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47e22e627cd3537666c496d5b2317ca46db828c9
39
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 lukaszraczylo
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47e22e627c |
fix(metrics): close the default-config store-down gap, fix escaping
Three blocking fixes from a second round of adversarial verification, plus two should-fix items bundled in since they touch the same code. storeDown detection covered only the fail-CLOSED path. failOpen defaults to true (newConfiguredLimiter), so on the shipped default a broken store made storeGetMulti return ok=true after silently reading the empty in-process fallback, bypassing every storeDown guard in metrics.go. Add limiter.configuredStoreDown, checked alongside ok in currentUsage and providerUsage, so a fail-open read served from the fallback is treated the same as a fail-closed refusal. The pinning test previously hand-set failOpen=false, which meant it only ever exercised the case that was already correct; it now leaves failOpen at its true default. The escaping rewrite from the previous round achieved injectivity by copying an invalid UTF-8 byte through raw, which can make the output itself invalid UTF-8. Measured against a real Prometheus scrape parser this round: invalid UTF-8 in a label value is fatal, the scrape target goes down, which is worse than the duplicate series the previous round was fixing (measured non-fatal, dropped and logged, target stays up). Replace an invalid byte with a deterministic \xHH marker instead, proven injective and always valid UTF-8 by an exhaustive test over every 1- and 2-byte input, not merely spot-checked. Also adds the fast path a benchmark showed the byte-oriented rewrite needed: unescaped, already-valid-UTF-8 input, the common case, returns unchanged with zero allocations instead of paying a full copy. llmgateway_rate_limit_rejections_total's HELP text claimed it "resets only on restart", which stopped being true once the previous round added generation-rotation bounding and reload-triggered eviction: a scope resets when its user is removed, and every tracked scope resets together in bulk the instant the tracked-scope cap is exceeded. The HELP text and README now say so. Adds llmgateway_limit_store_up, a per-replica gauge for this process's own connection health to the configured limit store: with the store flapping faster than its fail latch, every store-backed family can go silent scrape after scrape with nothing on the endpoint itself saying why. Also adds a test pinning that Gateway.pruneRejectionsAfterReload runs only when authStore.maybeReload reports a real reload, never on every request. |
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lukaszraczylo
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935df1a3f0 |
docs(metrics): add README section, testData, and a scrape example
The metrics feature shipped in code only: no README section, no
metrics block in .traefik.yml testData, nothing under examples/. The
Go doc comments were the entire manual for a human operator or a
config-generating assistant.
Add a README Metrics section covering the served path, both auth
modes (admin bearer token, optional CIDR allowlist), the CIDR-sizing
warning with the live-reproduced SNAT failure mode, the modelLabel
cardinality trade-off, the exposed metric families, the cross-replica
aggregation contract, label escaping, and store-outage behaviour. Add
a MetricsConfig reference table matching the existing AdminConfig
one, and a metrics row in the top-level Config table.
Add metrics: {enabled: true} to .traefik.yml's testData, the
catalog-facing smoke-test config, deliberately without allowedCIDRs
so a copy-pasted example never skips the README's own sizing
guidance.
Add a metrics block to the Kubernetes Middleware example and a
VMServiceScrape resource: the target cluster runs VictoriaMetrics, not
Prometheus, so the CRD differs even though the exposition format does
not. Verified the VMServiceScrape shape (apiVersion, selector,
endpoints, path) against the victoriametrics/operator documentation
rather than assuming it. Notes that /metrics is served by Traefik
itself, not by any backend service, since this middleware intercepts
the path before a backend is ever reached.
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lukaszraczylo
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208084ac83 |
merge: serve the Anthropic Messages API inbound
# Conflicts: # tools/yaegi-check/main.go |
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lukaszraczylo
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3e1f188426 |
fix(routes): preserve response bytes and close remaining test gaps
Replace the alias-echo rewrite on the Anthropic passthrough branch with a byte-preserving field replacement. The prior version decoded the response into a Go map and re-marshaled it. This silently corrupted a JSON integer beyond float64's exact range. It also rewrote 1.0 to 1, HTML-escaped angle brackets and ampersands, and re-sorted every key. A tool_use block's "input" is arbitrary model-generated JSON. A long numeric id inside tool arguments could be silently corrupted on a route documented as passthrough. rewriteModelField now walks the response with a JSON decoder and copies every field but "model" as raw bytes. Add a test with a 20-digit integer, a 1.0 float, and a literal "<" character inside tool_use input. It asserts the response is byte-identical to the source apart from the model field. Add a negative test for the anthropic-beta header allowlist. It asserts Authorization and Cookie never reach the upstream. It also asserts the upstream sees exactly one x-api-key value: the gateway's own key, never the client's. A single Get() call could miss a second, leaked value, since Set() and Add() interact in a way a naive check would not catch. The test checks the Values() length explicitly. Add a test case for the native passthrough route's prompt-cache billing. It fails if cache_creation_input_tokens or cache_read_input_tokens drop out of the billed prompt count. This closes a production billing change that previously carried no coverage at all. Decouple response delivery from usage extraction on the passthrough branch. A response body read failure, or a malformed usage field, no longer both discard the response and misreport the failure as an upstream connection error. A read failure still returns an error, now correctly classified as a translation failure. A malformed usage field no longer blocks the response at all: the client still gets it, and the existing zero-usage estimate takes over for accounting. Return the adapter's own usage value on a chatCompletion error in the translated path, instead of discarding it. This has no effect while streaming stays rejected up front. It prevents the same critical bug from resurfacing once streaming support lands. Normalize tool_result content to a plain string before applying the error prefix. The prior version only prefixed a Go string. Anthropic's array content form, which Claude Code sends, lost the is_error signal entirely. Absent content now becomes an empty string instead of the JSON null OpenAI rejects. Treat "stream": null the same as an absent key. The prior fix for a non-boolean stream value also rejected null. An SDK that serializes an unset optional field as null must still get an ordinary non-streaming response. Drop a yaegi-check assertion that could not fail. The fixture configures no cache, so the header it checked was never set regardless of what the code under test did. A mutation pass confirmed this: it deleted the line the assertion was meant to guard, and make yaegi-check still reported OK. Document that this route now intercepts POST /v1/messages unconditionally, even under passthroughUnknown, where it previously fell through to the next handler. Add the note to both the new README section and Known limitations. Correct the passthrough table's claim about response bytes to describe the actual guarantee. |
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lukaszraczylo
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46a3577162 |
docs: fix the provider health section and update the 6h default
The Provider health section claimed a broken provider stops being re-probed "every single interval forever", while its own third bullet said the opposite: under stock config the interval remained the binding constraint and nothing was actually suppressed. Rewrite the opening paragraph and the bullet to state the real relationship plainly: the backoff window only ever reduces re-probe frequency once it exceeds discoveryInterval, and the shipped defaults are chosen so that holds. Update every remaining reference to the old 30m maxOpenDuration default to the new 6h value, in the BreakerConfig reference table and the Provider health section, and explain what a misconfigured relationship between discoveryInterval and maxOpenDuration does. |
