The sustained gate stored one entry for every attempt, denied ones too, and summed all entries on each request. A flood grew memory with rate times interval and made each request slower. Both gates now keep only the newest limit plus one attempt times. A Lean proof shows this decides the same as the full count. One check dropped from 29,502 ns and 11 allocations to 43 ns and none. The go-ratecounter dependency is gone.
Version 0.1.12 had a data race between addValue and cleanUpOldValues. The
race detector in CI reported it in the burst test. Version 0.1.13 copies
the pooled values and the race is gone.
The v2 module path is github.com/sony/gobreaker/v2 and the breaker is
generic. The code instantiates it with any, which matches the v1
Execute signature.
Update all direct and indirect Go dependencies. Notable bumps are
gofiber/fiber v3.4.0 to v3.5.0, gofiber/contrib websocket v1.2.0 to
v1.2.6, fasthttp v1.72.0 to v1.74.0, gookit/goutil v0.7.6 to v0.8.0,
go-redis v9.20.1 to v9.22.0, pgx v5.10.0 to v5.11.0, OpenTelemetry
v1.44.0 to v1.46.0, grpc v1.82.1 to v1.83.2 and testify v1.11.1 to
v1.12.1. The go directive moves to 1.26.0 because websocket v1.2.6
requires it.
fiber v3.5.0 adds an SSRF dial guard to clients registered with
proxy.WithClient. The guard rejects loopback and private upstreams by
default. This proxy gets its upstream from operator configuration, and
sidecar deployments point it at localhost. Set
proxy.SecurityPolicy{AllowPrivateIPs: true} so these upstreams keep
working. This change also unblocks the nightly autoupdate workflow,
which failed on this guard.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu2wXqGUrfVBi5aLafKk8U
Fiber v3.3.0 and earlier never set the HSTS header in the helmet middleware (GHSA-gv83-gqw6-9j2c, GO-2026-5912). Version v3.4.0 fixes that and adds an open-redirect fix and X-Forwarded-For hardening. Version v3.4.0 does NOT contain the loopback SSRF block that v3.5.0 added to the proxy middleware, so the 127.0.0.1 backend behaviour is unchanged. The full race test suite, including the loopback proxy tests, passes. Transitive bumps: fasthttp v1.71.0 to v1.72.0, klauspost/compress to v1.19.0.
Builds used the go1.26.5 toolchain, whose standard library contained seven vulnerabilities that govulncheck reported as reachable (GO-2026-6218, GO-2026-6091, GO-2026-6090, GO-2026-6089, GO-2026-6088, GO-2026-5972, GO-2026-5026). This change pins the module toolchain to go1.26.6 and sets the CI Go version to 1.26.6, so every build compiles against the patched standard library. After the bump govulncheck reports zero vulnerabilities affecting the code. The go language directive stays at 1.25.0, so no language behaviour changes.
The indirect dependency github.com/klauspost/compress v1.18.6 contained an out-of-bounds read in the s2 package (GO-2026-5841). The proxy pulls this module in through valyala/fasthttp. govulncheck reports the vulnerable path as unreachable, so the real risk is low, but v1.18.7 removes the defect. The bump is a patch release with no API change.
The proxy derived per-user GraphQL cache keys from JWT claims without
verifying the token signature (CWE-345). A remote attacker could forge a
token that carried a victim's claim value and read the victim's cached
response.
This change adds opt-in signature verification behind JWT_VERIFY_SIGNATURE.
The flag defaults to false, so an upgrade without a config change keeps the
previous delegate-to-upstream behavior byte for byte.
When verification is on, the operator must set exactly one key source:
JWT_SECRET, JWT_PUBLIC_KEY, or JWT_JWKS_URL. The verifier pins the accepted
algorithms to the key family through WithValidMethods and a type-switched
keyfunc, and it refuses alg=none. This closes the algorithm-confusion class
of attack. A present but invalid token now returns 401. A missing
Authorization header stays anonymous.
Startup fails loudly when verification is on and the key source is absent or
unreadable, so the proxy can never boot half-configured.
lukaszraczylo