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https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder.git
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e39d6a0f0d
Multi-agent audit + fix pass covering bugs, security, dead config wiring,
and missing features. All quality gates green: build/vet/test -race/govulncheck/
golangci-lint. Frontend tests 47/47.
SECURITY & CORRECTNESS
- Scanner pipeline fail-closed: cache.go scan timeout now 503 (was goto servePkg);
scanner.go all-scanners-fail saves ScanStatusError; CheckVulnerabilities blocks
on missing/error result instead of allowing.
- Scanner argv corrections: govulncheck source-mode + go.mod discovery;
npm-audit generates lockfile via npm install --package-lock-only --ignore-scripts;
pip-audit per-extension dispatch (wheel direct / sdist extract+pyproject).
- GHSA version-range filtering implemented (was always-include); url.QueryEscape
on package name.
- pypi SSRF closed via host allowlist on original_url; url.QueryEscape on
rewriteURL output.
- Path traversal: cache temp file uses os.CreateTemp; smb keyToPath sanitized;
filesystem keyToPath returns error + filepath.Abs prefix-verify.
- Goroutine leaks plugged: cache.cleanupWorker stop channel; auth.ValidationCache
Stop() with sync.Once; ws.unregister buffered with non-blocking send.
- WebSocket double-close panic fixed via sync.Once Client.closeSend().
- Race conditions: gormstore.registryCache sync.RWMutex (was concurrent map
panic); auth.LastUsedAt no longer mutated under RLock; analytics strict
lock-ordering invariant (statsMu before downloadsMu).
- Auth validator fails CLOSED on transport/unknown-status errors (was returning
true,err 'allow cache fallback').
- Credential cache hash full SHA256 (was 8-byte truncate; eliminates 2^32
collision risk).
- filesystem.fs.used incremented after successful rename (no quota inflation
race).
- gormstore aggregation events deleted in same tx as insert (no double-counting).
- gormstore.SavePackage uses Updates(map) so zero-value security flags
(RequiresAuth=false) can be cleared.
- partition_manager validates partition name regex before DROP TABLE.
- vcs/git: version regex validation rejects --option-injection; checkout uses
--detach -- separator; removed TrimPrefix(repo,'v') that corrupted vault/
vitess/vim-go.
- WebSocket CheckOrigin allowlist (was return true; CSWSH closed); same-origin
default + ServerConfig.AllowedOrigins.
- fiber CVE GO-2026-4543 patched (v2.52.10 -> v2.52.12).
FUNCTIONAL FEATURES
- API key DB persistence: APIKeyModel + migration 202604280002, full CRUD,
async LastUsedAt updates with WaitGroup-tracked goroutines drained on Close.
- Admin bootstrap via GOHOARDER_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_KEY env var; idempotent
(skipped when non-revoked admin already exists).
- Auth middleware factory in pkg/app: RequireAuth, RequireRole, RequirePermission,
OptionalAuth. Mounted on proxy + read APIs when Auth.Enabled=true.
DELETE /api/packages/* requires admin role. /health public for k8s probes.
- NFS storage backend: pkg/storage/nfs wraps filesystem with /proc/mounts
detection (Linux), post-write fsync, read-after-write health probe.
- WebSocket real-time pipeline: pkg/events Broadcaster interface; cache + scanner
managers emit EventPackageCached / EventPackageDownloaded / EventScanComplete;
app.go runs 30s EventStatsUpdate ticker. Frontend has full WS client (reconnect
with exponential backoff 1s->30s, 25s heartbeat, subscriber pattern), Pinia
realtime store, Dashboard live indicator + activity feed + reactive stats
override.
- TLS termination: fiber.ListenTLS when Server.TLS.Enabled.
- Pre-warming: Prewarming.Enabled flag wired (was hardcoded false); Interval,
MaxConcurrent, TopPackages plumbed.
- NetworkConfig wired (timeouts, retry, rate-limit, circuit-breaker).