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lukaszraczylo
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e82dabb1dc |
docs: document the discovery circuit breaker
Add BreakerConfig to the full configuration reference, alongside RetryConfig and CacheConfig, and add a breaker row to the top-level Config table. Add a new Provider health section explaining the three states, the failure classification, the neutral treatment of a canceled context, and the scope limitation: the signal reflects the discovery endpoint only and must not be the sole reason to refuse routing to a provider. Also document the new healthState and openUntil fields GET /admin/api/overview returns per provider, in the same sentence that already lists discoveryEnabled, modelRates, and modelMeta. |
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lukaszraczylo
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25e73cb585 |
fix(routes): address review findings on the Anthropic Messages route
Preserve usage when response translation fails after a successful, billed upstream call. The route previously discarded already-billed tokens on that path. A client could induce unlimited free usage against any budget via a truncated tool-call response. Reject a streaming request with 400 instead of 501. Check it before the rate limiter runs. A 501 made anthropic-sdk-python retry the request, since it retries any status of 500 or higher. Each retry also counted against the caller's rate limit before this fix. Preserve block order when translating an Anthropic message to OpenAI's shape. A tool_result block before other content must stay before it. OpenAI otherwise rejects the translated conversation. Echo the client's requested model alias in both the passthrough and the translated response paths. The passthrough branch previously returned the upstream's own model id instead. Forward the anthropic-beta header to an anthropic-type upstream through an explicit allowlist. Never forward Authorization, x-api-key, Cookie, or hop-by-hop headers. Let the adapter's own credential injection win regardless. Bill Anthropic's prompt-cache tokens. anthropicUsagePayload now reads cache_creation_input_tokens and cache_read_input_tokens too. It folds all three into the billed prompt count. This applies to this route, the existing outbound Anthropic path, and the native passthrough route. Extract the metered-request pipeline shared by the unified route and this route into runMeteredCall. Thread an envelope writer through it so each route answers in its own error shape. This removes the duplication the original brief warned against. It also lets the rate-limit and body-admission error paths answer in this route's own shape. Treat a non-boolean "stream" value as a streaming request. A string or number value previously bypassed the streaming check silently. Emit max_completion_tokens instead of max_tokens for OpenAI's reasoning models. Those models reject max_tokens with a 400. Preserve tool_result.is_error by prefixing string content with "Error: ". OpenAI's tool message carries no error field of its own. Log a warning when the thinking field is dropped instead of discarding it silently. Classify a response-translation failure distinctly in the log. An operator must never see a genuine translation bug reported as an upstream connection error. Document the route in README.md. Cover both auth headers, the non-streaming limitation, and which providers translate versus pass through. Add the reviewer's yaegi-check probes to tools/yaegi-check/main.go, adjusted for the fixes above. |
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lukaszraczylo
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9dc67dedbb |
feat: add anonymous usage reporting, matching traefikoidc
Release builds send one anonymous "plugin loaded" ping per process, so the project can see roughly how many installs exist and which versions are in use. The payload is project name, version and timestamp. Nothing else leaves the pod: no identifiers, no hostname, no configuration, no provider names, no keys, no request data. Three things keep it from firing when it should not. Builds from source carry the devPluginVersion sentinel and stay silent, so developer checkouts and every test run never phone home. The ping is sent only after the plugin constructs successfully, so a rejected configuration is never counted as an install. A sync.Once holds it to one per process, because Traefik calls New once per route and oss-telemetry does not deduplicate on the client side. Operators of a release build opt out with DO_NOT_TRACK=1, OSS_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=1, or TRAEFIK_LLMGATEWAY_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1. README.md documents the full payload and the opt-out; a plugin that phones home without saying so in its own README would be indefensible. oss-telemetry is the plugin's first non-stdlib RUNTIME dependency, which has consequences for the Yaegi gate: - vendor/ is no longer excluded from yaegi-check's GOPATH copy. It was excluded on the reasoning that it held only test-only testify and _test.go files are never interpreted. That reasoning no longer holds: leaving vendor out would make the interpreted copy fail to resolve an import the real plugin tree resolves fine, so the gate would stop representing production. - yaegi-check now stamps a fake release version into its GOPATH copy so New's telemetry gate is PASSED rather than short-circuited, and the vendored package is actually called under the interpreter. Import resolution alone is not coverage; a cross-package call into interpreted third-party code is its own risk. Telemetry is suppressed by env vars set before anything is interpreted, so the gate never emits a real ping. - A new assertion reads the version back through GET /admin/api/overview. Without it a silently failed stamp would leave the dev sentinel in place and the harness would still print OK while covering nothing. Verified by disabling the stamp and watching the gate fail. shouldSendTelemetry is split out from sendStartupTelemetry so the decision is table-testable without a network, since oss-telemetry's endpoint is deliberately not overridable from consuming code. Also brings the version-gated documentation up to date, since the same README edit touches it. The latest release is v1.0.3, so the pre-1.0 experimental warning has met its own stated condition and is replaced by a semver stability statement in README.md and dropped from .traefik.yml's catalog summary. The catalog now serves the released tags (verified: the v1.0.3 download endpoint returns 200), so the "not yet published" and "analyzer has not been run" claims are corrected, the catalog form of the static config is documented as usable, and examples/kubernetes.yaml pins v1.0.3 instead of v0.1.0. |
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lukaszraczylo
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03fe1d6589 |
docs(readme): document body-admission limit and the narrower unified cap
Round-3, 2026-08-22 review (SHOULD-6): maxInFlightBodyRequests, the new 503, and the unified routes' narrower 4MiB decode cap appeared nowhere in the README -- a gap on a public Catalog plugin. Also corrected the now-stale "images/generations and audio/speech share the unified routes' 10MiB JSON cap" line: the unified chat/embeddings routes moved to 4MiB while the media routes kept 10MiB, so they no longer share a cap at all. Added: - maxInFlightBodyRequests to the top-level Config reference table. - A new "Body-admission limit" subsection under Limits and accounting, covering the semaphore's scope (read+decode only, not the whole request), the 503+Retry-After behavior, the self-tuning default, the 4MiB unified cap, and the explicit note that native passthrough is not gated by this at all (streams rather than decodes). |
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lukaszraczylo
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e57a97d63e |
fix(passthrough): close Content-Type bypass and matcher-parity bug
Independent review measured two real gaps in the round-1 model
enforcement and fixed both here, plus documentation and comment
regressions the round introduced.
