mirror of
https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder.git
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e39d6a0f0d
Multi-agent audit + fix pass covering bugs, security, dead config wiring,
and missing features. All quality gates green: build/vet/test -race/govulncheck/
golangci-lint. Frontend tests 47/47.
SECURITY & CORRECTNESS
- Scanner pipeline fail-closed: cache.go scan timeout now 503 (was goto servePkg);
scanner.go all-scanners-fail saves ScanStatusError; CheckVulnerabilities blocks
on missing/error result instead of allowing.
- Scanner argv corrections: govulncheck source-mode + go.mod discovery;
npm-audit generates lockfile via npm install --package-lock-only --ignore-scripts;
pip-audit per-extension dispatch (wheel direct / sdist extract+pyproject).
- GHSA version-range filtering implemented (was always-include); url.QueryEscape
on package name.
- pypi SSRF closed via host allowlist on original_url; url.QueryEscape on
rewriteURL output.
- Path traversal: cache temp file uses os.CreateTemp; smb keyToPath sanitized;
filesystem keyToPath returns error + filepath.Abs prefix-verify.
- Goroutine leaks plugged: cache.cleanupWorker stop channel; auth.ValidationCache
Stop() with sync.Once; ws.unregister buffered with non-blocking send.
- WebSocket double-close panic fixed via sync.Once Client.closeSend().
- Race conditions: gormstore.registryCache sync.RWMutex (was concurrent map
panic); auth.LastUsedAt no longer mutated under RLock; analytics strict
lock-ordering invariant (statsMu before downloadsMu).
- Auth validator fails CLOSED on transport/unknown-status errors (was returning
true,err 'allow cache fallback').
- Credential cache hash full SHA256 (was 8-byte truncate; eliminates 2^32
collision risk).
- filesystem.fs.used incremented after successful rename (no quota inflation
race).
- gormstore aggregation events deleted in same tx as insert (no double-counting).
- gormstore.SavePackage uses Updates(map) so zero-value security flags
(RequiresAuth=false) can be cleared.
- partition_manager validates partition name regex before DROP TABLE.
- vcs/git: version regex validation rejects --option-injection; checkout uses
--detach -- separator; removed TrimPrefix(repo,'v') that corrupted vault/
vitess/vim-go.
- WebSocket CheckOrigin allowlist (was return true; CSWSH closed); same-origin
default + ServerConfig.AllowedOrigins.
- fiber CVE GO-2026-4543 patched (v2.52.10 -> v2.52.12).
FUNCTIONAL FEATURES
- API key DB persistence: APIKeyModel + migration 202604280002, full CRUD,
async LastUsedAt updates with WaitGroup-tracked goroutines drained on Close.
- Admin bootstrap via GOHOARDER_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_KEY env var; idempotent
(skipped when non-revoked admin already exists).
- Auth middleware factory in pkg/app: RequireAuth, RequireRole, RequirePermission,
OptionalAuth. Mounted on proxy + read APIs when Auth.Enabled=true.
DELETE /api/packages/* requires admin role. /health public for k8s probes.
- NFS storage backend: pkg/storage/nfs wraps filesystem with /proc/mounts
detection (Linux), post-write fsync, read-after-write health probe.
- WebSocket real-time pipeline: pkg/events Broadcaster interface; cache + scanner
managers emit EventPackageCached / EventPackageDownloaded / EventScanComplete;
app.go runs 30s EventStatsUpdate ticker. Frontend has full WS client (reconnect
with exponential backoff 1s->30s, 25s heartbeat, subscriber pattern), Pinia
realtime store, Dashboard live indicator + activity feed + reactive stats
override.
- TLS termination: fiber.ListenTLS when Server.TLS.Enabled.
- Pre-warming: Prewarming.Enabled flag wired (was hardcoded false); Interval,
MaxConcurrent, TopPackages plumbed.
- NetworkConfig wired (timeouts, retry, rate-limit, circuit-breaker).
- AuthConfig.BcryptCost wired.
- Security.Scanners.Static.MaxPackageSize plumbed to cache.io.LimitReader.
- Handlers.{Go,NPM,PyPI}.Enabled gates route mounting.
- Graceful shutdown: authManager.Close drains async writes.
LINT/HYGIENE
- 80 golangci-lint issues resolved: errcheck (Close/Write/RemoveAll wrapped),
gofmt, gosec G104/G306, govet shadow renames + fieldalignment reorders,
staticcheck ST1000 pkg comments + QF1003 tagged switches + QF1008 embedded
field selectors + QF1001 De Morgan's law.
BEHAVIOR CHANGES
- Scanner now fail-closed: deployments without scanner binaries
(trivy/govulncheck/npm-audit/pip-audit/grype) BLOCK packages instead of
serving unscanned. Add binaries or plan a future allow-on-scan-error flag.
- WS origin defaults to same-origin; cross-origin dashboards must set
server.allowed_origins.
- Validator no longer fails open; private packages won't serve from cache when
validation can't be performed.
- download_events retention dropped from 24h to ~5min (deleted in agg tx).
Migration 202604280001 purges pre-upgrade events.
- DELETE /api/packages/* requires admin role when auth enabled.
NEW PACKAGES
- pkg/events - Broadcaster interface
- pkg/storage/nfs - NFS-aware filesystem wrapper
DEFERRED (out of scope this pass)
- Static scanner implementation (config defines AllowedLicenses/MaxPackageSize/
BlockSuspicious but pkg/scanner/static/ does not exist).
