
current tab's `sessionStorage` (a Pinia store owns this). Absent a
stored key, or on any `401`/`403` from a JSON route, it shows an inline
key-entry form instead of the dashboard. A submitted key is kept **only
in `sessionStorage`** — never a cookie, `localStorage`, or any
persistent store — so it disappears when the tab closes, and it is sent
only as the `x-api-key` header on this page's own `/admin/api/*`
fetches.
- **`GET /admin/api/overview`** and **`GET /admin/api/usage`** share one
gate: unauthenticated → 401, authenticated non-admin → 403, admin →
serve. `overview` returns the provider list, groups, the configured
model alias table (`alias`/`target` pairs, sorted by alias — see
[Model aliases](#model-aliases)), redis/cache/retry status (`retry`'s
`enabled`/`attempts`/`backoff` are the EFFECTIVE values after
[Retry](#retry)'s own defaulting, not the raw config — `attempts` and
`backoff` are both omitted when retry is disabled), and the plugin
version string. Each provider entry also carries `discoveryEnabled`
(the configured `discovery` flag, so the dashboard can tell "discovery
is off" apart from "discovery is on but has not refreshed yet" — both
otherwise show the identical zero `lastRefresh`), `attemptsDay`/
`failuresDay`/`attemptsMinute`/`failuresMinute` (the provider's own
current-window success-rate counters — see [Limits and
accounting](#limits-and-accounting)), `modelRates` (the identical
`attemptsDay`/`failuresDay` pair per known model, keyed by model id — no
per-model minute figures, since nothing displays them; the dashboard's
per-model badge falls back to a day-window-only detail instead), and
`modelMeta` (the resolved context window and cost per known model —
see [Model metadata](#model-metadata)), and `healthState`/`openUntil`
(the discovery circuit breaker's current state — `"closed"`, `"open"`,
or `"half-open"` — and, while open, when it will next attempt a
half-open probe; see [Provider health](#provider-health-discovery-circuit-breaker)).
`openUntil` is the zero time when `healthState` is not `"open"`. Each
alias entry carries its own `modelMeta` too. `usage`
returns every user's and every group's
current-window counter values — `requestsPerMinute`, `requestsPerDay`,
`tokensInPerDay`/`tokensOutPerDay`, `tokensInPerMonth`/
`tokensOutPerMonth`, `costPerDayMicroUsd`, `costPerMonthMicroUsd` —
alongside their configured limits, plus one extra `total` row: the
synthetic all-traffic scope (see [Limits and accounting](
#limits-and-accounting)), limits always `null`. A group row also carries
its configured `providers`/`models`/`mcpServers`/`agents` access lists,
omitted when unrestricted. The dashboard's Providers and Usage views
poll both every 5 seconds while open.
- **`GET /admin/api/usage/history`** returns a bucketed series for one
scope/metric/window — the data source for the dashboard's Charts view
(per-user/per-group/per-model/total, stacked tokens-in/tokens-out, with
a 24h/30d/12mo window switcher). Query parameters:
- `scope`: `user:{id}`, `group:{id}`, `model:{provider}/{model}`, or the
literal `total`.
- `metric`: `req`, `tokin`, `tokout`, or `cost`.
- `window`: `hour`, `day`, or `month`.
- `span` (optional): number of buckets, oldest-first, inclusive of the
current (possibly partial) bucket. Defaults to the window's max —
`48` for `hour`, `35` for `day`, `13` for `month` — and a larger
value is a `400`.
An unrecognized `scope`/`metric`/`window`, or an out-of-range `span`,
is `400`; a `user`/`group` id that names no configured entity — or a
`model` id outside the live catalog — is `404`; the configured store
being unreachable is `503` (a chart must never read an outage as "zero
usage"). Response shape:
`{"scope","metric","window","points":[{"bucket":"2026082114","value":123},...]}`.
The Charts view fetches this once per selection change, plus a 30s
auto-refresh of the current selection.
- **`GET /admin/api/usage/models`** ranks models by usage — the data
source for the Charts view's "Models" tab, and for the model entries in
its scope picker. Query parameters:
- `metric`: `req`, `tokin`, `tokout`, or `cost`.
