Files
gohoarder/pkg/app/middleware.go
T
lukaszraczylo e39d6a0f0d feat: comprehensive audit + Tier 3 wiring (security/correctness/features)
Multi-agent audit + fix pass covering bugs, security, dead config wiring,
and missing features. All quality gates green: build/vet/test -race/govulncheck/
golangci-lint. Frontend tests 47/47.

SECURITY & CORRECTNESS

- Scanner pipeline fail-closed: cache.go scan timeout now 503 (was goto servePkg);
  scanner.go all-scanners-fail saves ScanStatusError; CheckVulnerabilities blocks
  on missing/error result instead of allowing.
- Scanner argv corrections: govulncheck source-mode + go.mod discovery;
  npm-audit generates lockfile via npm install --package-lock-only --ignore-scripts;
  pip-audit per-extension dispatch (wheel direct / sdist extract+pyproject).
- GHSA version-range filtering implemented (was always-include); url.QueryEscape
  on package name.
- pypi SSRF closed via host allowlist on original_url; url.QueryEscape on
  rewriteURL output.
- Path traversal: cache temp file uses os.CreateTemp; smb keyToPath sanitized;
  filesystem keyToPath returns error + filepath.Abs prefix-verify.
- Goroutine leaks plugged: cache.cleanupWorker stop channel; auth.ValidationCache
  Stop() with sync.Once; ws.unregister buffered with non-blocking send.
- WebSocket double-close panic fixed via sync.Once Client.closeSend().
- Race conditions: gormstore.registryCache sync.RWMutex (was concurrent map
  panic); auth.LastUsedAt no longer mutated under RLock; analytics strict
  lock-ordering invariant (statsMu before downloadsMu).
- Auth validator fails CLOSED on transport/unknown-status errors (was returning
  true,err 'allow cache fallback').
- Credential cache hash full SHA256 (was 8-byte truncate; eliminates 2^32
  collision risk).
- filesystem.fs.used incremented after successful rename (no quota inflation
  race).
- gormstore aggregation events deleted in same tx as insert (no double-counting).
- gormstore.SavePackage uses Updates(map) so zero-value security flags
  (RequiresAuth=false) can be cleared.
- partition_manager validates partition name regex before DROP TABLE.
- vcs/git: version regex validation rejects --option-injection; checkout uses
  --detach -- separator; removed TrimPrefix(repo,'v') that corrupted vault/
  vitess/vim-go.
- WebSocket CheckOrigin allowlist (was return true; CSWSH closed); same-origin
  default + ServerConfig.AllowedOrigins.
- fiber CVE GO-2026-4543 patched (v2.52.10 -> v2.52.12).

FUNCTIONAL FEATURES

- API key DB persistence: APIKeyModel + migration 202604280002, full CRUD,
  async LastUsedAt updates with WaitGroup-tracked goroutines drained on Close.
- Admin bootstrap via GOHOARDER_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_KEY env var; idempotent
  (skipped when non-revoked admin already exists).
- Auth middleware factory in pkg/app: RequireAuth, RequireRole, RequirePermission,
  OptionalAuth. Mounted on proxy + read APIs when Auth.Enabled=true.
  DELETE /api/packages/* requires admin role. /health public for k8s probes.
- NFS storage backend: pkg/storage/nfs wraps filesystem with /proc/mounts
  detection (Linux), post-write fsync, read-after-write health probe.
- WebSocket real-time pipeline: pkg/events Broadcaster interface; cache + scanner
  managers emit EventPackageCached / EventPackageDownloaded / EventScanComplete;
  app.go runs 30s EventStatsUpdate ticker. Frontend has full WS client (reconnect
  with exponential backoff 1s->30s, 25s heartbeat, subscriber pattern), Pinia
  realtime store, Dashboard live indicator + activity feed + reactive stats
  override.
- TLS termination: fiber.ListenTLS when Server.TLS.Enabled.
- Pre-warming: Prewarming.Enabled flag wired (was hardcoded false); Interval,
  MaxConcurrent, TopPackages plumbed.
- NetworkConfig wired (timeouts, retry, rate-limit, circuit-breaker).
- AuthConfig.BcryptCost wired.
- Security.Scanners.Static.MaxPackageSize plumbed to cache.io.LimitReader.
- Handlers.{Go,NPM,PyPI}.Enabled gates route mounting.
- Graceful shutdown: authManager.Close drains async writes.