- AuthConfig.AuditLog wiring (no audit log infra yet).
- CacheConfig.TTLOverrides passthrough (would touch cache.Config beyond
integrator scope).
143 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
143 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"context"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/metadata"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
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)
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func TestBootstrapAdminFromEnv_EnvEmpty_NoOp(t *testing.T) {
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t.Setenv(BootstrapAdminEnvVar, "")
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store := newFakeStore()
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if err := BootstrapAdminFromEnv(context.Background(), store, fastCfg()); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("BootstrapAdminFromEnv: %v", err)
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}
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if got := len(store.keys); got != 0 {
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t.Errorf("store has %d keys, want 0 when env empty", got)
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}
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}
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func TestBootstrapAdminFromEnv_NilStore_NoOp(t *testing.T) {
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t.Setenv(BootstrapAdminEnvVar, "secret")
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if err := BootstrapAdminFromEnv(context.Background(), nil, fastCfg()); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("BootstrapAdminFromEnv(nil store): %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestBootstrapAdminFromEnv_FreshStore_CreatesAdmin(t *testing.T) {
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const raw = "super-secret-bootstrap-key"
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t.Setenv(BootstrapAdminEnvVar, raw)
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store := newFakeStore()
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if err := BootstrapAdminFromEnv(context.Background(), store, fastCfg()); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("BootstrapAdminFromEnv: %v", err)
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}
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if got := len(store.keys); got != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("store has %d keys, want 1", got)
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}
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var created *metadata.APIKey
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for _, k := range store.keys {
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created = k
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break
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}
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if created.Role != storedRoleAdmin {
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t.Errorf("Role = %q, want %q", created.Role, storedRoleAdmin)
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}
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if created.Project != bootstrapProject {
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t.Errorf("Project = %q, want %q", created.Project, bootstrapProject)
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}
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if created.Revoked {
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t.Errorf("Revoked = true, want false")
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}
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if created.ID == "" {
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t.Errorf("ID empty")
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}
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// Hash must verify against the raw env value.
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if err := bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(created.KeyHash), []byte(raw)); err != nil {
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t.Errorf("bcrypt mismatch: %v", err)
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}
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// Hash must NOT equal the raw key (would indicate plaintext storage).
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if created.KeyHash == raw {
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t.Errorf("KeyHash equals raw key — plaintext storage bug")
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}
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}
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func TestBootstrapAdminFromEnv_AdminAlreadyExists_Idempotent(t *testing.T) {
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t.Setenv(BootstrapAdminEnvVar, "another-secret")
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store := newFakeStore()
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// Pre-existing admin.
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_ = store.SaveAPIKey(context.Background(), &metadata.APIKey{
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ID: "existing-admin",
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KeyHash: "$2a$04$dummy",
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Role: storedRoleAdmin,
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Project: "default",
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CreatedAt: time.Now(),
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})
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if err := BootstrapAdminFromEnv(context.Background(), store, fastCfg()); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("BootstrapAdminFromEnv: %v", err)
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}
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if got := len(store.keys); got != 1 {
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t.Errorf("store has %d keys, want 1 (no new admin created)", got)
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}
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if _, ok := store.keys["existing-admin"]; !ok {
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t.Errorf("existing admin was removed/overwritten")
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}
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}
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func TestBootstrapAdminFromEnv_RevokedAdmin_StillCreatesNewOne(t *testing.T) {
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t.Setenv(BootstrapAdminEnvVar, "fresh-secret")
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store := newFakeStore()
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// Revoked admin should NOT count as "admin already exists".
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_ = store.SaveAPIKey(context.Background(), &metadata.APIKey{
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ID: "old-admin",
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KeyHash: "x",
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Role: storedRoleAdmin,
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Project: "bootstrap",
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Revoked: true,
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CreatedAt: time.Now(),
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})
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if err := BootstrapAdminFromEnv(context.Background(), store, fastCfg()); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("BootstrapAdminFromEnv: %v", err)
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}
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if got := len(store.keys); got != 2 {
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t.Errorf("store has %d keys, want 2 (revoked + fresh)", got)
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}
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}
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func TestBootstrapAdminFromEnv_NonAdminKeysIgnored(t *testing.T) {
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t.Setenv(BootstrapAdminEnvVar, "secret-x")
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store := newFakeStore()
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_ = store.SaveAPIKey(context.Background(), &metadata.APIKey{
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ID: "reader",
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KeyHash: "x",
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Role: storedRoleReadOnly,
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Project: "default",
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CreatedAt: time.Now(),
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})
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if err := BootstrapAdminFromEnv(context.Background(), store, fastCfg()); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("BootstrapAdminFromEnv: %v", err)
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}
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if got := len(store.keys); got != 2 {
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t.Errorf("store has %d keys, want 2 (read-only existing + new admin)", got)
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}
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}
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func TestBootstrapAdminFromEnv_StoreNotImplemented_NoOp(t *testing.T) {
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t.Setenv(BootstrapAdminEnvVar, "secret-y")
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store := newFakeStore()
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store.disabled = true
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if err := BootstrapAdminFromEnv(context.Background(), store, fastCfg()); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("BootstrapAdminFromEnv: %v", err)
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}
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}
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