- AuthConfig.BcryptCost wired.
- Security.Scanners.Static.MaxPackageSize plumbed to cache.io.LimitReader.
- Handlers.{Go,NPM,PyPI}.Enabled gates route mounting.
- Graceful shutdown: authManager.Close drains async writes.
LINT/HYGIENE
- 80 golangci-lint issues resolved: errcheck (Close/Write/RemoveAll wrapped),
gofmt, gosec G104/G306, govet shadow renames + fieldalignment reorders,
staticcheck ST1000 pkg comments + QF1003 tagged switches + QF1008 embedded
field selectors + QF1001 De Morgan's law.
BEHAVIOR CHANGES
- Scanner now fail-closed: deployments without scanner binaries
(trivy/govulncheck/npm-audit/pip-audit/grype) BLOCK packages instead of
serving unscanned. Add binaries or plan a future allow-on-scan-error flag.
- WS origin defaults to same-origin; cross-origin dashboards must set
server.allowed_origins.
- Validator no longer fails open; private packages won't serve from cache when
validation can't be performed.
- download_events retention dropped from 24h to ~5min (deleted in agg tx).
Migration 202604280001 purges pre-upgrade events.
- DELETE /api/packages/* requires admin role when auth enabled.
NEW PACKAGES
- pkg/events - Broadcaster interface
- pkg/storage/nfs - NFS-aware filesystem wrapper
DEFERRED (out of scope this pass)
- Static scanner implementation (config defines AllowedLicenses/MaxPackageSize/
BlockSuspicious but pkg/scanner/static/ does not exist).
- AuthConfig.AuditLog wiring (no audit log infra yet).
- CacheConfig.TTLOverrides passthrough (would touch cache.Config beyond
integrator scope).
307 lines
9.5 KiB
Go
307 lines
9.5 KiB
Go
// Package pipaudit wraps the `pip-audit` CLI to scan Python wheels and
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// source distributions for known vulnerabilities.
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package pipaudit
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"os/exec"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/config"
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"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/metadata"
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"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/uuid"
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"github.com/rs/zerolog/log"
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)
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// ScannerName is the name of this scanner
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const ScannerName = "pip-audit"
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// Scanner implements the pip-audit vulnerability scanner
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type Scanner struct {
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config config.PipAuditConfig
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}
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// New creates a new pip-audit scanner
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func New(cfg config.PipAuditConfig) *Scanner {
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return &Scanner{
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config: cfg,
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}
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}
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// Name returns the scanner name
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func (s *Scanner) Name() string {
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return ScannerName
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}
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// Scan scans a Python package using pip-audit
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func (s *Scanner) Scan(ctx context.Context, registry, packageName, version string, filePath string) (*metadata.ScanResult, error) {
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// Only scan PyPI packages
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if registry != "pypi" {
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return &metadata.ScanResult{
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ID: uuid.New().String(),
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Registry: registry,
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PackageName: packageName,
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PackageVersion: version,
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Scanner: ScannerName,
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ScannedAt: time.Now(),
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Status: metadata.ScanStatusClean,
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VulnerabilityCount: 0,
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Vulnerabilities: []metadata.Vulnerability{},
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Details: map[string]interface{}{
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"skipped": "pip-audit only supports PyPI packages",
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},
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}, nil
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}
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log.Info().
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Str("scanner", ScannerName).
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Str("package", packageName).
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Str("version", version).
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Msg("Starting pip-audit scan")
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// Create a temporary directory
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tmpDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "pip-audit-*")
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create temp dir: %w", err)
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}
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defer func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(tmpDir) }()
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// Copy the wheel/tar.gz file to temp directory
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tmpFile := filepath.Join(tmpDir, filepath.Base(filePath))
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if err := s.copyFile(filePath, tmpFile); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to copy file: %w", err)
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}
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// Build the appropriate pip-audit invocation based on artifact type.
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// `-r` expects requirements.txt — passing a wheel/tarball there is wrong.
