Files
gohoarder/pkg/auth/validator.go
T
lukaszraczylo e39d6a0f0d feat: comprehensive audit + Tier 3 wiring (security/correctness/features)
Multi-agent audit + fix pass covering bugs, security, dead config wiring,
and missing features. All quality gates green: build/vet/test -race/govulncheck/
golangci-lint. Frontend tests 47/47.

SECURITY & CORRECTNESS

- Scanner pipeline fail-closed: cache.go scan timeout now 503 (was goto servePkg);
  scanner.go all-scanners-fail saves ScanStatusError; CheckVulnerabilities blocks
  on missing/error result instead of allowing.
- Scanner argv corrections: govulncheck source-mode + go.mod discovery;
  npm-audit generates lockfile via npm install --package-lock-only --ignore-scripts;
  pip-audit per-extension dispatch (wheel direct / sdist extract+pyproject).
- GHSA version-range filtering implemented (was always-include); url.QueryEscape
  on package name.
- pypi SSRF closed via host allowlist on original_url; url.QueryEscape on
  rewriteURL output.
- Path traversal: cache temp file uses os.CreateTemp; smb keyToPath sanitized;
  filesystem keyToPath returns error + filepath.Abs prefix-verify.
- Goroutine leaks plugged: cache.cleanupWorker stop channel; auth.ValidationCache
  Stop() with sync.Once; ws.unregister buffered with non-blocking send.
- WebSocket double-close panic fixed via sync.Once Client.closeSend().
- Race conditions: gormstore.registryCache sync.RWMutex (was concurrent map
  panic); auth.LastUsedAt no longer mutated under RLock; analytics strict
  lock-ordering invariant (statsMu before downloadsMu).
- Auth validator fails CLOSED on transport/unknown-status errors (was returning
  true,err 'allow cache fallback').
- Credential cache hash full SHA256 (was 8-byte truncate; eliminates 2^32
  collision risk).
- filesystem.fs.used incremented after successful rename (no quota inflation
  race).
- gormstore aggregation events deleted in same tx as insert (no double-counting).
- gormstore.SavePackage uses Updates(map) so zero-value security flags
  (RequiresAuth=false) can be cleared.
- partition_manager validates partition name regex before DROP TABLE.
- vcs/git: version regex validation rejects --option-injection; checkout uses
  --detach -- separator; removed TrimPrefix(repo,'v') that corrupted vault/
  vitess/vim-go.
- WebSocket CheckOrigin allowlist (was return true; CSWSH closed); same-origin
  default + ServerConfig.AllowedOrigins.
- fiber CVE GO-2026-4543 patched (v2.52.10 -> v2.52.12).

FUNCTIONAL FEATURES

- API key DB persistence: APIKeyModel + migration 202604280002, full CRUD,
  async LastUsedAt updates with WaitGroup-tracked goroutines drained on Close.
- Admin bootstrap via GOHOARDER_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_KEY env var; idempotent
  (skipped when non-revoked admin already exists).
- Auth middleware factory in pkg/app: RequireAuth, RequireRole, RequirePermission,
  OptionalAuth. Mounted on proxy + read APIs when Auth.Enabled=true.
  DELETE /api/packages/* requires admin role. /health public for k8s probes.
- NFS storage backend: pkg/storage/nfs wraps filesystem with /proc/mounts
  detection (Linux), post-write fsync, read-after-write health probe.
- WebSocket real-time pipeline: pkg/events Broadcaster interface; cache + scanner
  managers emit EventPackageCached / EventPackageDownloaded / EventScanComplete;
  app.go runs 30s EventStatsUpdate ticker. Frontend has full WS client (reconnect
  with exponential backoff 1s->30s, 25s heartbeat, subscriber pattern), Pinia
  realtime store, Dashboard live indicator + activity feed + reactive stats
  override.
- TLS termination: fiber.ListenTLS when Server.TLS.Enabled.
- Pre-warming: Prewarming.Enabled flag wired (was hardcoded false); Interval,
  MaxConcurrent, TopPackages plumbed.
- NetworkConfig wired (timeouts, retry, rate-limit, circuit-breaker).
- AuthConfig.BcryptCost wired.
- Security.Scanners.Static.MaxPackageSize plumbed to cache.io.LimitReader.
- Handlers.{Go,NPM,PyPI}.Enabled gates route mounting.
- Graceful shutdown: authManager.Close drains async writes.

LINT/HYGIENE

- 80 golangci-lint issues resolved: errcheck (Close/Write/RemoveAll wrapped),
  gofmt, gosec G104/G306, govet shadow renames + fieldalignment reorders,
  staticcheck ST1000 pkg comments + QF1003 tagged switches + QF1008 embedded
  field selectors + QF1001 De Morgan's law.

