Files
graphql-monitoring-proxy/details.go
T
lukaszraczylo 8258b3d99a fix(auth): verify JWT signature to prevent cache-key forgery (GHSA-9gqw-h2rw-44wv)
The proxy derived per-user GraphQL cache keys from JWT claims without
verifying the token signature (CWE-345). A remote attacker could forge a
token that carried a victim's claim value and read the victim's cached
response.

This change adds opt-in signature verification behind JWT_VERIFY_SIGNATURE.
The flag defaults to false, so an upgrade without a config change keeps the
previous delegate-to-upstream behavior byte for byte.

When verification is on, the operator must set exactly one key source:
JWT_SECRET, JWT_PUBLIC_KEY, or JWT_JWKS_URL. The verifier pins the accepted
algorithms to the key family through WithValidMethods and a type-switched
keyfunc, and it refuses alg=none. This closes the algorithm-confusion class
of attack. A present but invalid token now returns 401. A missing
Authorization header stays anonymous.

Startup fails loudly when verification is on and the key source is absent or
unreadable, so the proxy can never boot half-configured.
2026-08-17 13:51:00 +01:00

145 lines
4.4 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"strings"
"github.com/goccy/go-json"
"github.com/lukaszraczylo/ask"
libpack_logger "github.com/lukaszraczylo/graphql-monitoring-proxy/logging"
libpack_monitoring "github.com/lukaszraczylo/graphql-monitoring-proxy/monitoring"
)
const defaultValue = "-"
var emptyMetrics = map[string]string{}
// extractClaimsFromJWTHeader extracts the user ID and role claim from an
// Authorization header value.
//
// When cfg.Client.JWTVerifier is set (JWT_VERIFY_SIGNATURE=true), the token
// signature is checked first; a signature, expiry, or algorithm failure
// returns a non-nil err and the caller must not trust usr/role (this is the
// fix for GHSA-9gqw-h2rw-44wv, where a forged token with a guessed claim
// could otherwise read another user's cached response).
//
// When JWTVerifier is nil (the default), this falls back to the legacy
// path: the payload is decoded without checking its signature, exactly as
// before this field existed. err is always nil on that path, matching
// pre-verification behaviour byte for byte.
func extractClaimsFromJWTHeader(authorization string) (usr, role string, err error) {
usr, role = defaultValue, defaultValue
if cfg.Client.JWTVerifier != nil {
claimMap, verr := cfg.Client.JWTVerifier.Verify(authorization)
if verr != nil {
handleError("JWT verification failed", map[string]any{"token": maskToken(authorization)})
return defaultValue, defaultValue, verr
}
usr = extractClaim(claimMap, cfg.Client.JWTUserClaimPath, "user id")
role = extractClaim(claimMap, cfg.Client.JWTRoleClaimPath, "role")
return usr, role, nil
}
tokenParts := strings.SplitN(authorization, ".", 3)
if len(tokenParts) != 3 {
handleError("Can't split the token", map[string]any{"token": maskToken(authorization)})
return usr, role, nil
}
claim, decErr := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(tokenParts[1])
if decErr != nil {
handleError("Can't decode the token", map[string]any{"token": maskToken(authorization)})
return usr, role, nil
}
var claimMap map[string]any
if jsonErr := json.Unmarshal(claim, &claimMap); jsonErr != nil {
handleError("Can't unmarshal the claim", map[string]any{"token": maskToken(authorization)})
return usr, role, nil
}
usr = extractClaim(claimMap, cfg.Client.JWTUserClaimPath, "user id")
role = extractClaim(claimMap, cfg.Client.JWTRoleClaimPath, "role")
return usr, role, nil
}
func extractClaim(claimMap map[string]any, claimPath, name string) string {
if claimPath == "" {
return defaultValue
}
// Validate claim path to prevent injection attacks
if !isValidClaimPath(claimPath) {
handleError(fmt.Sprintf("Invalid claim path for %s", name), map[string]any{"path": claimPath})
return defaultValue
}
value, ok := ask.For(claimMap, claimPath).String(defaultValue)
if !ok {
handleError(fmt.Sprintf("Can't find the %s", name), map[string]any{"claim_map": sanitizeClaimMap(claimMap), "path": claimPath})
return defaultValue
}
return value
}
// maskToken masks JWT tokens in logs to prevent exposure
func maskToken(token string) string {
if len(token) <= 10 {
return "***"
}
return token[:4] + "***" + token[len(token)-4:]
}
// isValidClaimPath validates JWT claim paths to prevent injection
func isValidClaimPath(path string) bool {
if path == "" {
return false
}
// Allow only alphanumeric characters, dots, underscores, and hyphens
for _, char := range path {
if (char < 'a' || char > 'z') &&
(char < 'A' || char > 'Z') &&
(char < '0' || char > '9') &&
char != '.' && char != '_' && char != '-' {
return false
}
}
// Prevent path traversal attempts
if strings.Contains(path, "..") || strings.Contains(path, "//") {
return false
}
return true
}
// sanitizeClaimMap removes sensitive data from claim map for logging
func sanitizeClaimMap(claimMap map[string]any) map[string]any {
sanitized := make(map[string]any)
sensitiveKeys := map[string]bool{
"password": true, "secret": true, "token": true, "key": true,
"auth": true, "credential": true, "private": true,
}
for k, v := range claimMap {
lowerKey := strings.ToLower(k)
if sensitiveKeys[lowerKey] {
sanitized[k] = "***"
} else {
sanitized[k] = v
}
}
return sanitized
}
func handleError(msg string, details map[string]any) {
cfg.Monitoring.Increment(libpack_monitoring.MetricsFailed, emptyMetrics)
cfg.Logger.Error(&libpack_logger.LogMessage{
Message: msg,
Pairs: details,
})
}