fix(metrics): honest rendering, injective escaping, aggregation docs

Three fixes from adversarial verification.

writeProviderMetrics rendered a storeDown providerCounters entry as a
hard zero, the same fabricated-reset hazard the request/token/cost
families already guarded against. Skip a storeDown provider or
provider-model entry instead of emitting it.

escapeLabelValue ranged over the string as runes, and Go substitutes
U+FFFD for every invalid UTF-8 byte. Two distinct configured names
that both contain invalid UTF-8 could therefore render as the
identical escaped value, colliding two series into one duplicate
series and failing the whole scrape target. Escaping is now
byte-oriented, which is injective and also avoids the per-rune decode
cost on a large value.

Every store-backed family's HELP text now states its aggregation
contract: with Redis configured, the value is the gateway-wide total
and identical on every replica, so summing across replicas overcounts
by the replica count and a cost alert fires early. Aggregate with
max() instead. Without Redis, the same family becomes genuinely
per-process and sum() becomes correct instead. The rejection counter
and the provider-healthy gauge get their own notes: the former is
always per-process regardless of Redis, the latter reflects each
replica's own independently-running discovery breaker.

Also replaces the AllowedCIDRs doc example (10.0.0.0/8) with a
cluster pod CIDR (10.42.0.0/16) and states plainly that a whole
RFC1918 range is never correct, since a SNAT-ing router or load
balancer makes external traffic arrive from inside it — reproduced
live against the target cluster.