- `window`: `hour`, `day`, or `month`. The ranking reads that window's
CURRENT bucket, not a span of them.
- `limit` (optional): 1-100, default 20.
Response shape: `{"metric","window","models":[{"id":"uni/qwen3-next","value":4100},...]}`,
sorted by `value` descending, ties broken on `id` ascending so a ranking
stays stable between polls. **Only models with non-zero usage are
returned** — a catalog runs to hundreds of models, so an empty `models`
array means "nothing used in this window", never "nothing configured".
Validation mirrors `usage/history`: a bad `metric`/`window`/`limit` is
`400`, an unreachable store is `503`.
Each `id` is the canonical `provider/model` of the provider that
actually **served** the request, so a request that failed over is
attributed to the provider that answered it, and one bare model id
reachable through two providers ranks as two separate rows. Per-model
counters are written after the response (that is the first point at
which the serving model is known), which is also why a passthrough reply
whose upstream reports no model id is counted for its user, group and
total but for no model.
- **`GET /admin/api/targets`** returns every configured MCP server and
agent for the dashboard's "MCP & Agents" tab:
`{"mcpServers":[...],"agents":[...]}`, each entry
`{"name","url","access","counters","health"}`. `url` has any userinfo/query
string stripped, same as a provider's `baseUrl` in `overview`. `access`
is the list of group names actually allowed to reach that target,
computed via the identical glob match `mcpServers`/`agents`
authorization itself uses (`GroupConfig.mcpServers`/`agents`), so this
view can never disagree with what the proxy enforces; omitted when
every configured group can reach it. `counters` is
`requestsPerMinute`/`requestsPerDay`/`requestsPerMonth` — requests
only, no tokens or cost (see [MCP and A2A](#mcp-and-a2a) for why).
`health` is `{"state","lastCheck","lastError","consecutiveFailures","latencyMs","source"}`
— see [MCP and A2A](#mcp-and-a2a)'s "Target health" section for the
full contract. `state` is `"unknown"`, `"healthy"`, or `"unhealthy"`,
and `consecutiveFailures` is always present; every other field is
omitted while `state` is `"unknown"` (this target has never been
observed). This route always reads existing state; when
`targetHealth.enabled`, it additionally triggers a background probe
sweep when one is due, so the response itself never waits on that
sweep. Polled every 5 seconds, in the same batch as `overview` and
`usage`.
- **What's exposed**: provider names, types, base URLs (with any
userinfo/query string stripped before it's ever echoed), model counts,
discovery status, group/user names, membership, limits, MCP/agent
target names/URLs/access, and live usage counters. **Never exposed**:
API keys (not even digests), provider keys, the Redis password, or
users-file path contents — every secret-bearing field is redacted from
every response.
- **Admin traffic is never counted**: none of the five `/admin/api/*`
JSON routes call `checkAndCount` — admin polling never moves any
user's or group's `requestsPerMinute`/`requestsPerDay` counters, and
usage statistics reflect real LLM traffic only (operator directive: an
admin dashboard tab left open, however aggressively it polls, must
never itself distort the numbers it displays). The direct consequence:
an admin's own `requestsPerMinute`/`requestsPerDay` limit, if
configured, is never enforced against admin-route traffic either — an
admin key holder can poll any of the four routes as fast as they like.
This is an accepted trade-off, not an oversight: these are admin-gated,
cheap reads, and an admin holder polling aggressively is a
self-inflicted, not a shared, resource cost. `GET /admin` and
`GET /admin/assets/*` count nothing either, for the simpler reason that
they are unauthenticated — there is no identified user to count a
request against.
- **Response headers**: all four JSON routes set
`X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` and `Cache-Control: no-store`; every
hashed asset sets `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` and its own
immutable `Cache-Control` (above). Every one of these routes — `GET
/admin`, every hashed asset, and the four JSON routes — shares one
`Content-Security-Policy` header (`default-src 'none'; script-src
'self'; style-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:;
frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'`) — no
`'unsafe-inline'`, since the built app has no inline script or style of
any kind, only external `/admin/assets/*` references; `img-src`
additionally allows `data:` for the page's inlined favicon. A browser
only enforces CSP against the top-level document that names it, so an
asset response's own header governs nothing when the browser fetched it
as a `