Files
gohoarder/pkg/scanner/scanner.go
T
lukaszraczylo e39d6a0f0d feat: comprehensive audit + Tier 3 wiring (security/correctness/features)
Multi-agent audit + fix pass covering bugs, security, dead config wiring,
and missing features. All quality gates green: build/vet/test -race/govulncheck/
golangci-lint. Frontend tests 47/47.

SECURITY & CORRECTNESS

- Scanner pipeline fail-closed: cache.go scan timeout now 503 (was goto servePkg);
  scanner.go all-scanners-fail saves ScanStatusError; CheckVulnerabilities blocks
  on missing/error result instead of allowing.
- Scanner argv corrections: govulncheck source-mode + go.mod discovery;
  npm-audit generates lockfile via npm install --package-lock-only --ignore-scripts;
  pip-audit per-extension dispatch (wheel direct / sdist extract+pyproject).
- GHSA version-range filtering implemented (was always-include); url.QueryEscape
  on package name.
- pypi SSRF closed via host allowlist on original_url; url.QueryEscape on
  rewriteURL output.
- Path traversal: cache temp file uses os.CreateTemp; smb keyToPath sanitized;
  filesystem keyToPath returns error + filepath.Abs prefix-verify.
- Goroutine leaks plugged: cache.cleanupWorker stop channel; auth.ValidationCache
  Stop() with sync.Once; ws.unregister buffered with non-blocking send.
- WebSocket double-close panic fixed via sync.Once Client.closeSend().
- Race conditions: gormstore.registryCache sync.RWMutex (was concurrent map
  panic); auth.LastUsedAt no longer mutated under RLock; analytics strict
  lock-ordering invariant (statsMu before downloadsMu).
- Auth validator fails CLOSED on transport/unknown-status errors (was returning
  true,err 'allow cache fallback').
- Credential cache hash full SHA256 (was 8-byte truncate; eliminates 2^32
  collision risk).
- filesystem.fs.used incremented after successful rename (no quota inflation
  race).
- gormstore aggregation events deleted in same tx as insert (no double-counting).
- gormstore.SavePackage uses Updates(map) so zero-value security flags
  (RequiresAuth=false) can be cleared.
- partition_manager validates partition name regex before DROP TABLE.
- vcs/git: version regex validation rejects --option-injection; checkout uses
  --detach -- separator; removed TrimPrefix(repo,'v') that corrupted vault/
  vitess/vim-go.
- WebSocket CheckOrigin allowlist (was return true; CSWSH closed); same-origin
  default + ServerConfig.AllowedOrigins.
- fiber CVE GO-2026-4543 patched (v2.52.10 -> v2.52.12).

FUNCTIONAL FEATURES

- API key DB persistence: APIKeyModel + migration 202604280002, full CRUD,
  async LastUsedAt updates with WaitGroup-tracked goroutines drained on Close.
- Admin bootstrap via GOHOARDER_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_KEY env var; idempotent
  (skipped when non-revoked admin already exists).
- Auth middleware factory in pkg/app: RequireAuth, RequireRole, RequirePermission,
  OptionalAuth. Mounted on proxy + read APIs when Auth.Enabled=true.
  DELETE /api/packages/* requires admin role. /health public for k8s probes.
- NFS storage backend: pkg/storage/nfs wraps filesystem with /proc/mounts
  detection (Linux), post-write fsync, read-after-write health probe.
- WebSocket real-time pipeline: pkg/events Broadcaster interface; cache + scanner
  managers emit EventPackageCached / EventPackageDownloaded / EventScanComplete;
  app.go runs 30s EventStatsUpdate ticker. Frontend has full WS client (reconnect
  with exponential backoff 1s->30s, 25s heartbeat, subscriber pattern), Pinia
  realtime store, Dashboard live indicator + activity feed + reactive stats
  override.
- TLS termination: fiber.ListenTLS when Server.TLS.Enabled.
- Pre-warming: Prewarming.Enabled flag wired (was hardcoded false); Interval,
  MaxConcurrent, TopPackages plumbed.
- NetworkConfig wired (timeouts, retry, rate-limit, circuit-breaker).
- AuthConfig.BcryptCost wired.
- Security.Scanners.Static.MaxPackageSize plumbed to cache.io.LimitReader.
- Handlers.{Go,NPM,PyPI}.Enabled gates route mounting.
- Graceful shutdown: authManager.Close drains async writes.