MUST FIX: peekPassthroughModel's Content-Type gate was an ALLOW-list
("application/json" or skip") and fully client-controlled. The
reviewer sent "Content-Type: text/plain" with {"model":"EXPENSIVE"}
and got a 200 from a group scoped to a cheap model. This commit
replaces the whole gating approach:
1. A group with an empty Models list has nothing for allowsModel to
reject, so the request body is never read at all
(group.hasModelRestriction). This is the overwhelming majority of
traffic, including the operator's own "home" group, and removes
the memory-buffering concern entirely for it.
2. For a group WITH a restricted Models list, the Content-Type gate
is now a SKIP-list of genuinely binary types (multipart/, audio/,
image/, video/, application/octet-stream). Every other
Content-Type, including "text/plain" or none at all, is
inspected. The attacker no longer controls whether the check
runs.
3. The peek reads at most 64KiB (maxModelPeekBytes), restored via
io.MultiReader so the remainder streams straight to the upstream
instead of a second full buffer. A bounded JSON token walk
(scanTopLevelModel) finds a top-level "model" key even when the
rest of the body is truncated past the cap.
4. A restricted group whose peek window never finds "model" is
denied (403), fail closed. This also means a Gemini passthrough
request (its model lives in the URL, never the body) is always
denied for a model-restricted group; documented in
maxModelPeekBytes' own comment, the handler's doc comment, and
the README.
Matcher parity: the round-1 version glued providerName+"/" onto
whatever the body sent unconditionally, so an already-prefixed body
("openai/x") produced "openai/openai/x" and false-403'd a legitimate
client. allowsPassthroughModel now reuses modelRegistry.
splitConfiguredProvider — the same rule resolve/resolveAgainst apply
to a client-given id — to strip a leading segment only when it names
an actually configured provider, before generating candidates.
Also in this commit:
- Restored ~26 lines of doc comments fieldalignment -fix silently
dropped when it reordered the group struct (auth.go: cache,
cacheTTL) and ProviderConfig (llmgateway.go: MetadataPath, and the
Passthrough field's own new comment). Verified nothing else was
reordered by re-running fieldalignment: 0 issues.
- Documented the path.Match footgun a non-empty PassthroughPaths
inherits: "*" does not cross "/", so ["*"] denies almost all real
multi-segment passthrough traffic rather than allowing it. Empty is
the actual allow-all value. Documented on the config field, the
allowsPassthroughPath method, and the handler's own doc comment.
- Renamed the local "model" that shadowed the outer request-model
variable near extractPassthroughUsage's call site to "respModel" —
the new gating already scopes the outer one to a narrower block, so
this was no longer a live shadow, but the rename removes any future
ambiguity between the request's model and the response's.
- README: rewrote the two "Unified vs. passthrough" table cells that
described the OPPOSITE of this feature's actual behavior, added a
"Native passthrough model authorization" section, and added
providers.<name>.passthrough / groups.<name>.passthroughPaths rows
to the config tables.
New tests: the Content-Type-bypass regression (text/plain, absent,
form-urlencoded, all now 403), the matcher-parity case (already-
prefixed body allowed), fail-closed on a binary body for a restricted
group, skip-entirely for an unrestricted group, byte-identical body
forwarding for a body larger than the peek cap and for a
ContentLength<0 (chunked) request, and a scanTopLevelModel unit table
covering truncation before/after the model field, nested values, and
malformed input.
Gate re-run in full after these changes: gofmt, go vet, fieldalignment,
golangci-lint (0 issues), go test -race (ok), make yaegi-check (OK),
make integration (ok, real Traefik + Redis). Re-ran the interpreted
Yaegi harness: RTT/req unchanged at 3.00, cmds/req unchanged at 74.00.
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lukaszraczylo
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2d10509e20 |
docs: render correctly on the Traefik plugin catalog
The catalog uses a plain CommonMark renderer, not GitHub's: the "[!WARNING]" alert syntax printed literally and the mermaid block rendered as a wall of diagram source. Use a portable bold blockquote and fold the diagram into <details> so plain renderers collapse it while GitHub still draws it. |
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lukaszraczylo
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171f6d04c9 |
docs(readme): document model metadata (review SHOULD-7)
New 'Model metadata' section: the context/cost layering order, the modelMeta config override example (mirrors the operator's own cluster snippet), alias inheritance, the ":free" naming convention, the metadataPath discovery capture (including the loaded-vs-max-context volatility note — a discovery refresh can legitimately report a different context window across reloads), the pricing-sync/built-in table workflow, and the two GET /v1/models extension fields with a worked example. Config reference tables gain a ModelMetaConfig subsection and modelMeta/metadataPath rows on Config/ProviderConfig; the Admin section notes the per-provider and per-alias modelMeta fields on GET /admin/api/overview. |
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lukaszraczylo
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21f51dc282 |
docs(readme): note bounded fire-and-forget writes for provider counters
Re-read the provider/model success-rate paragraph against the FIXED
deadline behavior (v0.22 review round, round 2) per instruction — the
claim itself ("a real deadline counts as a failure") was already
accurate and needed no correction; the multi-wrap bug it was allegedly
describing never surfaced through the README, since the README
describes intended behavior, not the wrap-depth implementation detail
that broke it. Added: FOLDED-1's bound (64 in flight per process,
lossy-under-pressure by design) on the fire-and-forget write this
paragraph already described, and an explicit note that enforcement never
goes through this path.