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// Wheels can be scanned directly via positional arg. Source distributions
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// (tarballs) need to be extracted; if they contain a pyproject.toml we
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// can scan that, otherwise we fail closed.
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cmd, prepErr := s.buildAuditCmd(ctx, tmpDir, tmpFile)
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if prepErr != nil {
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log.Warn().
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Err(prepErr).
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Str("package", packageName).
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Str("version", version).
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Msg("pip-audit could not prepare input artifact, returning scan-error")
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return s.scanErrorResult(registry, packageName, version, prepErr.Error()), nil
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}
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output, _ := cmd.CombinedOutput() // pip-audit returns non-zero when vulns found
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// Parse pip-audit output
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var auditResult PipAuditResult
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if len(output) > 0 {
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if err := json.Unmarshal(output, &auditResult); err != nil {
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log.Warn().Err(err).Msg("Failed to parse pip-audit output")
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// Parse failure → no signal → fail closed.
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return s.scanErrorResult(registry, packageName, version,
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fmt.Sprintf("failed to parse pip-audit output: %v", err)), nil
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}
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}
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// Convert to our format
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result := s.convertResult(&auditResult, registry, packageName, version)
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log.Info().
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Str("scanner", ScannerName).
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Str("package", packageName).
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Int("vulnerabilities", result.VulnerabilityCount).
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Msg("pip-audit scan completed")
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return result, nil
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}
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// Health checks if pip-audit is available
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func (s *Scanner) Health(ctx context.Context) error {
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cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "pip-audit", "--version")
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if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("pip-audit not available: %w (install with: pip install pip-audit)", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// copyFile copies a file from src to dst
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func (s *Scanner) copyFile(src, dst string) error {
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input, err := os.ReadFile(src) // #nosec G304 -- Source path is from scanner, controlled
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return os.WriteFile(dst, input, 0600)
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}
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// buildAuditCmd constructs the right pip-audit command for the input artifact.
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//
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// - .whl -> pip-audit <wheel> --format json
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// - .tar.gz / .tgz / .zip (sdist) -> extract; if pyproject.toml exists
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// run `pip-audit --pyproject <pyproject> --format json`; otherwise error.
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//
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// extractDir is used as a workspace for sdist extraction.
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func (s *Scanner) buildAuditCmd(ctx context.Context, extractDir, artifact string) (*exec.Cmd, error) {
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lower := strings.ToLower(artifact)
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switch {
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case strings.HasSuffix(lower, ".whl"):
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// pip-audit can scan a wheel directly via positional argument.
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return exec.CommandContext(ctx, "pip-audit", artifact, "--format", "json"), nil // #nosec G204 -- artifact path is in controlled tmp dir
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case strings.HasSuffix(lower, ".tar.gz"),
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strings.HasSuffix(lower, ".tgz"),
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strings.HasSuffix(lower, ".zip"):
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// Source distributions must be unpacked first.
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sdistDir := filepath.Join(extractDir, "sdist")
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if err := os.MkdirAll(sdistDir, 0o750); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("create sdist dir: %w", err)
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}
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if err := s.extractSdist(artifact, sdistDir); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("extract sdist: %w", err)
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}
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pyproject, err := findPyProject(sdistDir)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("no pyproject.toml in sdist: %w", err)
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}
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return exec.CommandContext(ctx, "pip-audit", "--pyproject", pyproject, "--format", "json"), nil // #nosec G204 -- pyproject path under controlled tmp dir
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default:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported pip artifact extension: %s", filepath.Base(artifact))
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}
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}
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// extractSdist unpacks a Python source distribution into destDir.