LINT/HYGIENE

- 80 golangci-lint issues resolved: errcheck (Close/Write/RemoveAll wrapped),
  gofmt, gosec G104/G306, govet shadow renames + fieldalignment reorders,
  staticcheck ST1000 pkg comments + QF1003 tagged switches + QF1008 embedded
  field selectors + QF1001 De Morgan's law.

BEHAVIOR CHANGES

- Scanner now fail-closed: deployments without scanner binaries
  (trivy/govulncheck/npm-audit/pip-audit/grype) BLOCK packages instead of
  serving unscanned. Add binaries or plan a future allow-on-scan-error flag.
- WS origin defaults to same-origin; cross-origin dashboards must set
  server.allowed_origins.
- Validator no longer fails open; private packages won't serve from cache when
  validation can't be performed.
- download_events retention dropped from 24h to ~5min (deleted in agg tx).
  Migration 202604280001 purges pre-upgrade events.
- DELETE /api/packages/* requires admin role when auth enabled.

NEW PACKAGES

- pkg/events  - Broadcaster interface
- pkg/storage/nfs  - NFS-aware filesystem wrapper

DEFERRED (out of scope this pass)

- Static scanner implementation (config defines AllowedLicenses/MaxPackageSize/
  BlockSuspicious but pkg/scanner/static/ does not exist).
- AuthConfig.AuditLog wiring (no audit log infra yet).
- CacheConfig.TTLOverrides passthrough (would touch cache.Config beyond
  integrator scope).
2026-07-10 09:37:55 +01:00