LINT/HYGIENE

- 80 golangci-lint issues resolved: errcheck (Close/Write/RemoveAll wrapped),
  gofmt, gosec G104/G306, govet shadow renames + fieldalignment reorders,
  staticcheck ST1000 pkg comments + QF1003 tagged switches + QF1008 embedded
  field selectors + QF1001 De Morgan's law.

BEHAVIOR CHANGES

- Scanner now fail-closed: deployments without scanner binaries
  (trivy/govulncheck/npm-audit/pip-audit/grype) BLOCK packages instead of
  serving unscanned. Add binaries or plan a future allow-on-scan-error flag.
- WS origin defaults to same-origin; cross-origin dashboards must set
  server.allowed_origins.
- Validator no longer fails open; private packages won't serve from cache when
  validation can't be performed.
- download_events retention dropped from 24h to ~5min (deleted in agg tx).
  Migration 202604280001 purges pre-upgrade events.
- DELETE /api/packages/* requires admin role when auth enabled.

NEW PACKAGES

- pkg/events  - Broadcaster interface
- pkg/storage/nfs  - NFS-aware filesystem wrapper

DEFERRED (out of scope this pass)

- Static scanner implementation (config defines AllowedLicenses/MaxPackageSize/
  BlockSuspicious but pkg/scanner/static/ does not exist).
- AuthConfig.AuditLog wiring (no audit log infra yet).
- CacheConfig.TTLOverrides passthrough (would touch cache.Config beyond
  integrator scope).
2026-07-10 09:37:55 +01:00