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func (s *Scanner) extractSdist(archive, destDir string) error {
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lower := strings.ToLower(archive)
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switch {
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case strings.HasSuffix(lower, ".tar.gz"), strings.HasSuffix(lower, ".tgz"):
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return exec.Command("tar", "-xzf", archive, "-C", destDir).Run()
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case strings.HasSuffix(lower, ".zip"):
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return exec.Command("unzip", "-q", archive, "-d", destDir).Run()
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default:
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return fmt.Errorf("unknown archive type: %s", archive)
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}
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}
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// findPyProject returns the path to a pyproject.toml within root, walking
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// one level deep (sdists typically extract to <pkg>-<ver>/).
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func findPyProject(root string) (string, error) {
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var found string
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err := filepath.WalkDir(root, func(path string, d os.DirEntry, err error) error {
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if err != nil {
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return nil
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}
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if d.IsDir() {
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return nil
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}
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if d.Name() == "pyproject.toml" {
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found = path
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return filepath.SkipAll
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}
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return nil
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})
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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if found == "" {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("pyproject.toml not found under %s", root)
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}
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return found, nil
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}
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// scanErrorResult returns a result marked scan-error so manager merge and
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// CheckVulnerabilities can fail closed when this scanner could not run.
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func (s *Scanner) scanErrorResult(registry, packageName, version, reason string) *metadata.ScanResult {
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return &metadata.ScanResult{
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ID: uuid.New().String(),
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Registry: registry,
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PackageName: packageName,
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PackageVersion: version,
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Scanner: ScannerName,
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ScannedAt: time.Now(),
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Status: metadata.ScanStatusError,
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VulnerabilityCount: 0,
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Vulnerabilities: []metadata.Vulnerability{},
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Details: map[string]interface{}{
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"error": reason,
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},
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}
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}
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// emptyResult returns an empty scan result
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// convertResult converts pip-audit output to our ScanResult format
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func (s *Scanner) convertResult(auditResult *PipAuditResult, registry, packageName, version string) *metadata.ScanResult {
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vulnerabilities := make([]metadata.Vulnerability, 0)
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severityCounts := make(map[string]int)
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for _, dep := range auditResult.Dependencies {
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for _, vuln := range dep.Vulns {
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// Map pip-audit severity to our standard
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severity := s.mapSeverity(vuln.ID)
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normalizedSeverity := metadata.NormalizeSeverity(severity)
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severityCounts[normalizedSeverity]++
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// Get fixed versions
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fixedIn := ""
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if len(vuln.FixVersions) > 0 {
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fixedIn = vuln.FixVersions[0]
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}
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vulnerabilities = append(vulnerabilities, metadata.Vulnerability{
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ID: vuln.ID,
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Severity: normalizedSeverity,
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Title: vuln.ID,
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Description: vuln.Description,
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References: []string{fmt.Sprintf("https://osv.dev/vulnerability/%s", vuln.ID)},
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FixedIn: fixedIn,
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})
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}
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}
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status := metadata.ScanStatusClean
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if len(vulnerabilities) > 0 {
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status = metadata.ScanStatusVulnerable
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}
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return &metadata.ScanResult{
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ID: uuid.New().String(),
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Registry: registry,
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PackageName: packageName,
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PackageVersion: version,
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Scanner: ScannerName,
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ScannedAt: time.Now(),
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Status: status,
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VulnerabilityCount: len(vulnerabilities),
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Vulnerabilities: vulnerabilities,
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Details: map[string]interface{}{
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"severity_counts": severityCounts,
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},
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}
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}
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// mapSeverity maps vulnerability ID patterns to severity levels
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func (s *Scanner) mapSeverity(vulnID string) string {
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// pip-audit doesn't provide severity directly
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// Default to MODERATE for all findings
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return "MODERATE"
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}
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// PipAuditResult represents pip-audit JSON output
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type PipAuditResult struct {
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Dependencies []PipDependency `json:"dependencies"`
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}
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type PipDependency struct {
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Name string `json:"name"`
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Version string `json:"version"`
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Vulns []PipVuln `json:"vulns"`
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}
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type PipVuln struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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Description string `json:"description"`
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FixVersions []string `json:"fix_versions"`
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Aliases []string `json:"aliases"`
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}
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