623 lines
19 KiB
Go

// Package scanner orchestrates pluggable vulnerability scanners and
// records their results against cached packages.
package scanner
import (
"context"
stderrors "errors"
"fmt"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/config"
hoardererrors "github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/errors"
"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/events"
"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/metadata"
"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/scanner/ghsa"
"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/scanner/govulncheck"
"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/scanner/grype"
"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/scanner/npmaudit"
"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/scanner/osv"
"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/scanner/pipaudit"
"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/scanner/trivy"
"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/uuid"
"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/websocket"
"github.com/rs/zerolog/log"
)
// Scanner defines the interface for security scanners
type Scanner interface {
// Name returns the scanner name
Name() string
// Scan scans a package for vulnerabilities
Scan(ctx context.Context, registry, packageName, version string, filePath string) (*metadata.ScanResult, error)
// Health checks scanner health
Health(ctx context.Context) error
}
// DatabaseUpdater is implemented by scanners that need database updates
type DatabaseUpdater interface {
UpdateDatabase(ctx context.Context) error
}
// Manager manages multiple security scanners
type Manager struct {
metadataStore metadata.MetadataStore
broadcaster events.Broadcaster
scanners []Scanner
config config.SecurityConfig
bcMu sync.RWMutex
enabled bool
}
// SetBroadcaster wires an events.Broadcaster onto the scanner so scan
// lifecycle events are published. Pass nil to disable broadcasting.
// Safe for concurrent use.
func (m *Manager) SetBroadcaster(b events.Broadcaster) {
m.bcMu.Lock()
m.broadcaster = b
m.bcMu.Unlock()
}
// emit publishes an event via the configured broadcaster, if any.
// Non-blocking: the underlying transport handles overflow by dropping.
func (m *Manager) emit(eventType string, payload map[string]interface{}) {
m.bcMu.RLock()
b := m.broadcaster
m.bcMu.RUnlock()
if b == nil {
return
}
b.BroadcastEvent(eventType, payload)
}
// New creates a new scanner manager with configured scanners
func New(cfg config.SecurityConfig, metadataStore metadata.MetadataStore) (*Manager, error) {
manager := &Manager{
scanners: make([]Scanner, 0),
enabled: cfg.Enabled,
config: cfg,
metadataStore: metadataStore,
}
if !cfg.Enabled {
log.Info().Msg("Security scanning disabled")
return manager, nil
}
// Initialize Trivy scanner
if cfg.Scanners.Trivy.Enabled {
trivyScanner := trivy.New(cfg.Scanners.Trivy)
manager.RegisterScanner(trivyScanner)
log.Info().Msg("Trivy scanner enabled")
// Update database on startup if configured
if cfg.UpdateDBOnStartup {
if err := trivyScanner.UpdateDatabase(context.Background()); err != nil {
log.Warn().Err(err).Msg("Failed to update Trivy database on startup")
}
}
}
// Initialize OSV scanner
if cfg.Scanners.OSV.Enabled {
osvScanner := osv.New(cfg.Scanners.OSV)
manager.RegisterScanner(osvScanner)
log.Info().Msg("OSV scanner enabled")
}
// Initialize Grype scanner
if cfg.Scanners.Grype.Enabled {
grypeScanner := grype.New(cfg.Scanners.Grype)
manager.RegisterScanner(grypeScanner)
log.Info().Msg("Grype scanner enabled")
// Update database on startup if configured
if cfg.UpdateDBOnStartup {
if err := grypeScanner.UpdateDatabase(context.Background()); err != nil {
log.Warn().Err(err).Msg("Failed to update Grype database on startup")
}
}
}
// Initialize govulncheck scanner
if cfg.Scanners.Govulncheck.Enabled {
govulncheckScanner := govulncheck.New(cfg.Scanners.Govulncheck)
manager.RegisterScanner(govulncheckScanner)
log.Info().Msg("govulncheck scanner enabled")
}
// Initialize npm-audit scanner
if cfg.Scanners.NpmAudit.Enabled {
npmAuditScanner := npmaudit.New(cfg.Scanners.NpmAudit)
manager.RegisterScanner(npmAuditScanner)
log.Info().Msg("npm-audit scanner enabled")
}
// Initialize pip-audit scanner
if cfg.Scanners.PipAudit.Enabled {
pipAuditScanner := pipaudit.New(cfg.Scanners.PipAudit)
manager.RegisterScanner(pipAuditScanner)
log.Info().Msg("pip-audit scanner enabled")
}
// Initialize GitHub Advisory Database scanner
if cfg.Scanners.GHSA.Enabled {
ghsaScanner := ghsa.New(cfg.Scanners.GHSA)
manager.RegisterScanner(ghsaScanner)
log.Info().Msg("GitHub Advisory Database scanner enabled")
}