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lukaszraczylo
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9d079f093c |
docs(readme): provider success-rate counters and admin fields
SHOULD-3 (v0.22 review round). Documents: - The new llmgw:prov:*/llmgw:provmodel:* counter key families under Limits and accounting: format, minute/day-only windows and their TTLs, and the SHOULD-1 semantics — a timed-out attempt counts as a failure, a client-canceled one does not, both on top of retry.go's own transient classification, reused not forked. - Native passthrough's provider-level-only accounting limitation (no resolved model at attempt time). - The new adminProviderView fields (discoveryEnabled, attemptsDay/ failuresDay/attemptsMinute/failuresMinute, modelRates) under Admin's GET /admin/api/overview description. |
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lukaszraczylo
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ad5adbcc1d |
docs(readme): handshake fallback, legacy-SSE exclusion, protocol allowlist (SF5)
Rewrote the federated POST /mcp bullets to document the review round 2 fix batch: per-backend timeouts (20s tools/list, 120s tools/call), the bare-first-with-fallback session handshake and exactly what triggers it (JSON-RPC error or HTTP 4xx, never a network failure or 5xx), the legacy HTTP+SSE-transport exclusion (URL path ending '/sse') and why no handshake can fix it, the loud 'no MCP server reachable' error when every attempted server fails, non-2xx/ empty-envelope rejection, the protocol-version allowlist, and the new 405 for a disallowed method on /mcp. Extended the admin-API GET /admin/api/targets bullet, the total-scope accounting list, and the rejected-before-quota bullet to include the federated endpoint. Architecture diagram gains a Federated branch node (render-checked with mmdc). |
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lukaszraczylo
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d565c1d4ea |
feat(mcp): federated /mcp aggregation endpoint
New POST /mcp: a single JSON-RPC 2.0 endpoint aggregating every MCP
server the caller's group can reach, for clients built against the
earlier pre-plugin gateway's one aggregated endpoint (pugbot's
mcpclient, agentkit) rather than this plugin's per-server
/mcp/{name}/... proxy.
Unlike the per-server proxy, this cannot be a byte-level reverse
proxy: aggregating N servers' tools/list results, or routing one
tools/call to the single right server, both require actually parsing
the JSON-RPC envelope. The gateway answers initialize/ping locally
and, for tools/list/tools/call, issues its own outbound JSON-RPC
call(s) to the relevant backend server(s) per incoming request — no
session state persisted across separate client requests, matching the
per-server proxy's own complete absence of gateway-side session
tracking. A backend may answer bare JSON or an SSE stream; both are
accepted (parseBackendJSONRPC).
- tools/list fans out concurrently to every allowed server and merges
results, prefixing each tool "<serverName>_<toolName>" — the
underscore convention the earlier agentgateway used and that
pugbot/agentkit already persist in their own tool-id records (e.g.
brave-search_brave_web_search, verified live). A failing/unreachable
server is skipped, not a whole-call failure.
- tools/call resolves the target by LONGEST matching
"<serverName>_" prefix against the caller's allowed servers
(disambiguates a server name that prefixes another), strips it,
forwards, and relays the result/error under the CLIENT's own id. An
unresolvable prefix (unconfigured, or authz-excluded) is a JSON-RPC
invalid-params error, not a 404.
- Reuses Feature B's countTargetRequest for per-target attribution —
every backend server actually contacted increments its own scope.
- notifications/* -> 202 no body; unknown method -> JSON-RPC
method-not-found; malformed body -> JSON-RPC parse error with
id:null (spec-required, not omitted).
No new limits config surface. Tests cover prefix resolution
(table-driven, incl. the ambiguous-prefix case), SSE/JSON backend
parsing, group-restricted aggregation (a denied server is never even
contacted), call routing/prefix-stripping, backend error relay,
unreachable-server handling, unknown-prefix errors, and per-target
counter attribution. README's MCP and A2A section documents the
federation contract and naming convention; the architecture diagram
and the total-scope/rejected-before-quota notes are updated to
include the new route.
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lukaszraczylo
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90545df588 | docs: drop reference to local design-doc path | ||
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lukaszraczylo
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b081055aaa |
fix(admin): wire-level access tests, MCP/agent UI, glob-safe chips
Review fix round on the group-access-display feature (Should-Fix + folded items): 1. TestAdminUsage_GroupAccessLists now asserts at the raw-JSON level, not just the typed adminUsageResponse struct: decodes rows into map[string]json.RawMessage and checks the four access-list keys are ENTIRELY ABSENT on user/total rows and an unrestricted group, PRESENT with exact values on a restricted group. A typed-struct decode alone cannot prove omitempty is doing its job -- a present-but-null field decodes into the same nil []string a genuinely absent key would. Verified by temporarily stripping the omitempty tags: the new assertions fail (four keys read back 'null'); the old struct-only assertions stayed green throughout, confirming the gap the review flagged. 2. UsageView.vue's Access block now renders MCP servers and Agents too, same Badge treatment as Providers, with muted 'All MCP servers'/ 'All agents' fallbacks -- GroupConfig carries all four lists (llmgateway.go), so the display now matches the payload instead of dropping two of the four fields silently. 3. A configured Models entry containing *, ?, or [ (path.Match's own special characters -- auth.go's matchesGlob) is a pattern, not a routable id: it now renders as a plain, non-copyable Badge (font-mono, secondary) instead of the copyable ModelChip, so a caller can no longer copy a glob pattern into a request's model field thinking it's a real id. Every Access label (Providers/Models/MCP servers/Agents) also gets a title attribute (one shared GLOB_HINT constant) making the glob-match semantics discoverable, since all four lists are glob-matched, not just Models. 4. groupSummary's providers/models/mcpServers/agents are now independent copies (cloneStringSlice), not aliases of the live group.* slices authorization reads on every request -- structurally prevents a future display-side sort/mutation from ever reordering or corrupting enforcement data. slices.Clone was tried first and reverted: it broke make yaegi-check (yaegi's stdlib symbol table does not resolve the generic slices package's type parameters under interpretation), so cloneStringSlice uses plain make/copy builtins instead -- verified yaegi-check passes with this version. 5. README.md's usage endpoint section: fixed the stale 'Overview and Usage views' reference (now 'Providers', matching the earlier tab rename) and added one line naming the new providers/models/ mcpServers/agents group-access fields, matching the section's existing terseness. 6. Renamed the 'unrestricted group carries empty/omitted lists' subtest to 'empty or omitted' -- the slash broke -run subtest path matching. 7. The Access block now uses the same dl/dt/dd markup as the sibling stat grid immediately below it, instead of a bespoke div/p structure -- one convention per panel. |
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lukaszraczylo