BEHAVIOR CHANGES

- Scanner now fail-closed: deployments without scanner binaries
  (trivy/govulncheck/npm-audit/pip-audit/grype) BLOCK packages instead of
  serving unscanned. Add binaries or plan a future allow-on-scan-error flag.
- WS origin defaults to same-origin; cross-origin dashboards must set
  server.allowed_origins.
- Validator no longer fails open; private packages won't serve from cache when
  validation can't be performed.
- download_events retention dropped from 24h to ~5min (deleted in agg tx).
  Migration 202604280001 purges pre-upgrade events.
- DELETE /api/packages/* requires admin role when auth enabled.

NEW PACKAGES

- pkg/events  - Broadcaster interface
- pkg/storage/nfs  - NFS-aware filesystem wrapper

DEFERRED (out of scope this pass)

- Static scanner implementation (config defines AllowedLicenses/MaxPackageSize/
  BlockSuspicious but pkg/scanner/static/ does not exist).
- AuthConfig.AuditLog wiring (no audit log infra yet).
- CacheConfig.TTLOverrides passthrough (would touch cache.Config beyond
  integrator scope).
2026-07-10 09:37:55 +01:00

285 lines
8.8 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/rs/zerolog/log"
)
// CredentialValidator validates credentials with upstream registries
type CredentialValidator interface {
// ValidateAccess checks if credentials grant access to a package
// Returns (allowed bool, error)
ValidateAccess(ctx context.Context, packageURL string, credentials string) (bool, error)
}
// NPMValidator validates npm registry credentials
type NPMValidator struct {
client *http.Client
timeout time.Duration
}
// NewNPMValidator creates a new npm credential validator
func NewNPMValidator() *NPMValidator {
return &NPMValidator{
client: &http.Client{
Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
},
timeout: 5 * time.Second,
}
}
// ValidateAccess validates npm package access using HEAD request
func (v *NPMValidator) ValidateAccess(ctx context.Context, packageURL string, credentials string) (bool, error) {
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "HEAD", packageURL, nil)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
// Add credentials if provided
if credentials != "" {
req.Header.Set("Authorization", credentials)
}
resp, err := v.client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
// Network error - fail closed. Caller decides any fallback policy.
log.Warn().Err(err).Str("url", packageURL).Msg("Validation request failed, denying access")
return false, fmt.Errorf("validation failed: %w", err)
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }() // #nosec G104 -- Cleanup, error not critical
// Check status code
switch resp.StatusCode {
case 200, 304:
// Access granted
return true, nil
case 401, 403, 404:
// Access denied
return false, fmt.Errorf("access denied: HTTP %d", resp.StatusCode)
default:
// Unexpected status - fail closed.
log.Warn().Int("status", resp.StatusCode).Str("url", packageURL).Msg("Unexpected validation status, denying access")
return false, fmt.Errorf("unexpected status %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
}
// PyPIValidator validates PyPI registry credentials
type PyPIValidator struct {
client *http.Client
timeout time.Duration
}
// NewPyPIValidator creates a new PyPI credential validator
func NewPyPIValidator() *PyPIValidator {
return &PyPIValidator{
client: &http.Client{
Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
},
timeout: 5 * time.Second,
}
}
// ValidateAccess validates PyPI package access using HEAD request
func (v *PyPIValidator) ValidateAccess(ctx context.Context, packageURL string, credentials string) (bool, error) {
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "HEAD", packageURL, nil)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
// Add credentials if provided
if credentials != "" {
req.Header.Set("Authorization", credentials)
}
resp, err := v.client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
// Network error - fail closed. Caller decides any fallback policy.
log.Warn().Err(err).Str("url", packageURL).Msg("Validation request failed, denying access")
return false, fmt.Errorf("validation failed: %w", err)
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }() // #nosec G104 -- Cleanup, error not critical
// Check status code
switch resp.StatusCode {
case 200, 304:
// Access granted
return true, nil
case 401, 403, 404:
// Access denied
return false, fmt.Errorf("access denied: HTTP %d", resp.StatusCode)
default:
// Unexpected status - fail closed.
log.Warn().Int("status", resp.StatusCode).Str("url", packageURL).Msg("Unexpected validation status, denying access")
return false, fmt.Errorf("unexpected status %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
}
// GoValidator validates Go module credentials
type GoValidator struct {
timeout time.Duration
}
// NewGoValidator creates a new Go module credential validator
func NewGoValidator() *GoValidator {
return &GoValidator{
timeout: 10 * time.Second,
}
}
// ValidateAccess validates Go module access using git ls-remote
func (v *GoValidator) ValidateAccess(ctx context.Context, modulePath string, credentials string) (bool, error) {
// Create context with timeout
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, v.timeout)