if len(manager.scanners) == 0 {
log.Warn().Msg("Security scanning enabled but no scanners configured")
}
return manager, nil
}
// RegisterScanner registers a scanner
func (m *Manager) RegisterScanner(scanner Scanner) {
m.scanners = append(m.scanners, scanner)
}
// ScanPackage scans a package using all registered scanners and saves results
func (m *Manager) ScanPackage(ctx context.Context, registry, packageName, version string, filePath string) error {
if !m.enabled {
return nil
}
log.Info().
Str("registry", registry).
Str("package", packageName).
Str("version", version).
Msg("Starting security scan")
// Collect results from all scanners
var scanResults []*metadata.ScanResult
scannerNames := make([]string, 0)
for _, scanner := range m.scanners {
// Skip scanners that don't support this registry
if !m.shouldRunScanner(scanner.Name(), registry) {
log.Debug().
Str("scanner", scanner.Name()).
Str("registry", registry).
Msg("Skipping scanner - not compatible with registry")
continue
}
result, err := scanner.Scan(ctx, registry, packageName, version, filePath)
if err != nil {
log.Error().
Err(err).
Str("scanner", scanner.Name()).
Str("package", packageName).
Msg("Scanner failed")
continue
}
scanResults = append(scanResults, result)
scannerNames = append(scannerNames, scanner.Name())
log.Info().
Str("scanner", scanner.Name()).
Str("package", packageName).
Str("status", string(result.Status)).
Int("vulnerabilities", result.VulnerabilityCount).
Msg("Scan completed")
}
// If no scanners succeeded, persist a synthetic error result so callers
// fail closed (no scan == blocked) rather than silently leaving
// SecurityScanned=false which would allow the package to be served.
if len(scanResults) == 0 {
log.Warn().
Str("package", packageName).
Msg("All scanners failed, saving scan-error result for fail-closed enforcement")
errResult := &metadata.ScanResult{
ID: uuid.New().String(),
Registry: registry,
PackageName: packageName,
PackageVersion: version,
Scanner: "all",
ScannedAt: time.Now(),
Status: metadata.ScanStatusError,
VulnerabilityCount: 0,
Vulnerabilities: []metadata.Vulnerability{},
Details: map[string]interface{}{
"error": "all configured scanners failed for this package",
},
}
if err := m.metadataStore.SaveScanResult(ctx, errResult); err != nil {
log.Error().
Err(err).
Str("package", packageName).
Msg("Failed to save scan-error result")
return err
}
m.emit(string(websocket.EventScanComplete), map[string]interface{}{
"registry": registry,
"name": packageName,
"version": version,
"status": string(errResult.Status),
"vulnerability_count": errResult.VulnerabilityCount,
})
return nil
}
// Merge and deduplicate results from all scanners
mergedResult := m.mergeResults(scanResults, scannerNames)
// Save consolidated result to metadata store
if err := m.metadataStore.SaveScanResult(ctx, mergedResult); err != nil {
log.Error().
Err(err).
Str("package", packageName).
Msg("Failed to save consolidated scan result")
return err
}
log.Info().
Str("package", packageName).
Str("status", string(mergedResult.Status)).
Int("total_vulnerabilities", mergedResult.VulnerabilityCount).
Int("unique_cves", len(mergedResult.Vulnerabilities)).
Strs("scanners", scannerNames).
Msg("Consolidated scan results saved")
m.emit(string(websocket.EventScanComplete), map[string]interface{}{
"registry": registry,
"name": packageName,
"version": version,
"status": string(mergedResult.Status),
"vulnerability_count": mergedResult.VulnerabilityCount,
})
return nil
}
// mergeResults merges and deduplicates scan results from multiple scanners
func (m *Manager) mergeResults(results []*metadata.ScanResult, scannerNames []string) *metadata.ScanResult {
if len(results) == 0 {
return nil
}
// Use first result as base
merged := &metadata.ScanResult{
ID: results[0].ID,
Registry: results[0].Registry,
PackageName: results[0].PackageName,
PackageVersion: results[0].PackageVersion,
Scanner: strings.Join(scannerNames, "+"), // Combined scanner name
ScannedAt: results[0].ScannedAt,
Status: metadata.ScanStatusClean,
Vulnerabilities: make([]metadata.Vulnerability, 0),
Details: make(map[string]interface{}),
}
// Use map for deduplication - key is CVE ID in uppercase
vulnMap := make(map[string]*metadata.Vulnerability)
severityCounts := make(map[string]int)
// Merge vulnerabilities from all scanners
for i, result := range results {
scannerName := scannerNames[i]
// Track scanner details
merged.Details[scannerName] = result.Details
// Add/merge vulnerabilities
for _, vuln := range result.Vulnerabilities {
cveKey := strings.ToUpper(vuln.ID)
// Check if CVE already exists
if existing, exists := vulnMap[cveKey]; exists {
// CVE found by multiple scanners - merge information