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dc8663673b | docs: mark project experimental PoC until version 1.0 | ||
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lukaszraczylo
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b98416d1e9 |
fix(webui): version display, CSP guards, config traps, bucket-aligned stacking
Review fix round (4 Important + 2 folded): 1. Version display: OverviewView.vue was missing the muted version line the old vanilla-JS page rendered (types/api.ts already declared overview.version) - added. 2. CSP invariant now guarded twice: webui/generate.mjs's new assertNoInlineAssets fails the build if dist/index.html contains an inline <script> (no src= attribute) or any <style> tag - the exact condition the tightened admin CSP (script-src/style-src 'self', no 'unsafe-inline') depends on. admin_test.go's new TestAdminIndexHTML_NoInlineAssets re-asserts the identical invariant server-side, against the decoded adminIndexHTML admin.go actually serves, so a regression is caught even if admin_assets_gen.go were regenerated with a modified copy of generate.mjs. 3. webui/components.json's iconLibrary:"lucide"/font:"inter" fields cannot be fixed in place - checked shadcn-vue's own schema (PRESET_ICON_LIBRARIES/PRESET_FONTS in the installed package): no "none"/fontawesome/system choice exists for either, and JSON (unlike the tsconfig.*.json files touched in the previous commit) has no comment syntax to warn inline. Documented instead: webui/README.md gained a loud warning section naming the exact regression (already hit twice this branch - a re-added Google Fonts import, a re-added lucide icon import) and the two-step fix to apply after any future shadcn-vue add/init call. 4. Real-CSP verification: the browser pass earlier in this branch ran under vite preview, which sends no CSP header at all. New integration/integration_test.go: TestAdminAssetCSP fetches GET /admin against the real Traefik+Yaegi pipeline, extracts the asset URL from its <script src="..."> tag, fetches that asset, and asserts both responses carry the exact adminCSP string byte-for-byte. admin.go's serveAdminAsset now also sets Content-Security-Policy (previously JSON/page routes only) so this holds for a direct navigation to an asset URL, not just as a same-origin sub-resource of GET /admin; admin_test.go's TestAdminAsset_Serving updated to match. 5. (folded) UsageChart.vue stacked the "tokens" tab's two series (tokin/tokout - two separate HTTP requests, not one atomic call) by positional index. A window rollover landing between the two requests could leave one series one bucket ahead, mis-stacking that refresh. Now aligns both series by their bucket key (a sorted union of every active series' buckets - the fixed-width, zero-padded bucket strings sort chronologically by construction), with a missing bucket in one series reading as 0 rather than shifting the whole series. 6. (folded) AuthGate.vue now triggers an immediate dashboard.refresh() on successful key submit, instead of waiting up to 5s for the next poll tick - the dashboard no longer sits blank right after auth. Rebuilt via make admin-ui; admin_assets_gen.go regenerated. |
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lukaszraczylo
|
afdb7415db |
docs: vue admin panel, usage charts, stats exclusion
README.md: ## Admin rewritten for the Vue rebuild (webui/, new
GET /admin/assets/{hashedname} route, tightened CSP with no more
'unsafe-inline', usage-charts description) and the stats-exclusion
directive ("Admin traffic is never counted" replaces "Poll counts
against quota"). ## Development gains `make admin-ui` plus a note
that Node is needed only for that one target.
docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-20-llmgateway-v02-design.md §4: an
amendment block documents the Vue rewrite (new route, tightened CSP,
Charts view) following this doc's established
controller-approved-amendment convention; the Accounting bullet is
amended for the stats-exclusion operator directive, with the original
wording struck through rather than deleted.
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lukaszraczylo
|
47b22d2d7f |
docs(limits): accurate fallback charting horizon and call-site attribution
1. README's fallback-charting story corrected: the 48h ceiling (memoryStoreMaxTTL) only binds hour and day, not month. hour charts its full default 48-bucket span; day shows only its most recent ~2-3 of the 35 possible buckets (its key still sits under the 48h ceiling). month is different: enforceTTLFor's ~32-day floor wins over the 48h ceiling there, so the CURRENT (in-progress) month's bucket charts in full on the fallback — only past months are unavailable, once their own key expired ~32 days after its own creation. Aligns with limits.go's clampTTL/enforceTTLFor and the +5d TestMemoryStore_IncrMulti_MonthCounterSurvivesPast48h... test from the prior round. 2. limits.go's "5 call sites, all in admin_test.go" attribution belonged to incrCounter, not incrBy — incrBy itself (memoryStore. incrBy and redisStore.incrBy together) has 11 direct test call sites. Fixed at both doc-comment sites (the counterStore interface doc and memoryStore.incrBy's own doc); the no-production-caller claim is unchanged and correct for both. 3. Appended the missing "Fix round 2" section to .superpowers/sdd/usage-history-report.md, documenting the enforcement-floor design (counterIncr.enforceTTL, enforceTTLFor, newCounterIncr, clampTTL's ceiling-vs-floor precedence) that this report's round-1 section never described. Corrected that same section's stale "incrMulti's loop inherits the clamp for free, since it calls incrBy" sentence — round 2 replaced that shape: incrMulti now clamps its own entries via the shared applyIncr primitive and no longer calls incrBy at all. Gate: go test ./... -count=1, gofmt, vet — all green. Docs and comments only, no behavior change. |
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lukaszraczylo
|
f9fa14ef3f |
fix(limits): enforcement-aware fallback TTL clamp
Re-review round on
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lukaszraczylo
|
5cc681496c |
perf(limits): single-batch counter writes, bounded fallback retention
Review fix round (2 Important + 5 folded) on 08cfdb4/b3fb705.
1. counterStore gains incrMulti(entries []counterIncr) ([]int64, error).
redisStore.incrMulti sends every entry's INCRBY+EXPIRE pair as ONE
pipeline (ttlToSeconds extracted from incrBy, now shared);
memoryStore.incrMulti loops incrBy for interface conformance.
checkAndCount batches every scope's req:min/req:day/req:hour into one
storeIncrMulti call (down from up to 9 round trips for a 3-scope
request) and reads req:min/req:day back from the reply, no extra
GETs. account batches every scope's nonzero tok-in/tok-out/cost
entries into one call (down from up to 27). Violation math and
fail-open/fail-closed/latched semantics are unchanged — only the
round-trip count moves.
2. memoryStoreMaxTTL (48h) caps every TTL memoryStore actually applies,
clamped inside incrBy so incrMulti's loop inherits it for free. The
in-process fallback is continuity, not history: applying the real
hour/day/month TTLs there was growing live-key count ~30x, multiplying
sweepEvery's own documented "167x incrBy cliff" by the same factor.
Sweep cadence is unchanged (still 30s-gated); the clamp shrinks what
there is to sweep instead.
Folded: historyMaxSpan's margin comment corrected (~4 days, not a
month); checkAndCount's godoc names req:hour; the integration
current-hour assertion sums every point instead of reading only the
last one (an hour-rollover race the suite cannot control); a new
exact-boundary test proves tokin+tokout landing exactly on a
TokensPerDay limit still violates; README documents the history route
as unthrottled (admin-gate is its only trust boundary) and the
fallback's 48h retention ceiling.