Adds tests pinning three properties mutation-proofed against this
suite: every storeDown skip (deleting any of them now fails
TestMetrics_StoreDown_SkipsRatherThanFabricatesZero), the CIDR-check
running before auth.identify (TestMetrics_
AllowlistedRequest_NeverTouchesAuthFailureTracking), and
escapeLabelValue's injectivity under invalid UTF-8
(TestEscapeLabelValue_InvalidUTF8_Injective). Also covers the new
rejection-counter pruning end to end through a real file-sourced
reload.
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-23 00:58:30 +01:00
parent 5700dd482d
commit d352379375
2 changed files with 303 additions and 18 deletions
+186
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"path/filepath"
"sort"
"strconv"
"strings"
@@ -175,6 +176,38 @@ func TestMetrics_NoAllowlistConfigured_KeylessRequestRejected(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestMetrics_AllowlistedRequest_NeverTouchesAuthFailureTracking pins the
// ORDERING handleMetrics' own doc comment claims (metrics.go): the CIDR
// allowlist is checked BEFORE auth.identify ever runs, so a keyless,
// allowlisted scrape never records a failed-auth attempt for its own
// source address. This is not observable from status codes alone — a
// handler that checked identify FIRST and fell back to the CIDR
// allowlist only on failure would return the identical 200 for every
// case TestMetrics_GateMatrix asserts, while still quietly feeding
// authStore's failure tracker on every single scrape. Mutation-proofing:
// reordering the two checks changes only this test's outcome, nothing
// else in this file.
func TestMetrics_AllowlistedRequest_NeverTouchesAuthFailureTracking(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := newMetricsTestConfig()
cfg.Metrics.AllowedCIDRs = []string{"192.0.2.0/24"}
h, gw := newMetricsGatewayHandle(t, cfg)
for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
// Default RemoteAddr (192.0.2.1:1234, verified empirically) —
// inside the allowlist, no key presented at all.
h.ServeHTTP(rec, metricsRequest(http.MethodGet, metricsPathDefault, ""))
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("request %d: status = %d, want 200", i, rec.Code)
}
}
if got := gw.auth.failures.get("192.0.2.1"); got != 0 {
t.Errorf("auth failure count for the allowlisted scraper's address = %d, want 0 — the CIDR check must run before auth.identify, never after", got)
}
}
func TestMetrics_InvalidCIDR_FailsConstruction(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := newMetricsTestConfig()
@@ -453,6 +486,13 @@ func TestEscapeLabelValue(t *testing.T) {
{"quote_then_backslash", `"\`, `\"\\`},
{"backslash_then_quote", `\"`, `\\\"`},
{"all_three", "a\"b\\c\nd", `a\"b\\c\nd`},
// Invalid UTF-8 bytes (0x80/0x81 are bare continuation bytes,
// never valid as the START of any UTF-8 sequence) must pass
// through UNCHANGED, byte-for-byte — see
// TestEscapeLabelValue_InvalidUTF8_Injective below for why this
// matters beyond just "does not crash".
{"invalid_utf8_lone_0x80", "u\x80", "u\x80"},
{"invalid_utf8_lone_0x81", "u\x81", "u\x81"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -464,6 +504,30 @@ func TestEscapeLabelValue(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestEscapeLabelValue_InvalidUTF8_Injective is the mutation-proofing
// test for the byte-oriented rewrite (review fix, adversarial
// verification 2026-08-23): a rune-oriented `for _, r := range s`
// implementation decodes invalid UTF-8 to U+FFFD, which makes escaping
// NOT injective — "u\x80" and "u\x81" are two distinct, real inputs
// (auth.go's buildEntry validates a user name as non-empty only, never
// restricted to valid UTF-8) that would both render as "u�" under
// that approach, colliding two distinct scope_id label values onto one
// series — confirmed against a real Prometheus scrape parser: a
// duplicate series, and the whole scrape target reported DOWN. The
// byte-oriented implementation must keep every input byte-for-byte
// distinguishable.
func TestEscapeLabelValue_InvalidUTF8_Injective(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
a := escapeLabelValue("u\x80")
b := escapeLabelValue("u\x81")
if a == b {
t.Fatalf("escapeLabelValue(%q) == escapeLabelValue(%q) == %q — two distinct inputs collided onto one label value", "u\x80", "u\x81", a)
}
if strings.Contains(a, "�") || strings.Contains(b, "�") {
t.Errorf("escaped output contains U+FFFD (replacement character) — the rune-decoding bug this test guards against: a=%q b=%q", a, b)
}
}
// TestMetrics_LabelValuesWithSpecialChars_Escaped is the end-to-end
// version of TestEscapeLabelValue: a real user name containing a double
// quote, a backslash, and a newline (auth.go's buildEntry doc comment
@@ -689,6 +753,69 @@ func TestMetrics_ProviderHealthy_ReflectsOpenBreaker(t *testing.T) {
assertSample(t, samples, "llmgateway_provider_healthy", map[string]string{"provider": "openai"}, "0")
}
// --- store outage: skip, never fabricate a zero ---
// TestMetrics_StoreDown_SkipsRatherThanFabricatesZero is the mutation-
// proofing test for every `if su.storeDown { continue }` /
// `if mc.storeDown { continue }` guard in metrics.go: deleting any of
// them makes this test fail. Forces the SAME limiter every family in
// this file reads from into a fail-closed store outage (alwaysErrStore,