194 lines
6.5 KiB
Go

package app
import (
"strings"
"github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2"
"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/auth"
"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/errors"
"github.com/rs/zerolog/log"
)
// Locals keys used by the auth middleware. Exported so other handlers in the
// app package (and the integrator) can fetch the resolved key/role without
// guessing at string literals.
const (
LocalAuthKey = "auth_key"
LocalAuthRole = "auth_role"
)
// extractAPIKey pulls the raw API key from either the Authorization bearer
// header or the X-API-Key header. Returns ("", false) when neither is set or
// the Authorization header has the wrong shape.
func extractAPIKey(c *fiber.Ctx) (string, bool) {
if h := strings.TrimSpace(c.Get("Authorization")); h != "" {
// Expect: "Bearer <token>". Be tolerant of casing on the scheme.
parts := strings.SplitN(h, " ", 2)
if len(parts) == 2 && strings.EqualFold(parts[0], "bearer") {
token := strings.TrimSpace(parts[1])
if token != "" {
return token, true
}
}
}
if h := strings.TrimSpace(c.Get("X-API-Key")); h != "" {
return h, true
}
return "", false
}
// writeAuthError sends a structured error response matching the project's
// errors envelope (errors.Error JSON shape). Uses the HTTPStatusCode map so
// callers don't need to remember which status maps to which code.
func writeAuthError(c *fiber.Ctx, code, message string) error {
status, ok := errors.HTTPStatusCode[code]
if !ok {
status = fiber.StatusInternalServerError
}
return c.Status(status).JSON(errors.New(code, message))
}
// requestIDFromCtx returns the request ID set by an upstream middleware or
// the X-Request-ID header. Empty string when neither is available — callers
// should treat empty as "no correlation id".
func requestIDFromCtx(c *fiber.Ctx) string {
if v := c.Locals("request_id"); v != nil {
if s, ok := v.(string); ok && s != "" {
return s
}
}
return c.Get("X-Request-ID")
}
// validateAndAttach is the shared core of all auth middlewares: pull the key,
// validate via the manager, and on success store it in Locals. Returns the
// resolved key plus a boolean indicating whether a key was present at all
// (false when no header). The error is non-nil only when validation failed
// (i.e. a key was present but invalid/expired).
func validateAndAttach(c *fiber.Ctx, authMgr *auth.Manager) (key *auth.APIKey, present bool, err error) {
rawKey, ok := extractAPIKey(c)
if !ok {
return nil, false, nil
}
apiKey, err := authMgr.ValidateAPIKey(c.Context(), rawKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, true, err
}
c.Locals(LocalAuthKey, apiKey)
c.Locals(LocalAuthRole, string(apiKey.Role))
return apiKey, true, nil
}
// RequireAuth returns a fiber.Handler that rejects requests without a valid
// API key. On success the resolved *auth.APIKey is stored in c.Locals under
// LocalAuthKey.
func RequireAuth(authMgr *auth.Manager) fiber.Handler {
return func(c *fiber.Ctx) error {
key, present, err := validateAndAttach(c, authMgr)
if !present {
log.Debug().
Str("path", c.Path()).
Str("method", c.Method()).
Str("request_id", requestIDFromCtx(c)).
Msg("auth: missing API key")
return writeAuthError(c, errors.ErrCodeUnauthorized, "missing API key; provide Authorization: Bearer <key> or X-API-Key header")
}
if err != nil {
log.Warn().
Err(err).
Str("path", c.Path()).
Str("method", c.Method()).
Str("request_id", requestIDFromCtx(c)).
Msg("auth: invalid API key")
return writeAuthError(c, errors.ErrCodeInvalidAPIKey, "invalid or expired API key")
}
log.Debug().
Str("key_id", key.ID).
Str("role", string(key.Role)).
Str("request_id", requestIDFromCtx(c)).
Msg("auth: key validated")
return c.Next()
}
}
// RequireRole returns a fiber.Handler that authenticates the caller and then
// requires the resolved key's role to be present in the supplied list (any-of
// semantics). An empty roles list behaves like RequireAuth.
func RequireRole(authMgr *auth.Manager, roles ...string) fiber.Handler {
return func(c *fiber.Ctx) error {
key, present, err := validateAndAttach(c, authMgr)
if !present {
return writeAuthError(c, errors.ErrCodeUnauthorized, "missing API key; provide Authorization: Bearer <key> or X-API-Key header")
}
if err != nil {
return writeAuthError(c, errors.ErrCodeInvalidAPIKey, "invalid or expired API key")
}
if len(roles) == 0 {
return c.Next()
}
actual := string(key.Role)
for _, r := range roles {
if r == actual {
return c.Next()
}
}
log.Warn().
Str("key_id", key.ID).
Str("role", actual).
Strs("required_roles", roles).
Str("request_id", requestIDFromCtx(c)).
Msg("auth: role mismatch")
return writeAuthError(c, errors.ErrCodeForbidden, "insufficient role for this resource")
}
}
// RequirePermission returns a fiber.Handler that authenticates the caller and
// then requires the resolved key to hold at least one of the supplied
// permissions. An empty perms list behaves like RequireAuth.
func RequirePermission(authMgr *auth.Manager, perms ...string) fiber.Handler {
return func(c *fiber.Ctx) error {
key, present, err := validateAndAttach(c, authMgr)
if !present {
return writeAuthError(c, errors.ErrCodeUnauthorized, "missing API key; provide Authorization: Bearer <key> or X-API-Key header")
}
if err != nil {
return writeAuthError(c, errors.ErrCodeInvalidAPIKey, "invalid or expired API key")
}
if len(perms) == 0 {
return c.Next()
}
for _, p := range perms {
if key.HasPermission(auth.Permission(p)) {
return c.Next()
}
}
log.Warn().
Str("key_id", key.ID).
Str("role", string(key.Role)).
Strs("required_perms", perms).
Str("request_id", requestIDFromCtx(c)).
Msg("auth: permission denied")
return writeAuthError(c, errors.ErrCodeForbidden, "insufficient permissions for this resource")
}
}
// OptionalAuth returns a fiber.Handler that attempts to validate any provided
// API key but never rejects the request. Handy for endpoints whose behavior
// changes when the caller is authenticated (e.g. per-key rate limits) but
// which still serve anonymous traffic. Locals are populated on success.
func OptionalAuth(authMgr *auth.Manager) fiber.Handler {
return func(c *fiber.Ctx) error {
_, present, err := validateAndAttach(c, authMgr)
if present && err != nil {
// Key was provided but invalid — log for observability, continue
// anonymously rather than 401-ing.
log.Debug().
Err(err).
Str("path", c.Path()).
Str("request_id", requestIDFromCtx(c)).
Msg("auth: optional auth ignored invalid key")
}
return c.Next()
}
}