Files
gohoarder/pkg/proxy/pypi/pypi_test.go
T
lukaszraczylo e39d6a0f0d feat: comprehensive audit + Tier 3 wiring (security/correctness/features)
Multi-agent audit + fix pass covering bugs, security, dead config wiring,
and missing features. All quality gates green: build/vet/test -race/govulncheck/
golangci-lint. Frontend tests 47/47.

SECURITY & CORRECTNESS

- Scanner pipeline fail-closed: cache.go scan timeout now 503 (was goto servePkg);
  scanner.go all-scanners-fail saves ScanStatusError; CheckVulnerabilities blocks
  on missing/error result instead of allowing.
- Scanner argv corrections: govulncheck source-mode + go.mod discovery;
  npm-audit generates lockfile via npm install --package-lock-only --ignore-scripts;
  pip-audit per-extension dispatch (wheel direct / sdist extract+pyproject).
- GHSA version-range filtering implemented (was always-include); url.QueryEscape
  on package name.
- pypi SSRF closed via host allowlist on original_url; url.QueryEscape on
  rewriteURL output.
- Path traversal: cache temp file uses os.CreateTemp; smb keyToPath sanitized;
  filesystem keyToPath returns error + filepath.Abs prefix-verify.
- Goroutine leaks plugged: cache.cleanupWorker stop channel; auth.ValidationCache
  Stop() with sync.Once; ws.unregister buffered with non-blocking send.
- WebSocket double-close panic fixed via sync.Once Client.closeSend().
- Race conditions: gormstore.registryCache sync.RWMutex (was concurrent map
  panic); auth.LastUsedAt no longer mutated under RLock; analytics strict
  lock-ordering invariant (statsMu before downloadsMu).
- Auth validator fails CLOSED on transport/unknown-status errors (was returning
  true,err 'allow cache fallback').
- Credential cache hash full SHA256 (was 8-byte truncate; eliminates 2^32
  collision risk).
- filesystem.fs.used incremented after successful rename (no quota inflation
  race).
- gormstore aggregation events deleted in same tx as insert (no double-counting).
- gormstore.SavePackage uses Updates(map) so zero-value security flags
  (RequiresAuth=false) can be cleared.
- partition_manager validates partition name regex before DROP TABLE.
- vcs/git: version regex validation rejects --option-injection; checkout uses
  --detach -- separator; removed TrimPrefix(repo,'v') that corrupted vault/
  vitess/vim-go.
- WebSocket CheckOrigin allowlist (was return true; CSWSH closed); same-origin
  default + ServerConfig.AllowedOrigins.
- fiber CVE GO-2026-4543 patched (v2.52.10 -> v2.52.12).

FUNCTIONAL FEATURES

- API key DB persistence: APIKeyModel + migration 202604280002, full CRUD,
  async LastUsedAt updates with WaitGroup-tracked goroutines drained on Close.
- Admin bootstrap via GOHOARDER_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_KEY env var; idempotent
  (skipped when non-revoked admin already exists).
- Auth middleware factory in pkg/app: RequireAuth, RequireRole, RequirePermission,
  OptionalAuth. Mounted on proxy + read APIs when Auth.Enabled=true.
  DELETE /api/packages/* requires admin role. /health public for k8s probes.
- NFS storage backend: pkg/storage/nfs wraps filesystem with /proc/mounts
  detection (Linux), post-write fsync, read-after-write health probe.
- WebSocket real-time pipeline: pkg/events Broadcaster interface; cache + scanner
  managers emit EventPackageCached / EventPackageDownloaded / EventScanComplete;
  app.go runs 30s EventStatsUpdate ticker. Frontend has full WS client (reconnect
  with exponential backoff 1s->30s, 25s heartbeat, subscriber pattern), Pinia
  realtime store, Dashboard live indicator + activity feed + reactive stats
  override.
- TLS termination: fiber.ListenTLS when Server.TLS.Enabled.
- Pre-warming: Prewarming.Enabled flag wired (was hardcoded false); Interval,
  MaxConcurrent, TopPackages plumbed.
- NetworkConfig wired (timeouts, retry, rate-limit, circuit-breaker).
- AuthConfig.BcryptCost wired.
- Security.Scanners.Static.MaxPackageSize plumbed to cache.io.LimitReader.
- Handlers.{Go,NPM,PyPI}.Enabled gates route mounting.
- Graceful shutdown: authManager.Close drains async writes.

LINT/HYGIENE

- 80 golangci-lint issues resolved: errcheck (Close/Write/RemoveAll wrapped),
  gofmt, gosec G104/G306, govet shadow renames + fieldalignment reorders,
  staticcheck ST1000 pkg comments + QF1003 tagged switches + QF1008 embedded
  field selectors + QF1001 De Morgan's law.

BEHAVIOR CHANGES

- Scanner now fail-closed: deployments without scanner binaries
  (trivy/govulncheck/npm-audit/pip-audit/grype) BLOCK packages instead of
  serving unscanned. Add binaries or plan a future allow-on-scan-error flag.
- WS origin defaults to same-origin; cross-origin dashboards must set
  server.allowed_origins.
- Validator no longer fails open; private packages won't serve from cache when
  validation can't be performed.
- download_events retention dropped from 24h to ~5min (deleted in agg tx).
  Migration 202604280001 purges pre-upgrade events.
- DELETE /api/packages/* requires admin role when auth enabled.