// failOpen=false — routes_unified_test.go's own stub), then asserts
// every store-backed family emits NO samples at all rather than a
// fabricated 0 (review fix, adversarial verification 2026-08-23:
// without the guards, a Redis blip reads as a hard 0 mid-outage, then
// jumps back to the real total on recovery — Prometheus treats that as
// a counter reset followed by a spurious full-total "increase").
// llmgateway_provider_healthy is deliberately excluded from the "must be
// absent" list: it comes from the in-process discovery breaker, never
// the counterStore, so a store outage must NOT affect it — asserted
// present here for exactly that reason.
func TestMetrics_StoreDown_SkipsRatherThanFabricatesZero(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := newMetricsTestConfig()
cfg.Metrics.ModelLabel = true
cfg.Users.Inline[0].Limits = &LimitsConfig{RequestsPerDay: 100}
h, gw := newMetricsGatewayHandle(t, cfg)
gw.limiter.store = alwaysErrStore{}
gw.limiter.failOpen = false
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rec, metricsRequest(http.MethodGet, metricsPathDefault, "sk-admin1"))
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200, body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
_, samples := parsePrometheusText(t, rec.Body.Bytes())
mustBeAbsent := []string{
"llmgateway_requests_total",
"llmgateway_tokens_total",
"llmgateway_cost_micro_usd_total",
"llmgateway_budget_consumed_ratio",
"llmgateway_provider_attempts_total",
"llmgateway_provider_failures_total",
"llmgateway_provider_model_attempts_total",
"llmgateway_provider_model_failures_total",
}
for _, s := range samples {
for _, absent := range mustBeAbsent {
if s.name == absent {
t.Errorf("sample %s%v present during a store outage — must be skipped, not fabricated as 0", s.name, s.labels)
}
}
}
var providerHealthyPresent bool
for _, s := range samples {
if s.name == "llmgateway_provider_healthy" {
providerHealthyPresent = true
}
}
if !providerHealthyPresent {
t.Error("llmgateway_provider_healthy missing — this family reads in-process breaker state, not the store, and must still render during a store outage")
}
}
// --- rate-limit rejections ---
// TestMetrics_RateLimitRejections_CountedByScope drives a real 429
@@ -745,6 +872,65 @@ func TestLimiter_RejectionSnapshot_StoreDown(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestMetrics_PruneRejectionsAfterReload_EndToEnd is the end-to-end proof
// for item 7 (adversarial verification, 2026-08-23): a file-sourced user
// removed via a real users-file hot-reload (auth.go's replaceFileUsers,
// driven through ServeHTTP exactly as production traffic drives it, not
// a direct limiter call) must stop exporting
// llmgateway_rate_limit_rejections_total, proving the wiring from
// ServeHTTP through authStore.maybeReload's new return value to
// Gateway.pruneRejectionsAfterReload actually runs, not just the
// pruning logic in isolation (TestLimiter_PruneRejections_
// RemovesDeletedUserScope, limits_test.go).
func TestMetrics_PruneRejectionsAfterReload_EndToEnd(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := t.TempDir()
fp := filepath.Join(dir, "users.json")
writeUsersDoc(t, fp, []*UserConfig{
{Name: "alice", Group: "g", APIKey: "sk-alice", Limits: &LimitsConfig{RequestsPerMinute: 1}},
}, time.Time{})
cfg := newMetricsTestConfig()
cfg.Users = &UsersConfig{
File: fp,
Inline: []*UserConfig{{Name: "admin1", Group: "g", APIKey: "sk-admin1", Admin: true}},
}
h, gw := newMetricsGatewayHandle(t, cfg)
body := map[string]any{"model": "gpt-test", "messages": []any{map[string]any{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}}}
h.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), newUnifiedRequest(t, http.MethodPost, "/v1/chat/completions", "sk-alice", body))
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rec, newUnifiedRequest(t, http.MethodPost, "/v1/chat/completions", "sk-alice", body))
if rec.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 429 (RequestsPerMinute:1 exhausted)", rec.Code)
}
rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rec, metricsRequest(http.MethodGet, metricsPathDefault, "sk-admin1"))
_, samples := parsePrometheusText(t, rec.Body.Bytes())
assertSample(t, samples, "llmgateway_rate_limit_rejections_total", map[string]string{"scope_kind": "user", "scope_id": "alice"}, "1")
// Remove alice from the users file and force ServeHTTP's own
// maybeReload call to pick it up — mirrors users_file_test.go's own
// clock-advance idiom (newReloadableAuthStore).
clock := &fakeClock{now: time.Now()}
gw.auth.nowFn = clock.Now
writeUsersDoc(t, fp, nil, time.Now().Add(time.Hour))
clock.Advance(reloadEvery + time.Second)
rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rec, metricsRequest(http.MethodGet, metricsPathDefault, "sk-admin1"))
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200, body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
_, samples = parsePrometheusText(t, rec.Body.Bytes())
for _, s := range samples {
if s.name == "llmgateway_rate_limit_rejections_total" && s.labels["scope_id"] == "alice" {
t.Errorf("alice's rejection series is still present after being removed from the users file and reloaded: %+v", s)
}
}
}
// --- budget-consumed ratio ---
func TestMetrics_BudgetConsumedRatio_ReflectsUsageVsLimit(t *testing.T) {