C1 (quota bypass): a client sending stream_options.include_usage=false
suppressed upstream usage reporting and escaped every token/cost budget,
since the non-streaming T12 estimate never covers a streaming response.
chatCompletion (provider_openai.go) now always forces include_usage=true
on the outgoing request, merged into a copy of the client's own
stream_options map so the caller's map is never mutated in place.
clientAskedUsage is derived from the client's own value via isTruthy, so
the usage-only chunk is still suppressed for a client that never asked
for it.
I1 (vacuous security tests): the X-Api-Key credential-strip set had zero
effective coverage — existing tests either never sent x-api-key, or
targeted anthropic, whose injectAuth overwrites x-api-key regardless of
whether the strip ran. Added one openai-passthrough and one MCP-proxy
test that authenticate via x-api-key itself and assert it arrives empty
upstream. Mutation-checked: both fail when "X-Api-Key": true is removed
from gatewayCredentialHeaders (verified, then restored).
I3 (auth-event logging): added Gateway.logAuthEvent (logger.go), called
at all six authStore.identify call sites (llmgateway.go's ServeHTTP,
routes_unified.go's handleModels). A failed attempt logs method, path,
and remote address; a success logs the resolved user's name and route.
Neither line ever includes the presented API key.
M2 (usage.estimated): runUnified now reads result.estimated and logs the
estimate explicitly when a non-streaming response's usage falls back to
the body-size heuristic, making the field genuinely read — removes the
stale //nolint:unused on limits.go's usage struct.
M8 (gosec consistency): secrets.go's file: secret path read now carries
the same "#nosec G304 -- operator-supplied file path from middleware
config" annotation as users_file.go's equivalent read.
Doc nit: mcp_a2a.go's validateTargetURLs comment now also names the
dot-only ("."/"..") rule validateConfigName enforces, not just character
set and reserved names.
Gates: go test ./... -count=1 (-race) green, gofmt -l . empty, go vet
clean, make yaegi-check OK, golangci-lint (gosec+staticcheck+unused+
errcheck+govet, global config) 0 issues.
- providers.go: validate provider names against ^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$ and
reject reserved names (v1, mcp, a2a) that would shadow gateway routes;
reject nil ProviderConfig map values at construction instead of
panicking.
- mcp_a2a.go: apply the same name-pattern and reserved-name validation to
mcpServers/agents keys, and reject nil TargetConfig/AgentConfig map
values at construction.
- auth.go: reject nil GroupConfig map values at construction.
- provider_openai_test.go, mcp_a2a_test.go, auth_test.go: table-driven
constructor-error coverage for the above.
- integration/integration_test.go: point the package doc at
`make integration-up`/`integration-keep` instead of a bare
`docker compose up -d --build`, which skips the dynamic.yml.tmpl
render step and can run against a stale or absent dynamic.yml; add
max_tokens to the gemini chat request so translate_gemini.go's
hasMaxTokens=true branch is actually exercised under real Yaegi.
- translate_gemini.go: soften the max_tokens comment's verification claim
to match what the integration suite actually now exercises.
Hoist the Upgrade->501 and traversal->400 checks in handleTargetProxy
above checkAndCount, matching handlePassthrough's own order
(403 -> 501 -> 400 -> limit). A request rejected before the upstream
call must never burn the caller's or their group's rate-limit quota
for a call that was never going to reach the target. Updated the
function's doc comment to state and justify the order.
Add TestHandleTargetProxy_RateLimited_Returns429WithRetryAfter:
group requestsPerMinute:1, two hits on /mcp/{name}/x -> first 200,
second 429 with Retry-After, upstream called exactly once.
Add TestHandleTargetProxy_JSONResponse_OnlyRequestCounterMoves: a
usage-shaped JSON response from the target leaves token/cost
counters at 0 while the request-rate counter moves to 1, proving
the target proxy never tees or accounts a response the way native
passthrough does.
Add GET /v1/mcp/servers and GET /v1/agents: group-filtered,
name-sorted registry listings of configured MCP servers and A2A
agents, with their gateway-relative proxy (and, for agents, card)
URLs.
Add handleTargetProxy for /mcp/{name}/{rest...} and
/a2a/{name}/{rest...}: reverse-proxies to the target's configured
URL. Checks run unknown name (404), group deny via allowsMCP/
allowsAgent (403), request-rate limits (429/503), then Upgrade
(501) and path traversal (400) around the proxy call itself. No
upstream credential is injected — MCP servers and A2A agents are
in-cluster targets, unlike native provider passthrough.
Extract proxyUpstream from routes_passthrough.go's handlePassthrough
into a shared reverse-proxy core (header stripping, SSE-safe
flushWriter streaming, dead-upstream 502, canceled-client log-only,
optional JSON usage teeing) used by both native passthrough and the
new target proxy. Behavior-preserving for Task 13: its tests pass
unmodified.
Validate every configured MCP-server and agent target URL at
construction (url.Parse, http/https scheme only) — a malformed or
non-HTTP target is a constructor error, not a per-request 502.
lukaszraczylo