log.Debug().
Str("cve", vuln.ID).
Strs("existing_scanners", existing.DetectedBy).
Str("new_scanner", scannerName).
Msg("CVE found by multiple scanners, merging")
// Add scanner to DetectedBy list
existing.DetectedBy = append(existing.DetectedBy, scannerName)
// Prefer higher severity if different
if m.compareSeverity(vuln.Severity, existing.Severity) > 0 {
existing.Severity = vuln.Severity
}
// Merge references (deduplicate URLs)
refSet := make(map[string]bool)
for _, ref := range existing.References {
refSet[ref] = true
}
for _, ref := range vuln.References {
if !refSet[ref] {
existing.References = append(existing.References, ref)
refSet[ref] = true
}
}
// Prefer fixed_in version if not already set
if existing.FixedIn == "" && vuln.FixedIn != "" {
existing.FixedIn = vuln.FixedIn
}
} else {
// New CVE - add to map
vulnCopy := vuln
vulnCopy.DetectedBy = []string{scannerName}
vulnMap[cveKey] = &vulnCopy
}
}
// Update status to worst case.
// Order: vulnerable > error > pending > clean. Vulnerable wins because
// the cache layer must surface the actual vulns. Otherwise, if any
// scanner errored, propagate so CheckVulnerabilities can fail closed.
switch result.Status {
case metadata.ScanStatusVulnerable:
merged.Status = metadata.ScanStatusVulnerable
case metadata.ScanStatusError:
if merged.Status != metadata.ScanStatusVulnerable {
merged.Status = metadata.ScanStatusError
}
case metadata.ScanStatusPending:
if merged.Status != metadata.ScanStatusVulnerable && merged.Status != metadata.ScanStatusError {
merged.Status = metadata.ScanStatusPending
}
}
}
// Convert map to slice and count severities
for _, vuln := range vulnMap {
merged.Vulnerabilities = append(merged.Vulnerabilities, *vuln)
severityCounts[strings.ToUpper(vuln.Severity)]++
}
// Update counts
merged.VulnerabilityCount = len(merged.Vulnerabilities)
merged.Details["severity_counts"] = severityCounts
merged.Details["deduplication_summary"] = fmt.Sprintf(
"Merged results from %d scanners (%s)",
len(scannerNames),
strings.Join(scannerNames, ", "),
)
return merged
}
// compareSeverity returns >0 if s1 is more severe than s2, <0 if less, 0 if equal
func (m *Manager) compareSeverity(s1, s2 string) int {
severityOrder := map[string]int{
"CRITICAL": 4,
"HIGH": 3,
"MODERATE": 2,
"MEDIUM": 2, // Support both for backwards compatibility
"LOW": 1,
"UNKNOWN": 0,
}
v1 := severityOrder[strings.ToUpper(s1)]
v2 := severityOrder[strings.ToUpper(s2)]
return v1 - v2
}
// CheckVulnerabilities checks if a package exceeds vulnerability thresholds
func (m *Manager) CheckVulnerabilities(ctx context.Context, registry, packageName, version string) (bool, string, error) {
if !m.enabled {
return false, "", nil
}
// Get active CVE bypasses from database
bypasses, err := m.metadataStore.GetActiveCVEBypasses(ctx)
if err != nil {
log.Warn().Err(err).Msg("Failed to get CVE bypasses, continuing without bypasses")
bypasses = []*metadata.CVEBypass{} // Continue without bypasses
}
// Check if entire package is bypassed
packageKey := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s@%s", registry, packageName, version)
packageKeyNoVersion := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s", registry, packageName)
for _, bypass := range bypasses {
if bypass.Type == metadata.BypassTypePackage && bypass.Active {
if bypass.Target == packageKey || bypass.Target == packageKeyNoVersion {
log.Info().
Str("package", packageKey).
Str("bypass_id", bypass.ID).
Str("reason", bypass.Reason).
Time("expires_at", bypass.ExpiresAt).
Msg("Package bypassed by admin")
return false, "", nil
}
}
}
// Get latest scan result.
// SECURITY: Fail closed when no scan exists or backend errors.
// Previously this returned (false, "", nil) which allowed unscanned
// packages through — a fail-open bypass. Cache layer is expected to
// wait for the initial scan via SecurityScanned flag; once that flag
// is set, GetScanResult MUST return a record. A missing record at this
// point indicates either a cleared/lost scan or a transient error;
// either way we block.
result, err := m.metadataStore.GetScanResult(ctx, registry, packageName, version)
if err != nil {
var hErr *hoardererrors.Error
if stderrors.As(err, &hErr) && hErr.Code == hoardererrors.ErrCodeNotFound {
return true, "no scan available - fail closed", nil
}
// Real backend error (DB transient, etc.) — also block.
log.Warn().
Err(err).
Str("package", packageName).
Msg("Failed to retrieve scan result, failing closed")
return true, "scan lookup failed - fail closed", nil
}
if result == nil {
// File-backed metadata store returns (nil, nil) on not-found.
return true, "no scan available - fail closed", nil
}