NEW PACKAGES

- pkg/events  - Broadcaster interface
- pkg/storage/nfs  - NFS-aware filesystem wrapper

DEFERRED (out of scope this pass)

- Static scanner implementation (config defines AllowedLicenses/MaxPackageSize/
  BlockSuspicious but pkg/scanner/static/ does not exist).
- AuthConfig.AuditLog wiring (no audit log infra yet).
- CacheConfig.TTLOverrides passthrough (would touch cache.Config beyond
  integrator scope).
2026-07-10 09:37:55 +01:00

140 lines
4.7 KiB
Go

package pypi
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"testing"
"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/auth"
)
func TestIsAllowedPyPIHost(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
host string
allowed []string
want bool
}{
{"pypi.org allowed", "pypi.org", defaultAllowedPyPIHosts, true},
{"files.pythonhosted.org allowed", "files.pythonhosted.org", defaultAllowedPyPIHosts, true},
{"subdomain of pythonhosted.org allowed", "cdn.pythonhosted.org", defaultAllowedPyPIHosts, true},
{"case insensitive", "PyPI.ORG", defaultAllowedPyPIHosts, true},
{"with port", "pypi.org:443", defaultAllowedPyPIHosts, true},
{"AWS metadata blocked", "169.254.169.254", defaultAllowedPyPIHosts, false},
{"GCP metadata blocked", "metadata.google.internal", defaultAllowedPyPIHosts, false},
{"localhost blocked", "localhost", defaultAllowedPyPIHosts, false},
{"loopback blocked", "127.0.0.1", defaultAllowedPyPIHosts, false},
{"private RFC1918 blocked", "10.0.0.1", defaultAllowedPyPIHosts, false},
{"attacker domain blocked", "evil.example.com", defaultAllowedPyPIHosts, false},
{"empty host blocked", "", defaultAllowedPyPIHosts, false},
{"trailing-substring attack blocked", "evilpythonhosted.org", defaultAllowedPyPIHosts, false},
{"prefix attack blocked", "pypi.org.evil.com", defaultAllowedPyPIHosts, false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := isAllowedPyPIHost(tt.host, tt.allowed)
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("isAllowedPyPIHost(%q) = %v, want %v", tt.host, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
// newHandlerForSSRFTest builds a Handler with only the fields needed to reach
// the SSRF guard. cache is nil intentionally — the guard rejects before any
// cache call.
func newHandlerForSSRFTest() *Handler {
return &Handler{
credExtractor: auth.NewCredentialExtractor(),
credHasher: auth.NewCredentialHasher(),
upstream: "https://pypi.org/simple",
allowedHosts: defaultAllowedPyPIHosts,
}
}
func TestHandlePackageFile_SSRFRejected(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
originalURL string
}{
{"AWS metadata IP", "http://169.254.169.254/"},
{"GCP metadata host", "http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/"},
{"localhost", "http://localhost:8080/secret"},
{"private network", "http://10.0.0.5/"},
{"file scheme", "file:///etc/passwd"},
{"gopher scheme", "gopher://internal/"},
{"unrelated public host", "https://evil.example.com/payload.whl"},
}
h := newHandlerForSSRFTest()
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
path := "/example/example-1.0.0.whl"
q := url.Values{}
q.Set("original_url", tt.originalURL)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, path+"?"+q.Encode(), nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.handlePackageFile(req.Context(), w, req, path)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("expected 400 for SSRF target %q, got %d (body=%q)", tt.originalURL, w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
})
}
}
func TestHandlePackageFile_AllowedHostNotRejected(t *testing.T) {
// Sanity check: an allowlisted host should NOT be rejected at the SSRF
// guard. We don't have a real cache so the call will fail later with a
// non-400 status — that's fine, we only assert the SSRF guard didn't
// fire.
h := newHandlerForSSRFTest()
path := "/example/example-1.0.0.whl"
q := url.Values{}
q.Set("original_url", "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/abc/example-1.0.0.whl")
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, path+"?"+q.Encode(), nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
defer func() {
// nil cache will panic when reached — recover and treat as "guard
// did not block", which is the property we care about.
_ = recover()
}()
h.handlePackageFile(req.Context(), w, req, path)
if w.Code == http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("allowlisted host wrongly rejected with 400: %s", w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestRewritePackagePageURLs_QueryEscape(t *testing.T) {
// Original URL contains characters that strings.ReplaceAll(&,=) would miss:
// '?', '#', '+'. Verify url.QueryEscape handles them.
html := `<a href="https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/x/y+z/foo-1.0.whl?token=abc#frag">link</a>`
out := rewritePackagePageURLs(html, "foo", "http://proxy/pypi")
// '+' must be encoded (otherwise PyPI would interpret as space)
if !contains(out, "original_url=https%3A%2F%2Ffiles.pythonhosted.org%2Fpackages%2Fx%2Fy%2Bz%2Ffoo-1.0.whl%3Ftoken%3Dabc%23frag") {
t.Errorf("expected fully URL-encoded original_url, got: %s", out)
}
}
func contains(s, sub string) bool {
return len(s) >= len(sub) && (indexOf(s, sub) >= 0)
}
func indexOf(s, sub string) int {
for i := 0; i+len(sub) <= len(s); i++ {
if s[i:i+len(sub)] == sub {
return i
}
}
return -1
}