Billing:
- Passthrough SSE streams now bill the usage the upstream reports.
The gateway falls back to a request-size estimate only on a 2xx
stream or a truncated JSON body.
- A unified stream that fails after it starts is estimated, not
billed at zero.
- Billing uses the built-in LiteLLM price table and honours
modelMeta free: true.
- Pricing entries are validated. Cost arithmetic rounds the total and
saturates on overflow.
- Gemini thinking tokens count as completion tokens.
Limits and storage:
- A rejected request rolls back its counts on the other scopes, so one
user cannot lock out a group.
- Redis EXPIRE replies are checked. Keys recreated without a TTL are
repaired at once.
- A mutating pipeline is not retried after reply bytes arrive.
- History, model totals and target usage report a store outage.
Routing and translation:
- Discovered ids with a provider-like prefix are listed only in
owner/id form, so listing and routing agree.
- Anthropic and Gemini discovery follows pagination.
- The developer role maps to system.
- stream_options.include_usage is honoured on translated streams.
- tool_choice none keeps tools when history holds tool blocks.
- refusal maps to content_filter. Data URI parameters are stripped.
Streaming, retry and failover:
- SSE accepts CR, LF and CRLF line ends. This closes a CR injection
path.
- Retry-After is never jittered. A cancelled wait returns the
context error.
- The watchdog timer stops at end of body.
- Oversized bodies return 413.
- A failed stream ends with an error event.
- Failover restores pre-existing headers. Client cancels do not count
as provider successes.
Also: "admin" is a reserved provider name. metrics.path must start
with "/". Pricing warnings go to the right gateway instance. The admin
targets view sends access as null or [] so the two states differ.
Upstream organisation headers are stripped. The users-file reload
error is logged once per error. Dead code is removed, and test-only
helpers move to test files.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01V5jYJNxpDFdJkyyExpADrv
F1: TestModelRegistry_MaybeRefresh_Throttled_OnePerInterval mutated a
plain `now` variable while a background refresh goroutine read it
through nowFn, racing under -race in about 14% of full-suite runs once
this branch's timer-heavy tests shared the parallel phase. Guards the
clock with a mutex instead. registry.go is untouched.
F4: a mid-body watchdog timeout never reached provider-health
accounting. limiter.recordProviderAttempt only ran at header-arrival
time, so a provider that reliably stalled mid-body reported
attempts=1 failures=0 forever. watchdogBody.fire now invokes the same
attemptRecorder a second time, as a failure, when it fires. Reuses the
existing recorder rather than adding new plumbing; this does mean two
attempts are recorded for one logical request (one success at header
time, one failure at watchdog-fire time), not one attempt marked
failed outright.
F6: watchdogBody.Read reset the timer on any err == nil read,
regardless of n. A reader returning (0, nil) forever would have held
the watchdog open indefinitely. Reset now only fires when n > 0.
F9 (three items):
- proxyUpstream passed logPrefix as a bare providerName, which
newWatchdogBody wrapped in a hardcoded `provider %q` — labeling an
MCP/A2A target as a provider. watchdogBody now takes an
already-formatted label from the caller instead.
- errUpstream was wrapped twice: once in watchdogBody's own error, once
again by every caller that already wraps it. watchdogBody now wraps
only errProviderTimeout; callers' existing wraps still make
errors.Is(err, errUpstream) hold.
- timeout_test.go read wb.timedOut directly in one place while every
other access is atomic; switched to atomic.LoadInt32.
Also rewords errProviderTimeout's message from "provider request timed
out" to "upstream progress stalled" (finding F3, documented not fixed
per coordinator ruling): the watchdog measures time since the last
successful upstream read, which can go quiet because of a slow client
write between reads, not only a slow provider. The new wording no
longer asserts which side caused it.
New tests: TestChatCompletion_Stream_StallsMidBody_RecordsProviderFailure,
TestWatchdogBody_ZeroByteRead_DoesNotResetTimer,
TestWatchdogBody_TimeoutError_UsesCallerLabel_NotHardcodedProvider.
Each mutation-verified per its own doc comment.
TestWatchdogBody_NoBlockingGoroutineLeak_AcrossManyRequests drove its
timed-out iterations against a server that never wrote headers. That
hits Transport.ResponseHeaderTimeout inside client.Do and returns
before a response ever exists, so watchdogBody.fire never runs and the
test could not have caught a leak in fire itself.
The mutation-verification pass (manually adding a permanently blocked
goroutine to fire, then reverting) confirmed this: the test passed
even with that goroutine present. Fixing the stalling server to write
headers first, mirroring the mid-body-stall tests above it, makes
fire run on every iteration. Re-running the same mutation now fails
the test as intended.
Adapters previously issued upstream requests with no timeout at all.
A provider that accepted a connection and then stalled hung the
gateway request forever. newAdapterHTTPClient now sets
Transport.ResponseHeaderTimeout, and every response body read
(providers.go's upstreamBytes, routes_passthrough.go's proxyUpstream)
runs through a watchdogBody that resets on every successful read and
cancels the request once timeout passes with no progress.
The idle-progress design lets a long stream that keeps emitting tokens
run indefinitely. Only silence, never total duration, ends a request.
Config.RequestTimeout sets the global default (five minutes when
unset). ProviderConfig.RequestTimeout overrides it per provider. Both
are Go duration strings, validated at construction; a zero or negative
value is rejected rather than treated as unlimited, since that would
reintroduce the hang this feature fixes.
Native passthrough (routes_passthrough.go) and the MCP/A2A target
proxy (mcp_a2a.go) share the identical watchdog mechanism through
proxyUpstream's new timeout parameter.
A watchdog-fired timeout wraps errProviderTimeout and names the
provider. It never wraps context.Canceled, so it stays distinguishable
from a genuine client disconnect in every existing log classification.
lukaszraczylo