defer cancel()
// Determine repository type and validate accordingly
if strings.HasPrefix(modulePath, "github.com/") {
return v.validateGitHub(ctx, modulePath, credentials)
}
if strings.HasPrefix(modulePath, "gitlab.com/") {
return v.validateGitLab(ctx, modulePath, credentials)
}
// For other Git providers, use generic git validation
return v.validateGit(ctx, modulePath, credentials)
}
func (v *GoValidator) validateGitHub(ctx context.Context, modulePath, credentials string) (bool, error) {
// Extract token from credentials
token := strings.TrimPrefix(credentials, "Bearer ")
token = strings.TrimPrefix(token, "Token ")
if token == "" || token == credentials {
// No token provided or not in expected format
return false, fmt.Errorf("no GitHub token provided")
}
// Build git URL
repoURL := fmt.Sprintf("https://%s.git", modulePath)
// Create temporary directory for .netrc
tempDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "gohoarder-validate-*")
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
defer func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(tempDir) }()
// Create .netrc file with credentials
netrcPath := filepath.Join(tempDir, ".netrc")
netrcContent := fmt.Sprintf("machine github.com\nlogin oauth2\npassword %s\n", token)
if writeErr := os.WriteFile(netrcPath, []byte(netrcContent), 0600); writeErr != nil {
return false, writeErr
}
// Run git ls-remote (lightweight, just checks access)
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "git", "ls-remote", repoURL, "HEAD") // #nosec G204 -- git command with validated URL
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),
"HOME="+tempDir, // Use temp .netrc
"GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0", // Disable prompts
)
output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
// Check error message
errMsg := string(output)
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "could not read Username") ||
strings.Contains(errMsg, "Authentication failed") ||
strings.Contains(errMsg, "fatal: repository") ||
strings.Contains(errMsg, "not found") {
// Access denied
return false, fmt.Errorf("access denied: %s", strings.TrimSpace(errMsg))
}
// Other error (network, etc.) - fail closed.
log.Warn().Err(err).Str("module", modulePath).Msg("Git validation failed, denying access")
return false, fmt.Errorf("validation error: %w", err)
}
// Success - repository accessible
return true, nil
}
func (v *GoValidator) validateGitLab(ctx context.Context, modulePath, credentials string) (bool, error) {
// Extract token from credentials
token := strings.TrimPrefix(credentials, "Bearer ")
token = strings.TrimPrefix(token, "Token ")
token = strings.TrimPrefix(token, "Private-Token ")
if token == "" || token == credentials {
// No token provided
return false, fmt.Errorf("no GitLab token provided")
}
// Build git URL
repoURL := fmt.Sprintf("https://%s.git", modulePath)
// Create temporary directory for .netrc
tempDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "gohoarder-validate-*")
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
defer func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(tempDir) }()
// Create .netrc file with credentials
netrcPath := filepath.Join(tempDir, ".netrc")
netrcContent := fmt.Sprintf("machine gitlab.com\nlogin oauth2\npassword %s\n", token)
if writeErr := os.WriteFile(netrcPath, []byte(netrcContent), 0600); writeErr != nil {
return false, writeErr
}
// Run git ls-remote
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "git", "ls-remote", repoURL, "HEAD") // #nosec G204 -- git command with validated URL
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),
"HOME="+tempDir,
"GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0",
)
output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
errMsg := string(output)
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "could not read Username") ||
strings.Contains(errMsg, "Authentication failed") ||
strings.Contains(errMsg, "not found") {
return false, fmt.Errorf("access denied: %s", strings.TrimSpace(errMsg))
}
log.Warn().Err(err).Str("module", modulePath).Msg("Git validation failed, denying access")
return false, fmt.Errorf("validation error: %w", err)
}
return true, nil
}
func (v *GoValidator) validateGit(ctx context.Context, modulePath, credentials string) (bool, error) {
// Generic git validation for other providers
// Similar to GitHub validation but with generic host detection
repoURL := fmt.Sprintf("https://%s.git", modulePath)
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "git", "ls-remote", repoURL, "HEAD") // #nosec G204 -- git command with validated URL
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0")
output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
errMsg := string(output)
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "could not read Username") ||
strings.Contains(errMsg, "Authentication failed") ||
strings.Contains(errMsg, "not found") {
return false, fmt.Errorf("access denied: %s", strings.TrimSpace(errMsg))
}
log.Warn().Err(err).Str("module", modulePath).Msg("Git validation failed, denying access")
return false, fmt.Errorf("validation error: %w", err)
}
return true, nil
}