Tests: countingIncrStore proves exactly one incrMulti call per
checkAndCount and per account, with correct per-scope/metric/window
values and unchanged violation math; a fake-RESP-server test pins
incrMulti's wire format (one pipeline, entry-ordered replies); TTL
clamp tests cover both the ceiling and the pass-through case at the
boundary.
Gates: go test ./... -count=1, -race, gofmt, vet, golangci-lint,
make yaegi-check all green. make integration: every test passes
except the pre-existing TestUsersFileHotReload flake, which is NOT
caused by this change — verified via an isolated worktree at the
prior commit (
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lukaszraczylo
|
b3fb705b36 |
docs: document the tokens-in/out split, total scope, and history API
Extends Limits and accounting and Admin for the v0.2 data-layer
change (
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lukaszraczylo
|
611e9c04bc |
docs(hot-reload): honest settle semantics and TTL comment
Micro-fixes from re-review, all text/bound-level, no behavior change to production logic: 1. settleToBaseline's doc comment (config_hot_reload_test.go) claimed to guard the propagation window unconditionally. Reworded: it is a real guard on the fired path (two known rebuilds to wait out), best effort only on the skip path, where no amount of polling can prove a rebuild will never eventually fire — waiting is still required there because the earlier disappear-only check was a guaranteed-zero-wait bug, not because settling can prove safety on that path. 2. Restored the cleanup settle bound from 20s to 30s, matching the longest propagation delay actually observed during verification. 3. README's Config hot-reload intro dropped "on every run" and now states the same fired-vs-skip distinction the test's own Skip message makes: zero non-200s is blip-free-reload evidence only when the watch fires within the test's bound; otherwise it shows just that the stack survived an unreloaded rewrite attempt. 4. auth.go's group.cacheTTL field comment still said a positive value "overrides it for this group's cache entries only" — reworded to the corrected write-time/shared semantics: it sets the TTL written when that group's own request populates an entry, entries are shared across groups, not scoped by group. Gate: go build/vet/gofmt clean on both modules; go test ./... -count=1 green. |
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lukaszraczylo
|
c1bb9fe87a |
fix(hot-reload): honest reload docs, unconditional settle, isolated probe budget
Review response (5 Important + 3 folded):
1. README's cacheTTL row/bullet implied per-group scoping; cacheTTL sets
the TTL written when a group's own request populates a shared cache
entry, it never scopes the entry itself. Reworded only, cacheKey
unchanged.
2. README's fallback-counter claim ("used only when redis is not
configured") was wrong: limits.go also falls back during a Redis
outage whenever failOpen is true (the default). Reworded against
limiter.storeIncrBy/storeGet.
3. Dropped the unevidenced "in-flight requests finish on the old
instance" claim; replaced with what TestConfigHotReload actually
observes (zero non-200s across the rewrite window, every run).
4. Real bug: cleanup's settle poll checked for the injected alias to
disappear, which trivially no-ops on the skip path (the alias was
never live, so "absent" was already true on the first check) —
exactly the unguarded window that caused the earlier 404 cascade.
Replaced with settleToBaseline: captures the baseline /v1/models id
set up front, then polls unconditionally (both paths) for 3
consecutive matching polls, bounded 20s. Verified against a live run
that actually hit the skip path.
5. The ~20rps probe loop shared aliceKey/"eng" (1000/min) with most of
this suite's other tests; a budget-exhaustion 429 would look identical
to a reload blip. Added a dedicated hotreload group
(requestsPerMinute: 100000) and hotreload-probe user to
dynamic.yml.tmpl; every request TestConfigHotReload issues now uses
that key.
6. examples/docker-compose.yml still shipped providers.file.filename,
contradicting the new guidance; switched to providers.file.directory.
Verified by actually running the demo stack.
7. waitForModelAliasBounded and the new settle poll now use
doJSONNonFatal (returns an error instead of calling t.Fatalf), so a
transient transport error resets that poll's retry state instead of
aborting the whole test.
8. Reworded the skip-path Skip message: zero failures there proves only
that the stack survived an unreloaded rewrite attempt, not that a
successful reload is blip-free. Re-added the old single-file path to
.gitignore alongside the new directory entry.
Gates: go build/vet/gofmt clean on integration/; root go test -race,
gofmt, vet, yaegi-check all clean; make integration run cold twice, both
exit 0, plus a verbose run that landed on the skip path (the exact
scenario item 4 fixes) with the full suite, including
TestUsersFileHotReload, passing immediately after.
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lukaszraczylo
|
945f41b9b0 |
docs: kubernetes hot-reload guidance
README Kubernetes section: what a Middleware CR edit actually does (Traefik builds a new instance, warm-fills discovery, swaps it in; requests in flight finish on the old one), what survives a rebuild (Redis-backed counters and cache — windowKey's key never carries instance identity) vs what resets (in-memory fallback counters, down-latches, the discovery cache), why new models via discovery need no config edit, why the users Secret must be a whole-volume mount (subPath never receives a kubelet update) and how the plugin's own 5s mtime poll picks up the resulting symlink swap, and why a file-provider dynamic config needs directory: rather than filename: in Kubernetes (ConfigMap symlink swap) and under Docker Desktop (VirtioFS fsnotify) alike. examples/kubernetes.yaml: annotated the existing (already-correct, no-subPath) users Secret volume mount explaining why subPath would silently break Secret updates, so a future edit doesn't 'simplify' it into one. |
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lukaszraczylo
|
1ae8555255 |
feat: per-group cache TTL
GroupConfig gains CacheTTL (json cacheTTL, empty inherits the global cache.ttl). Parsed and validated at construction (newAuthStore, groupCacheTTL in cache.go): a malformed duration, a duration <= 0, or CacheTTL set while the global cache block is not configured is a constructor error naming the group, mirroring Cache:true's existing "nothing to inherit from" check. group carries the resolved time.Duration (0 means inherit). responseCache.store gains an explicit ttl parameter; routes_unified.go computes effectiveTTL(g.cache, grp) immediately before each store call, so setEx's Redis-native EX seconds reflect the group's own override. Tests: constructor-error table, empty-inherits and valid-override resolution, effectiveTTL inheritance/override, a scripted-RESP-server proof that store's SET...EX carries a different value per group, and an end-to-end Gateway.ServeHTTP test with two groups asserting the actual wire EX value (30 vs 60) differs per group. README: GroupConfig.cacheTTL config row and a Caching-section paragraph. |