// If the scan itself errored (all scanners failed for this package),
// block. A scan-error record means we don't actually know whether the
// package is safe.
if result.Status == metadata.ScanStatusError {
return true, "scan failed - fail closed", nil
}
// Build set of bypassed CVEs for fast lookup
bypassedCVEs := make(map[string]*metadata.CVEBypass)
for _, bypass := range bypasses {
if bypass.Type == metadata.BypassTypeCVE && bypass.Active {
// Check if bypass applies to this package (if AppliesTo is set)
if bypass.AppliesTo != "" && bypass.AppliesTo != packageKey && bypass.AppliesTo != packageKeyNoVersion {
continue // This bypass doesn't apply to this package
}
bypassedCVEs[strings.ToUpper(bypass.Target)] = bypass
}
}
// Count vulnerabilities by severity, excluding bypassed CVEs
severityCounts := make(map[string]int)
for _, vuln := range result.Vulnerabilities {
// Check if this CVE is bypassed
if bypass, ok := bypassedCVEs[strings.ToUpper(vuln.ID)]; ok {
log.Debug().
Str("cve", vuln.ID).
Str("package", packageName).
Str("bypass_id", bypass.ID).
Str("reason", bypass.Reason).
Time("expires_at", bypass.ExpiresAt).
Msg("CVE bypassed by admin")
continue
}
severityCounts[strings.ToUpper(vuln.Severity)]++
}
// Check against thresholds
thresholds := m.config.BlockThresholds
// Check critical
if thresholds.Critical >= 0 && severityCounts["CRITICAL"] > thresholds.Critical {
return true, fmt.Sprintf("Package has %d CRITICAL vulnerabilities (threshold: %d)",
severityCounts["CRITICAL"], thresholds.Critical), nil
}
// Check high
if thresholds.High >= 0 && severityCounts["HIGH"] > thresholds.High {
return true, fmt.Sprintf("Package has %d HIGH vulnerabilities (threshold: %d)",
severityCounts["HIGH"], thresholds.High), nil
}
// Check moderate (medium)
moderateCount := severityCounts["MODERATE"] + severityCounts["MEDIUM"] // Support both for backwards compatibility
if thresholds.Medium >= 0 && moderateCount > thresholds.Medium {
return true, fmt.Sprintf("Package has %d MODERATE vulnerabilities (threshold: %d)",
moderateCount, thresholds.Medium), nil
}
// Check low
if thresholds.Low >= 0 && severityCounts["LOW"] > thresholds.Low {
return true, fmt.Sprintf("Package has %d LOW vulnerabilities (threshold: %d)",
severityCounts["LOW"], thresholds.Low), nil
}
// Check block on severity
if m.config.BlockOnSeverity != "" && m.config.BlockOnSeverity != "none" {
severity := strings.ToUpper(m.config.BlockOnSeverity)
// Block if any vulnerabilities at or above the specified severity exist
switch severity {
case "CRITICAL":
if severityCounts["CRITICAL"] > 0 {
return true, "Package has CRITICAL vulnerabilities", nil
}
case "HIGH":
if severityCounts["CRITICAL"] > 0 || severityCounts["HIGH"] > 0 {
return true, "Package has HIGH or CRITICAL vulnerabilities", nil
}
case "MODERATE", "MEDIUM":
moderateCount := severityCounts["MODERATE"] + severityCounts["MEDIUM"]
if severityCounts["CRITICAL"] > 0 || severityCounts["HIGH"] > 0 || moderateCount > 0 {
return true, "Package has MODERATE, HIGH, or CRITICAL vulnerabilities", nil
}
case "LOW":
if len(result.Vulnerabilities) > 0 {
return true, "Package has vulnerabilities", nil
}
}
}
return false, "", nil
}
// UpdateDatabases updates vulnerability databases for all scanners
func (m *Manager) UpdateDatabases(ctx context.Context) error {
if !m.enabled {
return nil
}
log.Info().Msg("Updating vulnerability databases")
for _, scanner := range m.scanners {
if updater, ok := scanner.(DatabaseUpdater); ok {
if err := updater.UpdateDatabase(ctx); err != nil {
log.Error().
Err(err).
Str("scanner", scanner.Name()).
Msg("Failed to update database")
return err
}
}
}
log.Info().Msg("Vulnerability databases updated successfully")
return nil
}
// Health checks health of all scanners
func (m *Manager) Health(ctx context.Context) error {
if !m.enabled {
return nil
}
for _, scanner := range m.scanners {
if err := scanner.Health(ctx); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("scanner %s health check failed: %w", scanner.Name(), err)
}
}
return nil
}
// shouldRunScanner determines if a scanner should run for a given registry
// Language-specific scanners only run for their target ecosystems
func (m *Manager) shouldRunScanner(scannerName, registry string) bool {
registry = strings.ToLower(registry)
// Language-specific scanners - only run for their target registry
switch scannerName {
case "govulncheck":
return registry == "go"
case "npm-audit":
return registry == "npm"
case "pip-audit":
return registry == "pypi"
// Multi-ecosystem scanners - run for all registries
case "trivy", "osv", "grype", "github-advisory-database":
return true
// Default: allow scanner to run (for future scanners)
default:
return true
}
}