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lukaszraczylo
|
657480348b |
fix: v0.2 final review wave
Transcriptions Yaegi coverage via integration mock, flattened admin usage batch, hardened CSP, sanitized provider lastErr, source-archive prefix template, vendor export-ignore warning, release paths. |
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lukaszraczylo
|
2090b31ae2 |
feat: operator-defined model aliases
Spec §5 (v0.2): Config.ModelAliases map[string]string, alias-first resolution precedence ahead of provider-prefix splitting, alias-OR-target authorization, lazy target resolution with a 404 naming both ids, /v1/models listing, admin overview alias table (JSON + dashboard), and construction-time validation (shape, prefix-shadow, explicit-model collision, chain, empty target). routes_unified.go/routes_media.go needed no resolution-call-site changes - both already pass the client's raw requested id through to registry.resolve, so aliases inherit the __alias echo and multipart rewrite machinery for free. cache.go needed no changes either - cacheKey already hashes requestedModel, so two aliases resolving to the same target already produce distinct cache entries. Adds registry_test.go validation table + precedence/authz/lazy-404/ listing coverage, a dedicated cache-key split test, chat/embeddings/ images/audio-transcriptions end-to-end tests, an extended admin overview test, and an integration test covering the openai-type vs anthropic-type echo asymmetry under real Traefik+Yaegi. |
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|
lukaszraczylo
|
f49c51b341 |
fix(docs,integration): example env completeness, flaky reset, cache key assertion
Task 5 re-review fixes: 1 Important + 3 folded. 1. (Important) examples/kubernetes.yaml was construction-broken on copy-paste: the inline dashboard-admin user resolves env:LLMGW_ADMIN_KEY at construction time regardless of admin.enabled, but the Helm env snippet never listed it. Added it there, alongside a comment on the admin user explaining the env var is required either way. Fixed the two reversed above/below cross-references (kubernetes.yaml:90/:115) and reworded the misleading "self-contained" comment on the inline admin user. Verified with a throwaway round-trip test covering: no env vars set fails, every documented env var set succeeds (admin.enabled staying false as committed), and — the actual bug — every var set EXCEPT LLMGW_ADMIN_KEY still fails even with admin disabled. 2. README: Admin section's "(disabled still 404s)" now points at the same 404/passthroughUnknown wording the section already uses above it. Caching section's "block absent entirely is a construction error" now says "not enabled" — auth.go's actual check is !cfg.Cache.Enabled, which is identically true whether the block is omitted or present with enabled: false. 3. integration/mock/main.go: added POST /flaky/reset (handleFlakyReset), reachable through the "flaky" provider's own native passthrough route, resetting the atomic hit counter on demand. TestRetryFlakyRecovers now calls it at the start of the test, removing the make integration-keep re-run trap the old doc comment warned about instead of fixing. dynamic.yml.tmpl's stale "test 8" comment now reads "task 5". 4. integration_test.go: added redisKeys (docker compose exec redis-cli KEYS, mirroring flushRedis's own pattern) and a TestResponseCache assertion that redis holds at least one llmgw:cache:* key immediately after the miss request. go test ./... -count=1, gofmt, vet, make yaegi-check all pass; make integration exits 0 across two fresh full runs. |
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lukaszraczylo
|
2fe71c25eb |
docs: v0.2 features
README, examples, and a comment update covering v0.2's four features:
- README: new Caching section (key semantics incl. requestedModel +
endpoint, hit/miss header, count-requests-free-tokens, group override,
redis-required) and Admin section (enable flag, admin:true users,
browser key-entry flow, sessionStorage, what's exposed/redacted,
poll-counts-against-quota, unauthenticated-shell). Retry and Image/audio
sections already existed from T3/T4; left as-is. Config reference gains
cache/admin rows at the top level, GroupConfig.cache, UserConfig.admin,
and full CacheConfig/AdminConfig tables. Known limitations gains
images/audio-not-cost-accounted and cache-shares-entries-across-users.
- examples/kubernetes.yaml: adds cache{enabled:true,ttl:5m} (this example
already configures redis) and admin{enabled:false} with a comment on
enabling it, plus an inline admin:true user gated behind that flag.
Round-trips through New() cleanly (verified with a throwaway test).
- examples/docker-compose.yml: adds retry, cache (left disabled — this
minimal demo runs no Redis), and admin (left disabled, with a comment
on enabling it). Round-trips through New() cleanly (verified the same
way).
- admin.go: pluginVersion's doc comment now says to keep it in sync with
the release tag.
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lukaszraczylo
|
2c8a32c77a | fix(media): rewrite prefixed alias in multipart replay, strip alias key, multipart validation | ||
|
lukaszraczylo
|
93b289c1c8 | feat: unified image and audio endpoints with gemini image translation | ||
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lukaszraczylo
|
722e6f3d29 |
fix(retry): retries-after-first semantics, ctx-aware backoff, hardened classification
Critical: attempts now counts retries performed AFTER the first try
(default 1 -> two tries total), not the total try count. The prior
reading made retry:{enabled:true}'s own documented default perform zero
retries. (*retryPolicy).totalTries() is the single conversion point,
clamping any attempts<1 to 1 so do()'s loop bound can never compute <=0
and skip calling call() entirely (no (nil,nil) return path).
Backoff waits are now ctx-aware: sleepFn func(time.Duration) is replaced
by waitFn func(context.Context, time.Duration) bool, whose production
implementation (defaultWaitFn) selects between time.After(d) and
ctx.Done(). A context canceled mid-wait aborts the remaining retries
immediately instead of blocking out the full backoff.
Also: classify a request-build failure (invalid method/URL) as
non-transient via errRequestBuildFailed, since retrying an identically
malformed request only wastes attempts; drop the drain cap to a
dedicated 64KiB constant instead of the 32MiB response cap; fix a
t.Fatal call from a non-test goroutine in the mid-stream-death test;
drop the misleading omitempty on Config.Retry (a struct value is never
'empty' to encoding/json); document the Retry-After >2s-falls-back-to-
backoff behavior and cover it with a direct table test.
README: add the retry config table, a RetryConfig field reference, and
a Retry section documenting the semantics. examples/kubernetes.yaml
gains a retry block alongside its other optional sections.
Gate: go test -race, gofmt, vet, yaegi-check, golangci-lint (incl a
fieldalignment fix on two new test structs) all clean. 295 subtests
pass, 0 failed. integration/ untouched.
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lukaszraczylo
|
c9ae14adf7 |
docs: spec limit semantics, pricing caveats, manifest hedge
I2 (controller ruling): docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-19-traefik-llmgateway-design.md
described limits as "user overrides group" / "user limit if set, else
group limit, else unlimited" — stale relative to the actual, already-correct
implementation (buildLimitScopes/checkAndCount evaluate every configured
scope and return the first violation). Amended §2 and §7 to state both
scopes are enforced together and the tighter bound wins.
I4 (manifest hedge): .traefik.yml's groups.default was a bare "{}",
the shape empirically reproduced as a decode failure outside this
repo's own (necessarily simplified) yaegi-check harness. Changed to
"providers: []" — same zero semantics, no longer a bare empty object.
manifest_test.go's JSON mirror and drift-check token updated to match;
make yaegi-check still passes (its YAML-subset parser already handles
an inline "[]" under a nested map key).
M9 (pricing provenance): pricing.go's built-in table comment replaced
"verify before release" with a real source note (each provider's own
published list prices, recorded 2026-08, approximate). README's limits
section gained the matching caveat and points to the "pricing" config
override for billing-grade accuracy.
Doc nits: README's Kubernetes section now says the example manifest
applies cleanly once Traefik's CRDs (Middleware, IngressRoute) are
installed, rather than claiming kubectl apply -f works unconditionally.
README's Security notes section no longer claims "no auth-event logging
at all" (see the paired fix: commit) — it now describes what is logged
and that key material never appears.
This commit and its sibling fix: commit are the final wave closing out
the whole-branch review findings for docs/superpowers/sdd/2026-08-20-
traefik-llmgateway.
Gates: go test ./... -count=1 (-race) green, gofmt -l . empty, go vet
clean, make yaegi-check OK, golangci-lint 0 issues.
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lukaszraczylo
|
5a11cc85be |
docs: correct security claims, pipeline diagram, k8s example completeness
Fixes from review, verified against source before rewriting:
- README.md Security notes: "auth events are logged" was false — grepped
auth.go, zero logging calls exist anywhere in it. A lookup miss is a
plain 401 envelope with no log line at all, not "logged without key
material". Also corrected the adjacent providerHTTPError claim: the
struct retains the upstream response body as a field (surfaced
deliberately to the client under error.upstream); only its Error()
string omits the body, and nothing in this codebase currently logs a
providerHTTPError via a bare %v anyway.
- README.md mermaid diagram: the previous version showed a single global
Auth gate ahead of routing. ServeHTTP (llmgateway.go) actually dispatches
on path+method first and calls identify() separately inside each
recognized-route branch; an unrecognized route (passthroughUnknown/404
fallback) never calls identify() at all. Redrawn Route -> per-branch
Auth, with the unauthenticated fallback branching directly off Route.
Also fixed the 401 node's error type label from the nonexistent
"invalid_api_key" to the actual envelope type, "authentication_error"
(llmgateway.go, routes_unified.go). Re-rendered with mmdc before and
after the fix.
- README.md + examples/kubernetes.yaml: narrowed the bare-{} empty-group
claim. Re-verified this session with an isolated, minimal repro
(Traefik file provider only, no docker-compose configs: mechanism
involved) that a bare `default: {}` still fails plugin construction
with the file provider specifically: "expected a map, got 'string'".
Scoped the claim to what is actually verified (file provider, twice)
and explicitly flagged Docker/ECS label providers and the Kubernetes
CRD provider as untested, rather than asserting the file provider is
unaffected or that the CRD provider shares its decode path — the
latter was an unverified inference in the prior text, now hedged.
- examples/kubernetes.yaml: the IngressRoute referenced an undefined
Service (llmgateway-dummy-backend), so the manifest did not actually
apply as advertised. Added the missing Deployment + Service (traefik/
whoami, the same image already exercised end-to-end in
examples/docker-compose.yml this session). Re-validated: 6-document
YAML parses, Middleware's plugin config still round-trips through the
real Config struct and New() (throwaway test, deleted after).
- README.md Known limitations: dropped the standalone path-traversal
bullet — it duplicated content already stated in the "request rejected
before it reaches a provider" bullet immediately above it.
NOTE for the reviewer: the ruling on the bare-{} finding stated "file
provider observed working" and named Docker/ECS label providers as the
affected ones. I re-tested this directly (twice, including a standalone
repro outside the compose demo) and the file provider fails on a bare
{} exactly as originally reported — I could not reproduce "file provider
unaffected" and have not tested the label providers at all. Narrowed the
doc wording to only what I verified rather than asserting either
provider's behaviour without evidence; flagging the discrepancy in case
the review had independent grounds I don't have visibility into.
Gates: go test ./... -count=1, gofmt -l ., go vet ./..., make
yaegi-check — all clean. Also re-ran go test -race, golangci-lint (incl.
gosec), and fieldalignment, matching the standard this task already set;
all clean.
|
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|
lukaszraczylo
|
08dca6ad98 |
docs: README, kubernetes and compose examples, MIT license
- README.md: what-it-is, quickstart (localPlugins today, catalog form
once published), full config reference table for every Config/
ProviderConfig/GroupConfig/LimitsConfig/UsersConfig/UserConfig/
RedisConfig/ModelPricing/TargetConfig/AgentConfig field, model routing,
limits and accounting semantics, unified vs passthrough differences,
MCP/A2A, security notes, known limitations (streaming buffering under
Yaegi, quota-on-reject nuances, identity-encoding, path-traversal
rejects), Kubernetes deployment notes, and development/catalog-
submission status. Every claim grounded against the actual source read
this session; two draft claims (user-limits "replace" group limits, an
unqualified "go-redis is documented as unsuitable in resp.go/
providers.go") were caught and corrected against the real
buildLimitScopes semantics and an actual grep before committing.
- examples/kubernetes.yaml: Secret (users.json) + Middleware CR +
IngressRoute + a Helm values snippet. The Middleware's plugin config
round-trips through the real Config struct and New() (verified via a
throwaway, since-deleted test), not just YAML-syntax-checked.
- examples/docker-compose.yml: minimal localPlugins-based demo (traefik +
whoami + inline file-provider config via compose's inline configs.content).
Brought up and exercised end-to-end against real OpenAI this session:
auth 401/200, /v1/models, /v1/chat/completions (upstream 401 envelope
with a fake key, proving passthrough+key-injection+wrapping all work),
and the unknown-route 404 envelope. Found and fixed a real bug in the
process: a bare "{}" empty group value fails Traefik's own dynamic-
config decode with "expected a map, got 'string'"; fixed to an
explicit empty list and documented the gotcha in both example files and
the README.
- LICENSE: MIT, copyright 2026 Lukasz Raczylo.
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